The Eternal Recurrence and the Problem of the Overman (Paper)

The Eternal Recurrence and the Problem of the Overman

Of the multiple ideas presented in Friedrich Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the two most intellectually stimulating and encompassing pieces contained therein are the philosophical idea of the Übermensch, hereafter referred to as the Overman, and the Eternal Recurrence. In the following essay the reader will find a thorough analysis of these two themes as well as a comparison of their faults, philosophically, in relation to each other.

The first central idea in Nietzsche's work is presented in the First Part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. According to Zarathustra the Overman is the next evolution in mankind [Nietzsche, p. 13]. Nietzsche presents Zarathustra to the readers as the archetype of the Overman. In the First Part Nietzsche presents Zarathustra with all the accoutrements that would accompany an Overman: intellectual prowess, oratory skills, love of mankind, reclusiveness. The Overman, being characterized by such skills and behaviors, is a level of humanity that has superseded the ability of regular humans, but also desires to raise the rest of humanity up to the level of Overman. In order for the regular man to become an Overman there is the task of BECOMING. Zarathustra describes man as,”...a rope stretched between the animal and the Overman – a rope over an abyss [Nietzsche, p. 14].” Zarathustra says that what has made man untenable is,”...not your sin – it is your self-satisfaction... [Nietzsche, p. 14].” In the later part of this essay the reader will see the difficulty of reconciling the becoming required to achieve the status of Overman with the Eternal Recurrence.

The second major idea presented through the mouth of Zarathustra is the idea of the Eternal Recurrence. In the Third Part, Zarathustra presents an idea that all things that now live have lived already and are doomed to live again [Nietzsche, pp. 105-108]. In the theme of eternal recurrence, Zarathustra contemplates a gateway to which he has walked along a path. He stops at the gateway and asks questions of a dwarf there,” This long lane backwards: it continueth for an eternity. And that long lane forward – that is another eternity” [Nietzsche, p. 106]. To this the dwarf replies, “All truth is crooked; time itself is a circle” [Nietzsche, p. 107]. The idea here being that what has happened is destined to happen again and again an innumerable amount of times. For Zarathustra to stand at this gateway he must have already stood at the gateway and will always stand at the gateway in the future. Nietzsche's conception of the Eternal Recurrence is a romantic idea that is fraught with problems, not just in regard to the Overman but in regard to reason.

The problems that are presented with the Overman include: the ability to transform oneself into something that one does not know about, how to gain something that one does not have the capacity to understand, and to what extent the Overman represents a better humanity than humanity now.

In order for a human to transform, evolve, or otherwise change into something else, that person must understand either what it is they are changing into, how they are changing, or that they are changing. Changing, or becoming, does not necessarily imply an understanding of the end result of this change but would require some limited understanding of the change. If a person is expected to change then there must be a will to change for that change to take effect. Zarathustra acts as the catalyst for this change but does not offer a full explanation of the benefits that this change would provide for humanity with.

The Eternal Recurrence is even more problematic than the Overman. The primary problem that arises from the Eternal Recurrence is the idea of free will. Free will is necessary for humanity to decide what decisions to make and these decisions enable the individual to construct a sense of self, a sense of individuality, a sense of purpose. This is taken away by Eternal Recurrence. If a person has already done something before and is always destined to repeat it then it absolves humans of the responsibility of their actions because, in essence, these are already predetermined actions. Some may counter that if one does not know of Eternal Recurrence then their actions and decisions would retain their value to that individual. While that individual might still see their actions as having purpose that would be a misconception on the part of the individual. The decisions that the person would make would have already been made the same way with the same deliberations an infinite number of times and would continue to be made in the same fashion for eternity.

Once free will has been excerpted from the equation and humans are no longer the motivator of themselves, what remains to be answered is: Who or what is that motivator? In his debasing of christian morality, it is the belief of the essayist that Nietzsche would object vehemently to the view of an omnipotent unmoving mover. If it is not some demagogic entity that controls the actions of the world then it would be some wispy metaphysical term that would, at the same time, allow control of the universe and yet be 'non-living'. This is untenable.

To compound the problem one must also inspect the individuality of humans. In a cyclical time scheme the same people would recur doing the same actions, at the same places, with the same thoughts. If this were the case then one must pose the question; In each new cycle is the individual a new individual doing the same things or is it the same self doing the same things? In both cases there are inconsistencies. If one becomes another, different, identical self then you would have created the same person at a different time, in a different cycle, thereby creating a person that looks, thinks, and acts the same but is separated by time from his former selfs. This would make him a 'different' self which would nullify the Eternal Recurrence by putting a different person at different points in time instead of the same person. If one were to retain their individuality and were to remain the same self throughout the different cycles of time then one must account for the loss of memory between different cycles. If in each new cycle the individual is the exact same individual then that same individual should retain the memories from each previous cycle. If those memories are not retained then it is a new person in each new cycle. They would be connected to each other only because each new biological entity is doomed to repeat the same actions as the last. There would not be any metaphysical link that would tie these individuals together into one self.

The final problem with the Eternal Recurrence lies in its beginning. For something to recur it must first occur. Much in the same way that in order to draw a circle with a pencil one must first set the pencil to paper. Once completed, this written circle will recur indefinitely in a cyclical fashion. The same logic can apply to the Eternal Recurrence. There must be a linear starting point to a cyclical view of time. Once that linear starting point is established the recurrence will continue indefinitely. But for everything to occur in an eternity backwards and an eternity forwards there can be no starting point. Everything must be as it has been and will be.

These fallacies with the Overman and the Eternal Recurrence come together in the form of free will. If free will is negated by the Eternal Recurrence, how should the regular man will himself to become the Overman? The choice to become an Overman is based on a time-line that is purely linear. Attempting to reconcile this to the cyclical time-line of the Eternal Recurrence is almost impossible. If becoming an Overman requires free will and the Eternal Recurrence suppresses free will to the point of non-existence, then one, the other, or both, must be false

The two theories of the Overman and the Eternal recurrence are not compatible. The Overman, the next logical evolutionary step for humans, and the Eternal Recurrence are logical entities in their own right but when added together they turn what were two logical arguments into two mutually exclusive arguments.

Bibliography

Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, and Thomas Common. Thus spoke Zarathustra. 3 ed. New York: Modern Library, 1917. Electronic Copy.