Platonic Forms, Time, and Narrativity (Paper)

Platonic Forms, Time, and Narrativity

The following paper will argue that the act of unchanging being through time is incompatible with Plato's epistemological view of humans. The argument will be preceded with a brief introduction of three core ideas: Time, Platonic Ethics, Narrativity. As Plato argues in the Euthyphro, the idea of piety must be unchanging and constant in order for the idea of piety to carry any weight. If the idea of piety must remain the same regardless of time in order for it to be 'Piety' and therefore carry metaphysical weight, humans must be able to understand piety in its fullness, which is to say that humans must be in a state of Being in order to fully understand Piety^ª.

Time is a series of interlocking moments as realized through the human(s) perception. In Heraclitus' work, with which it seems that Plato would tend to agree^*, he presents an understanding of time in which you have four basic premises: 1) That ‘X equals X’ at T¹, meaning that X exists at a moment in time, hence being. 2) That time is infinitely divisible. 3) That, because time is infinitely divisible, you can have no ‘moments in time’ because for everything that you label a moment you will be able to further divide that moment. 4) That because you cannot have any moments in time at no time can ‘X equal X’ which results in a world not of being but in a world of becoming. While this is logically correct in the sense that all the premises accurately reflect a logical conclusion we are concerned with presenting the accuracy of these premises in the first. Heraclitus uses the metaphor of a river to explain his ideas about the constant flux of the world and the constant change that takes place. Plato notes that according to Heraclitus, it is impossible to step into the same river twice. By this he means that the river is constantly changing and that the person entering the river would never be able to step into the same water twice, for this water would have been removed down river and replaced by new water. In order for this to be possible he stands in support of an ever changing world with no definable moments in time. This ever-changing phenomenon is not without faults, among them assumptions that time takes place regardless of humans and disregarding the fact that time and its divisibility is contingent upon the constructs usefulness to humans.

In order for this ever-changing world to be rational it must be exhibited by physical matter held in a vacuum otherwise this pretense does not hold up well in the physical world. We shall start with the first premise. ‘X equals X’. This premise may come across as straightforward but must be explained here for it has implications on the rest of the argument. The statement of ‘X equals X’ is a statement of Being while ‘X does not equal X’ stands to mean that the item is nonexistent. Unlike statements of Becoming, Being implies that at a specified time, T¹, a physical item actually existed whether in a physical or metaphysical form. This is juxtaposed to a statement such as Heraclitus' that we live in an ever-changing world. His world view is a clear statement in favor of Becoming in which we take a relative existence dependent upon what is exerting power upon us and the setting that we find ourselves in. According to Heraclitus, at all times then we are simply Becoming with no moment of Being.

In collusion with relativity goes dependence. Time, in order to exist, is dependent on people. Because of this time is something that is created, by humans, in order to give shape and meaning to the world around us. In the absence of humans, time does not exist. As previously stated, time is imposed by humans on a situation either while it is happening or after it has happened, and occasionally both. We require time’s dependence upon ourselves in order to construct a world in which to live with relative ease and it is for this reason that moments in time exist. This usefulness of time, in planning events, remembering actions, and keeping schedules is the reason for its existence, not some ethereal notion. Time is because we say it is. Because we create time it is of the utmost usefulness to ourselves that we also enable us to note moments in time. These moments are also relative to those viewing them. A scientist may measure things in nanoseconds for his work but an hourly worker will measure theirs in minutes. Moments, as part of a time that we create, are created for their usefulness to us. The impact of time on Platonic Ethics, particular the acquirement of knowledge of the Forms, is massive as will be shown below. The view of time that is held by Plato, via Heraclitus, is incompatible with the epistemological system which Plato describes. Before an examination of these problems the reader will find a detailed description of The Theory of the Forms and Narrativity.

Platonic Ethics is having and holding ethical virtue and knowledge over a continuous time frame with the intent on becoming more knowledgeable over time as displayed in The Republic Book V-VI. The basic principle upon which The Theory of the Forms is based is participation, particularly participation in the the Forms themselves. The Forms are metaphysical traits that exist separately from humans but are present in the world through different objects' participation in them. For instance, a person is tall because they participate in the form of Tallness. In a more basic understanding, anything that can be denoted as a adjective, whether it is a color, size, or description of any kind, is a reflection of that things participation in said forms. In addition to these forms is an overarching Form of The Good, under which all forms fall. A trait of all forms are that they are forms of good. The way in which humans understand the various objects around them and, in some sense, their own being itself, is through their understanding of forms. These forms are discoverable through dialectic discussions with other intelligent beings. This dialectical discussion introduces problems for the Theory of the Forms.

If Forms, and therefore knowledge, are discoverable through discussion then these discussions must take place between two people during a specified period of time. This time that is spent in discussion must, by necessity, take place in a world of Becoming. The reason behind this necessity is simple. If neither individual has any prior knowledge of the form they are attempting to find, such as Piety, then the individuals must be changing as they attempt to reason a definition for Piety. This dialectics will be labeled R. The time that they spend reasoning will be labeled S^†. The moment when they discover the true definition of the form of Piety will be labeled D. Now during the period of R both participants are using knowledge that they already have. This knowledge constitutes part of their Being. During S the participants are therefore to be considered in a state of Being. The problem arises that once they discover the true definition of Piety and therefore have the Form of Piety they can no longer be the same selves. Upon realizing D the participants have either: A- passed into a state of becoming during which they learn the Form of Piety and then revert into a state of Being after having learned this or B- passed from one state of Being into a new state of Being without having a state of Becoming. Through the first way of thinking the participants have retained narrativity and see themselves as the same Beings that did not have D previously but now have D. In the second way of interpretation the participants must reject narrativity in favor of Being different people, one person when they did not know D and a different person now that they know D.

One of the most important ideas contained in The Theory of the Forms is the idea that once a person has begun to understand forms as forms themselves they are ethically required to help other beings, through dialectics, to understand these forms. Now if dialectics is the only way to discover forms and forms are what allow us to understand the intelligible things around us, it stands to reason that through dialectics all knowledge has the ability to follow.

Narrativity is the act of being the same 'self' through a continuous time frame. This is to say that a being with Narrative identity sees their body and mind as existing as the same entities at different moments in time. At T¹ X is X. At T² X is X. At T³ X is X and so on. One who constructs their identity of self through a narrative time line is the same being as they were last year, 10 years ago, etc. The opposite of a narrative construction of self is a non-narrative construct. In non-narrative constructions of the self the individual sees themselves as fundamentally different people at different times. For example at T¹ the person is X, at T² the person identifies as Y and at T³ the person identifies as Z. In each of these cases the person does not necessarily identify with their previous selves because their new self is not a narrative begun in the last self. So while a person with a narrative construction of self lives in a state of Becoming the non-narrative person lives in a state of Being. The narrative person is in a state of becoming because they are constructing different ideas of themselves at different points in time while still maintaining that they are the same person. The impact of this view is tied closely to time and change over time as will be seen below.

If we are not the same person over time then it is impossible for us to understand any unchanging idea while in a state of Becoming. Being held in a state of constant Becoming means that our bodies and ideas are subject to change at random. However, this change would subject Piety, or any other Form for that matter, to the corruption of change. Because of this the person would have to reject a narrative life in exchange for a life of pure moments. In these moments that individual would be in a state of Being rather than in a state of Becoming. This state of being would mean that they are a whole, unchanging individual at that point in time. However, this view would mean that any individual would only have so much time in which to utilize a particular form because once they were able to move to the next point along their narrative they would in effect become a different self. While becoming this different self does not necessarily mean that they would no longer understand the form of X, they would, of necessity understand it in a different way and therefore incompletely. This different way of understanding would corrupt the original understanding of any particular form. For example, X understands the form of Piety at T¹. The duration of X understanding Piety is dependent on the duration of T¹ due to his state of being being connected to T¹ in the same fashion. X is only in a state of Being for the duration of T¹ and then becomes Y at T². Once T² is reached Y now understands Piety at a different moment in time as a different Being enclosed in a state of Being that will also only last until the end of T². When T² becomes T³ then Y, who was once X, is now Z. This is the crux of the problem. While the Forms themselves do not change the human understanding of them, by necessity, must change. There are only a few ways in which humans have the ability to understand a form in its entirety. We must either remain in a constant state of Being or our understanding of the forms is not impacted by the way we change. As one will see in the following there are problems with both of these hypotheses.

The first hypothesis to overcome is that we exist in a constant state of Being. There are some very fundamental problems with remaining in a state of constant Being. The first problem one could typically expect to face is that of change. If one is in a state of constant Being then how do they change, either physically or mentally? Any person would be stuck in this state without motion, thought [because it requires motion to think], or change of any kind. Living in this state would be equivalent to non-existence. One would not be able to feel, think, grow, age, die. One would not have a will either, because of the need to think in order to will. So while one would be a physical being they would stand as a statue in a vacuum, neither feeling nor knowing.

The other possibility is that our understanding of the forms does not change in relation to our state of Being. This however is wrong. It is through our change in Being that we learn, either from a state of Being to a new State of Being or remaining in a constant state of Becoming. Remaining in a constant state of becoming will make our understanding of any Form relative to our state of being and the time at which we are in these states of being. However, if one was to adopt a truly non-narrative view of their self identity then they would still be faced with the problem of the statue as mentioned above.

In essence the reason why Plato's epistemological view of humans and the Forms that they strive for is incompatible with the actualities that he presents about the Forms is that humans, by necessity must construct themselves as narrative beings. This places the human in question in a state of constant Becoming. While in this state of Becoming the individual would not be able to comprehend the full truth of the Forms. This is due to the fact that their perception of the Forms changes depending on their current state of Becoming in much the same way that a person cannot step into the same river twice with the Form being the river one originally steps into. Therefore the only way to understand forms would be to exist solely in a state of Being like the Forms themselves do. However, as stated above, this is not possible for the Human to do and still retain their 'humanity'. The solution here would be to view time as a human construct that can be changed via thought. By this it is meant that people are able to conceptualize time into units that are most useful to them.^˜ By being able to conceptualize the self as a narrative Becoming construct that also has episodic bouts of pure Being would make it possible to understand Plato's Forms in their fullness without the problem of becoming statue-like. It would allow the individual to engage in moments of Being while still reverting to a narrativity of becoming when necessary.

Bibliography

Published Work

Hutchins, Robert Maynard. "Plato." In Great books of the Western World. [Private library] ed. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1987. Books 1-7.

Strawson, Galen. "Against Narrativity."Ratio XVII, no. 4 (2004): 428-452.

Unpublished Work

Eames, Jeremy. .”Biomedical Platonic Ethics”. Unpublished manuscript, University of South Florida (2012)

Eames, Jeremy. . “Heraclitian Time”. Unpublished manuscript, University of South Florida (2011)

ªHere piety is used as a stand in for every form. Whether Justice, Love, Tallness, etc.

*Fragment 41; Quoted by Plato in Cratylus . The further breakdown on time and becoming is attributed to Heraclitus and is understood that Plato agrees with Heraclitus and his world of becoming.

†It is labeled S so as to not confuse it with other designations for time in different scenarios presented in this paper.

˜The truthfulness of this is a matter best left for further debate.

The Eternal Recurrence and the Problem of the Overman (Paper)

The Eternal Recurrence and the Problem of the Overman

Of the multiple ideas presented in Friedrich Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the two most intellectually stimulating and encompassing pieces contained therein are the philosophical idea of the Übermensch, hereafter referred to as the Overman, and the Eternal Recurrence. In the following essay the reader will find a thorough analysis of these two themes as well as a comparison of their faults, philosophically, in relation to each other.

The first central idea in Nietzsche's work is presented in the First Part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. According to Zarathustra the Overman is the next evolution in mankind [Nietzsche, p. 13]. Nietzsche presents Zarathustra to the readers as the archetype of the Overman. In the First Part Nietzsche presents Zarathustra with all the accoutrements that would accompany an Overman: intellectual prowess, oratory skills, love of mankind, reclusiveness. The Overman, being characterized by such skills and behaviors, is a level of humanity that has superseded the ability of regular humans, but also desires to raise the rest of humanity up to the level of Overman. In order for the regular man to become an Overman there is the task of BECOMING. Zarathustra describes man as,”...a rope stretched between the animal and the Overman – a rope over an abyss [Nietzsche, p. 14].” Zarathustra says that what has made man untenable is,”...not your sin – it is your self-satisfaction... [Nietzsche, p. 14].” In the later part of this essay the reader will see the difficulty of reconciling the becoming required to achieve the status of Overman with the Eternal Recurrence.

The second major idea presented through the mouth of Zarathustra is the idea of the Eternal Recurrence. In the Third Part, Zarathustra presents an idea that all things that now live have lived already and are doomed to live again [Nietzsche, pp. 105-108]. In the theme of eternal recurrence, Zarathustra contemplates a gateway to which he has walked along a path. He stops at the gateway and asks questions of a dwarf there,” This long lane backwards: it continueth for an eternity. And that long lane forward – that is another eternity” [Nietzsche, p. 106]. To this the dwarf replies, “All truth is crooked; time itself is a circle” [Nietzsche, p. 107]. The idea here being that what has happened is destined to happen again and again an innumerable amount of times. For Zarathustra to stand at this gateway he must have already stood at the gateway and will always stand at the gateway in the future. Nietzsche's conception of the Eternal Recurrence is a romantic idea that is fraught with problems, not just in regard to the Overman but in regard to reason.

The problems that are presented with the Overman include: the ability to transform oneself into something that one does not know about, how to gain something that one does not have the capacity to understand, and to what extent the Overman represents a better humanity than humanity now.

In order for a human to transform, evolve, or otherwise change into something else, that person must understand either what it is they are changing into, how they are changing, or that they are changing. Changing, or becoming, does not necessarily imply an understanding of the end result of this change but would require some limited understanding of the change. If a person is expected to change then there must be a will to change for that change to take effect. Zarathustra acts as the catalyst for this change but does not offer a full explanation of the benefits that this change would provide for humanity with.

The Eternal Recurrence is even more problematic than the Overman. The primary problem that arises from the Eternal Recurrence is the idea of free will. Free will is necessary for humanity to decide what decisions to make and these decisions enable the individual to construct a sense of self, a sense of individuality, a sense of purpose. This is taken away by Eternal Recurrence. If a person has already done something before and is always destined to repeat it then it absolves humans of the responsibility of their actions because, in essence, these are already predetermined actions. Some may counter that if one does not know of Eternal Recurrence then their actions and decisions would retain their value to that individual. While that individual might still see their actions as having purpose that would be a misconception on the part of the individual. The decisions that the person would make would have already been made the same way with the same deliberations an infinite number of times and would continue to be made in the same fashion for eternity.

Once free will has been excerpted from the equation and humans are no longer the motivator of themselves, what remains to be answered is: Who or what is that motivator? In his debasing of christian morality, it is the belief of the essayist that Nietzsche would object vehemently to the view of an omnipotent unmoving mover. If it is not some demagogic entity that controls the actions of the world then it would be some wispy metaphysical term that would, at the same time, allow control of the universe and yet be 'non-living'. This is untenable.

To compound the problem one must also inspect the individuality of humans. In a cyclical time scheme the same people would recur doing the same actions, at the same places, with the same thoughts. If this were the case then one must pose the question; In each new cycle is the individual a new individual doing the same things or is it the same self doing the same things? In both cases there are inconsistencies. If one becomes another, different, identical self then you would have created the same person at a different time, in a different cycle, thereby creating a person that looks, thinks, and acts the same but is separated by time from his former selfs. This would make him a 'different' self which would nullify the Eternal Recurrence by putting a different person at different points in time instead of the same person. If one were to retain their individuality and were to remain the same self throughout the different cycles of time then one must account for the loss of memory between different cycles. If in each new cycle the individual is the exact same individual then that same individual should retain the memories from each previous cycle. If those memories are not retained then it is a new person in each new cycle. They would be connected to each other only because each new biological entity is doomed to repeat the same actions as the last. There would not be any metaphysical link that would tie these individuals together into one self.

The final problem with the Eternal Recurrence lies in its beginning. For something to recur it must first occur. Much in the same way that in order to draw a circle with a pencil one must first set the pencil to paper. Once completed, this written circle will recur indefinitely in a cyclical fashion. The same logic can apply to the Eternal Recurrence. There must be a linear starting point to a cyclical view of time. Once that linear starting point is established the recurrence will continue indefinitely. But for everything to occur in an eternity backwards and an eternity forwards there can be no starting point. Everything must be as it has been and will be.

These fallacies with the Overman and the Eternal Recurrence come together in the form of free will. If free will is negated by the Eternal Recurrence, how should the regular man will himself to become the Overman? The choice to become an Overman is based on a time-line that is purely linear. Attempting to reconcile this to the cyclical time-line of the Eternal Recurrence is almost impossible. If becoming an Overman requires free will and the Eternal Recurrence suppresses free will to the point of non-existence, then one, the other, or both, must be false

The two theories of the Overman and the Eternal recurrence are not compatible. The Overman, the next logical evolutionary step for humans, and the Eternal Recurrence are logical entities in their own right but when added together they turn what were two logical arguments into two mutually exclusive arguments.

Bibliography

Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, and Thomas Common. Thus spoke Zarathustra. 3 ed. New York: Modern Library, 1917. Electronic Copy.

Platonic Biomedical Ethics (Paper)

The following paper was written for a Bio-medical ethics class at the University of South Florida under the guidance of Mr. Nathan Draluck. May it be informative to you. Enjoy.

Platonic philosophy provides a way for doctors and patients to operate on the same intellectual plane by providing a stable and apparent ethical system based on the 'form' of good and the derivatives of good actions. The doctor and patient will be shown to rationally be of the same biological entity. The differences between doctor and patient are merely physical and the ability is real for all patients to be doctors. Because of an overpoweringly strong current in the biomedical community, dualism^# has become smothered and doctors have become intensely concerned with biological treatment, even when it is harmful to intellectual activity. Due to this lack of understanding on the part of doctors they have effectively relegated the patient to a subjugated role in lieu of affording them any large autonomy.

This paper will focus predominately on the relationship between doctors and their patients through the prism of Platonic Ethics. Furthermore, the paper will show that when considered in a rational way, Platonic Ethics provides an approach that is both safe for the doctor and engaging for the patient.

The reader will find three imitative case studies in which will be found a clear argument for the use of platonic ideals in treating a patient. Case one will expound on The Theory of the Forms and attempt to explain the actual differences between the patient and the doctor. While this may seem clear on the surface, the true difference, I believe, is actually nonexistent. In the second case we will examine the dualistic nature of Platonism and how this is translated, or not, into biomedical ethics. In the final case we will examine the autonomy of both parties involved in medical decision making, the patient and the doctor, and attempt to discover how autonomous each party actually is by defining autonomy in a platonic sense.^*

The Platonic theory of the forms is a rationally sound argument for the understanding of things around us. In order to give the reader a basic understanding of the arguments that follow it is necessary to provision the reader with the basics of Platonism. The chief metaphysical quality for Plato is The Theory of the Forms.^¤ The following will explain in detail the fundamentals of Platonic philosophy which will then be expounded upon later.

The basic principle upon which The Theory of the Forms is based is participation, particularly participation in the the Forms themselves. The Forms are metaphysical traits that exist separately from humans but are present in the world through different objects participation in them. For instance, a person is tall because they participate in the form of Tallness. In a more basic understanding, anything that can be denoted as a adjective, whether it is a color, size, or description of any kind, is a reflection of that things participation in said forms. In addition to these forms is an overarching Form of The Good, under which all forms fall. A trait of all forms are that they are forms of good. The way in which humans understand the various objects around them and, in some sense, their own being itself, is through their understanding of forms. These forms are discoverable through dialectic discussions with other intelligent beings.

One of the most important ideas contained in The Theory of the Forms is the idea that once a person has begun to understand forms as forms themselves they are ethically required to help other beings, through dialectics, to understand these forms. Now if dialectics is the only way to discover forms and forms are what allow us to understand the intelligible things around us, it stands to reason that through dialectics all knowledge has the ability to follow. While these may seem like rather arcane ideas when presented in short, it is strongly suggested that the reader view the complete Platonic works for themselves.

This brief overview has the ability to directly improve the doctor-patient relationship through several means. If we understand that doctors have a larger degree of understanding than their patients then we must also concede that because of this the doctors have a larger responsibility to impart this knowledge to their patients. The doctor must be willing to impart information, through dialectics, to the patient to increase the patients understanding of any medical conditions, preconditions, possible and probable outcomes from procedures, etc. A failure to do this on the doctors part would result in actions that would not be in accordance with Platonic Metaphysics and therefore would not fall under the form of The Good but would rather be a privation of good.^* While the doctor would have the ethical obligation to inform the patient of knowledge in which the patient was lacking, it is also the responsibility of the patient, in pursuit of knowledge, to attempt to discover, through dialectics, as much knowledge as possible. In doing so, medical knowledge would naturally be incorporated into this knowledge. From these interactions one may gather that through the form of the Good anything that transpires between a patient and doctor will be for the benefit of both parties as long as both parties willingly engage in Good, Selfless acts in accordance with Platonic Metaphysics.

Following this, one must make the argument that in these situations the parties involved have an overt obligation to do certain things. In order to arrive at this point the reader must first realize the following: that both the doctor and the patient are human beings who are capable of knowledge. If this supposition holds true then we can infer that there are obligation that each party must meet. The doctor has an obligation to search for knowledge in the same manner as the patient has an obligation to search for knowledge. With this primary obligation the reader can draw, among others, two distinct conclusions: That the patient should take into account the doctors suggestions for treatment only if they are unwilling to complete their own studies on the subject matter and, if this is the case, paternalism is to be considered opted into at this point in time. In cases in which the patient is unwilling, while possessing the ability to, attain the same knowledge as the doctor they have themselves mandated that their relation with their doctors will be a paternalistic one. While paternalism carries a heavily weighted connotation of loss of power, or immediate and unwarranted deference, it carries the heavier connotation of the inability to use dialectics. Therefore, paternalism should not be viewed as inherently negative but rather negative due to its association with non-dialectics.

Drawing upon The Theory of the Forms as outlined above, the reader shall find a discussion of Platonic Dualism, and how this is translated, or not, into biomedical ethics, in the anteceding argument. The first necessity in order to do this is a more thorough understanding of Platonic Dualism itself. Like most dualistic philosophies Platonic Dualism is a dualism of the mind an the body in which the mind is always superior to the body. In Platonic Dualism the terms for mind are many and varied but this paper will use only two interchangeably: mind and soul. Upon the death of the body the soul/mind are loosed to live among the forms and the forms are the highest ecstasy the mind can have both while contained in a body and upon the souls release from said body. Of paramount importance in this dualism is the idea that one should not deliberately kill ones body in order to release ones souls. To do so is an act of both desperation and an act demonstrating the pinnacle of a privation of good. While suicide is not acceptable in Platonic Dualism the body should always be treated in an inferior manner while the mind should be treated in a superior fashion. The reasoning behind this is that it is through our minds that we control our bodies therefore making our bodies a tool for our minds.

The dualism presented above has a very real connection with contemporary medicine. While this type of dualism is still extremely relative in contemporary society, many doctors focus their attention solely on the bodily ailments of their patients even when it can be detrimental to the patients mental health. The focal point of modern medicine is to prevent the death of the body through natural causes and this death is viewed as the ultimate item to beat. However when viewed realistically through a Platonic prism the death of the body can actually be a good act because it frees the mind from the constraints of the body. This is not to say that it is not worthwhile to treat the body, for it is worthwhile but only to the extent that it helps the mind. Put another way, the mind should be the focal point of medical procedures, while the body should only be treated in a fashion that neither hinders the mind nor makes the mind powerless. The example we can use to illustrate this is hypothetical in nature but revealing none the less.

A patient who has experienced some worldly calamity is in a coma and there is evidence that the brain has retained its capacity to function. The body of the patient is kept alive through a life support system. The doctors have the ability to bring the patient out of the coma but doing so will have repercussions on the mental state of the patient. Modern medicine will tell us that the patient is alive but comatose and therefore removing the comatose state is of the utmost importance even if this will result in a diminishing of the patients intellectual capabilities. From a Platonic viewpoint this is unacceptable. While the removal of the comatose state would certainly benefit the patient, it would only be of benefit if said removal was non-damaging to the intellectual abilities of the person in question. Therefore the 'Good' act in this case would be to let the patient either: remain in a coma or die of natural causes and thus have their soul separated from their body thereby preserving the intellectual capacity of that being.

The final sense in which Platonic Metaphysics has a role in Biomedical Ethics is in the sense of autonomy. The Platonic Sense of autonomy can be summed up in 4 points:

1. Autonomy is based upon the mind and its power over the body. ^*
2. Autonomy is for the mind to be free from coercive outside influence.
3. To be autonomous one must understand that actions that are willed through the body from the mind affect other individuals, who also have autonomy.
4. To be autonomous one must be cognizant of the fact that their mind has the capacity to learn any number of forms and their derivatives that are present in material objects.^*

Through these four points the reader can draw several conclusions about the roles of patients and doctors in autonomous relationships.

In order for a patient to be autonomous the mind must have power over the body and therefore the patient must have an active mind.^* A patient must understand their medical conditions and should only assent to things that they understand. If they do not understand things then they are willing themselves into a paternal relationship. This is acceptable but must be actively recognized by the patient. This lack of understanding is a lack of participation in dialectics on the part of the patient as the patient has the same mental ability as anyone else to learn. This understanding is predicated on the patient having an active mind.

Several of the obligations that are required of patients are also required of doctors, namely that they possess an active mind, among others. In addition every doctor should understand their patient's medical conditions and only recommend things that they understand. If they do not understand things then they are responsible for informing their patients of such. This is acceptable but must be actively recognized by both the doctor and the patient. One of the most damaging things that a doctor can do to impede upon the patients sense of autonomy is coercing a patient into a therapy that is not agreed to by the patient unless that patient has willingly approved of a paternalistic method of treatment with said doctor. If the patient has knowingly entered into a paternalistic relationship with the doctor then any treatment that the doctor orders that is beneficial to the patient is acceptable.

To display the way autonomy would work in a Platonic sense we turn again to our coma patient. In this thought experiment the coma patient is alive in the body but dead in the mind. In this situation the patient would not be able to control their body as they have no mind of which to speak. Without the use of their mind the patient would lack any type of autonomy and if autonomy is central to person-hood then this coma patient could not be considered to be a person. While they are still a human being genetically and they have a living body, the lack of a fit mind robs them of all right to person-hood. The doctor would not be able to treat the patient due to the fact that without a mind they are not human and therefore cannot understand their condition nor their treatment and could not consent to any given medical approach.

In conclusion the doctor-patient relationship can be effectively governed by a thorough understanding of Platonic metaphysics as they apply to Biomedical Ethics. The doctor and patient are both capable of the same knowledge and patients who willfully lack the knowledge of a doctor are knowingly committing themselves to a paternalist relationship with their physician. In addition, the modern medical approach places an inordinately large emphasis on the bodily health of their patients and not nearly enough of doctors resources are dedicated to ensuring the intellectual activity of a patient is preserved. Finally, the autonomy of a patient must be preserved at all times in order to serve the best interests of the patient.

#Body-mind dualism.

*In this sense autonomy would involve the definition of 'self/soul' as opposed to the definition of biological entity, further expanding upon the dualistic nature of Platonic philosophy.

¤A much broader understanding of The Theory of the Forms can be found in other works by Plato: The Republic, Phaedrus, Parmenides, and Sophist among others.

*Borrowed from Aquinas, Summa Theologica .

*Refer to Platonic Dualism

*Refer to Platonic Theory of the Forms

*Here active is used to mean fully functional

Dabbling in Plato (Paper)

My latest philosophy paper, based on Book VII of Plato's Republic. Enjoy.

Statement: Socrates argues that we should force the guardians who have seen the realm of the forms (outside the cave) to go back and rule even if they do not want to do so.

Thesis: It is morally corrupting to both a person and the state to force a participant to engage in an activity against their freewill when the cost to benefit ratio of that activity has not been clearly established.

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      In Plato's Republic Socrates examines what it means for a philosopher, long trapped in the world of the physical, to attain passage into the realm of the forms. Socrates paints a picture of civilization taking place in a cave where all one can see are the shadows on the wall until they are elevated above the mundane and are allowed to glimpse this spiritual realm of the forms. Yet upon this attainment of true knowledge they are to be forced back into the cave, back into the darkness to enlighten and to rule those they had previously left behind. According to Socrates they would force both themselves and each other back into the darkness because they would be spending the majority of their time in the world of the forms anyway. Their journey back into the darkness would be for the mutual good of everyone but most of all for the state. They would facilitate the state and through the state the increase in general 'good'.

      There are problems that arise however when Plato speaks of forcing people into the cave after being able to behold the world of the forms. This could lead to emotional and physical violence amongst those privy to the actual forms. There is also a problem with facilitating 'good'. If you are bring good to the people who have not seen the world of the forms then what were they experiencing prior to a philosophers return to govern them? It seems that the de facto answer would be a form of 'bad'. However, if all the forms are under the 'umbrella form', so to speak, of good, then bad would not exist negating the need for the philosophers who new of the realm of the forms to return to the physical world to rule others. In addition to this there is a problem with any person witnessing a physical ascent into a metaphysical realm. Where would this person 'be'? If he were speaking of the realm of the forms as a purely mental state then the philosopher who is aware of the forms would live in a dichotomy. On the one hand they would see themselves as the souls they truly were but on the other hand they would still need to partake of the physical realm to attend to the physical necessities of living. Otherwise they would waste away until they died. In addition to these rather large problems there is also the problem of who would decide that someone had actually visited the realm of the forms. In the event of someone claiming to have attained the knowledge of the forms but not, and them being made the ruler of the city would have drastic consequences both for the state as a whole but also for the individual citizens of the city be they economic, physically injurious, of mentally harmful consequences.

      While these are serious problems the issue that is really at stake is that of personal liberty and to what extent the greater good should take precedent over personal freedom. If philosophers were to force each other to return to the darkness are they not acting in a manner that is inconsistent with the 'good' by forcing their collective will upon someone who resists them.

      In terms of ruling the city, Plato also assumes that the rulers would all come to the correct and best way to rule the city. If one philosopher was to rule the city after being forced back into the physical world, it is not a stretch to think that they might themselves fall back into an emotional way of thinking by way of being forced into something they do not wish to do. While in this emotional state the ruler could make laws that punish those that are responsible, at least in some way, for him being forced back into the physical world, namely the non-philosophers. In a worst case scenario the ruler could essentially create a state that benefits him alone and morph the state into a dictatorial style of government that reduces the population to slavery at best and death at worst.

      Many of the points raised previously might have a suitable answer, at least from Socrates' perspective. In response to the enlightened philosophers becoming harmful to each other one might say that because of their learning they would not see any benefit to society or each other in partaking in it and therefore would abstain from it.

      The idea that by not having good in the physical world and therefore being left with bad is a more difficult point to answer. If all the forms are part of the form of good, then the form of bad must be so also. But if the form of bad is also good then it would not be bad, it would be good thereby making the idea of bad good. This in essence negates anything 'bad' in the world and would further negate the need for the philosophers to return to the physical world. It also presents the problem of having an idea that does not have an opposite and therefore becomes the normal. Without the bad, the good just wouldn't be good in the same sense that most people think of it. The best way to resolve this conundrum is to place the bad outside of the conventional idea of the theories of the forms. Socrates might possibly say that bad is created by the gods as a way for mortals to distinguish between things, or something to that effect. There really is not a good answer to this question.

      The question of a person actual ascending into a metaphysical world is not so much of a problem. The allegory that Socrates provides is exactly that, an allegory. The actual ascent would be induced in the mental state of the participant. Hence his being forced back into darkness would be more of a forcing him to partake in everyday affairs.

      The problem of deciding who had actually attained the knowledge of the forms and therefore is fit to be forced back to rule can be explained by the forms themselves. If a person is fit to rule then the form of governance, or something similar to it, would be evident in their character, and evident to those who recognized the forms, i.e. the philosophers. If the person were attempting to fake this knowledge that would also be apparent.

      This same reasoning can be used to explain the way that philosophers would react to being forced back into the physical realm. Because philosophers are taught to reject the emotions in favor of the rational they would see themselves returning to the physical world as beneficial and therefore for 'good' and would not reject the expectation of having to do so. Their personal liberty would not be at issue as they would want to do the most good they could for the state and would not be emotionally attached to liberty. They would most likely view their bodies as simply instruments for their minds to operate through and would see the sensibility of subjecting themselves to physically governing.

The way that each philosopher would rule would also be nearly identical. If the forms were dictating what the good thing to do is then the philosopher ruling the current city would view that as the best possible choice. Any other philosopher would see the same choice as the best because each rule and law would be taken directly from the form of the good.

      The real problem with forcing people back into the physical world is deciding exactly how they have to improve it/rule it. The form of the good would already be prevalent in the world because of the lack of a form of bad. Until a satisfactory answer is found to this question the idea of sending enlightened philosophers back into the physical world to rule is unacceptable. The good that they are capable of is not what is in question but rather whether or not the amount of good they could do in an already good world would be significant enough to force them into something that they might be unwilling to partake in. Unless a cost to benefit ratio is established, the violation of person liberties/freedoms, whether a grievance of the participant or not, sets a bad example for the remainder of the population. This idea could possibly lead to the enslavement of the free citizens to work exclusively for the state to better the lives of everyone in the state, but you are still compromising the welfare of the few for the many, which is morally negligent on the part of the state.