On Epistemology

On Epistemology

How do we know what it is that we know and how do we find what it is that we do not know but wish to know?

There are several ways to rationalize what we know, or rather what we think we know. We could attribute that knowledge that we have to Divine Providence, much like Augustine and Aquinas have done. We can admit that we know nothing, such as Plato/Socrates did. We can strive to understand through love and infinite resolution as Kierkegaard did. But it seems as though all these views of epistemology are devoid of a real answer. In the following I will survey three ways in which we think that we learn and provide a philosophical look at some of the most common way that we learn.

We learn by being taught, either by parental figures, or by professional teachers, or by peers. In this case we assume that our parents/teachers/peers have learned these things from someone or somewhere else. It may have been a book for instance. In this book are ideas that were written by its author. The author there for must have learned it from their teacher/parent/peer, and so on ad infinitum. This present the problem of an eternal regression. In order for there to be knowledge there must be a genesis. This starting point is either the starting point for all knowledge or the hope that there is a starting point for all knowledge, as knowledge cannot simply spring into existence. Or maybe it can.

Perhaps the genesis of knowledge is not in the idea that there is a definitive starting point, but in the fact that there is an infinite set of genesis points for knowledge. Here I mean the individual. Now many will say that the set of individuals is not infinite but is in fact finite. While at any one time there is a finite set of individuals in existence, there is the potential for an infinite number of individuals to exist in the future, hence an infinite amount of genesis points for knowledge albeit spread throughout time. So how does the individual become a genesis point for knowledge? We shall see.

The Darwinian idea of Natural Selection is a prime example of creating something new out of something that is, thereby creating something new. While the critical will ask where the first thing then came from, this essay will not attempt to answer that questions as it is best to let theologians and physicists to argue about it. We can imply that through our existence here there must have been a ‘first thing’ and this will be enough to work with without bothering with where it came from. Therefore, this first thing had the ability to create and to change itself over time. Much like a fish might grow larger fins to swim faster; this first thing would adapt and change over time to attempt to achieve a status of steady stability which is what all things desire, as opposed to chaos.

Given the penchant for thought that all the individuals have, the idea of self-genesis of knowledge is a completely justifiable thing in the sense that individuals, who have the power to adapt to their environments, would also have the ability to both adapt their ideas the encompass different ideas within them, and the genesis of new ideas, either new in totality or being derivative of older ideas. Throughout the course of western philosophy we see this happening. Commenting and critiquing another thinker, or another person in general, allows the individual to create new ideas. In fact it is the spark that drives all greater thought. You must look no farther than the Socratic Method that was applied in the Polis of Athens during the age of Pericles and the Thirty Tyrants.  In asking questions the dialecticians are refining a thought or idea. In refining this idea they are intrinsically changing the idea. If you change an idea then it is no longer the same idea. It has become a new and separate idea. This idea then has the ability, based on its interpretation and based on debates and discourses, to propagate more ideas. And so on in an exponential factor to the effect of . A single idea has the ability to spawn an infinite amount of subsequent ideas, much the same as an individual has the capacity to spawn a single idea or thought that will perpetuate into a long string of ideas. This only begs the question as to what spawns the original idea. 

Here is where Darwinism is applied. Much as the fish is able to grow larger fins to swim faster, so to the ability for humans to evolve the power to create ideas. To be the genesis of ideas. We are Creators in every sense of the word, giving ideas life, then the products of ideas a reality. With this ability the propagation of ideas is guaranteed. As long as there are people, there are ideas. We have the power to create knowledge and the power to change knowledge. Quite a scary spectacle. 

Foucault and Greek Sexuality (Paper)

Greek Sexuality

Greek sexuality in the ancient period can be seen in two distinct ways: that of Foucault as being devoid of sexual discrimination and that of John Boswell as being sexually defined. Between these two historians lay many examples pointing to a clear emphasis is the classical period on understood and socially constructed homosexual relationships that differed dramatically in clearly defined ways. These examples will be used to support John Boswell's illustration of sexuality in the classical Greek period as superior to Foucault's. There are two distinct areas within this sexuality that illustrate the existence of homosexuality in the classical period, in light of Foucault's insistence that this distinction is not possible. The first area is in overturning the assumption that passivity and activity in homosexual relations were necessarily different than in heterosexual ones. The second is in determining that age does define the appropriate context of a homosexual relationship.

Defining passivity and activity in the Greek classical world as a tool to be used in determining the socio-sexual determination of the participants involved is shaky at best. In need of even graver consideration is the defining of homosexual men as members of a lower class than heterosexual men based on the socio-sexual determination of activity and passivity. In his work The History of Sexuality Foucault paints a picture of homosexual men as being regarded as inferior to heterosexual men due to the perceived effeminacy that homosexuals are supposedly labeled with for their 'passive' acts. Farther from the truth Foucault could not get. Plato states in the Symposium,

“Those who love men and rejoice to lie with and be embraced by men are also the finest boys and young me, being naturally the most manly. The people who accuse them of shamelessness lie;...A clear proof of this is the fact that as adults they alone acquit themselves as men in public careers.”¹

Plato, one of the most accomplished and respected citizens of Athens, goes on to reason that homosexual soldiers would make the best army in the world.² To limit the understanding of sexuality in the classical world to socially relative terms such as activity and passivity is academically inaccurate when there is first hand accounts that clearly show the existence and celebration of the homosexual lifestyle. Even in Greek mythology there are myriad examples of homosexual action.³ The heterosexual love of ancient Greece was even displayed as something that was transcended by homosexual love. According to Boswell, ”The Attic law-giver Solon considered homosexual eroticism too lofty for slaves and prohibited it to them.”⁴

The other area in which Boswell draws a distinction between modern historical study and the actuality of the period is in the age discrimination that was purportedly applied to same sex relationships. Foucault portrays these relationships as occurring almost solely between young boys and old men. He seems to encourage the idea that same sex relationships (homosexuality) between two older men would result in those parties becoming social outcasts. However the opposite is actually true. Apart from the quotes above, Boswell also portrays this discrimination between age as against what Foucault is implying. The ageism here means that now Foucault is further distinguishing male on male sexuality not just as homosexual (a term which is supposed to subsume all other archetypes of male on male sexual relations but) act but now as a homosexual, age dependent act. For example, Euripides at age seventy was loved by and in love with Agathon.⁵ This is just one among many example that Boswell is able to provide. Furthermore, with respect to activity/passivity, there is no unambiguous document that defines age as a criterion for determining who was the one to be loved and who would love the beloved. Because of the lack of factual evidence, Foucault appears to be using later texts of the Middle Ages when attempting to explain the clearly homosexual-friendly reality of the classical Greek world.

In all Foucault is wrong in assuming that homosexual relationships in classical Greece were generally considered socially unacceptable with the only exception being based on a different age dynamic. Instead, classical Greece was a place of homosexual acceptance and even celebration with homosexual relationships being held, in many instances, in a higher regard than heterosexual relationships. Furthermore the idea that homosexual relationships were looked down upon is clearly dispelled by Boswell.

1Plato, Symposium. 192A cf. Phaedrus's Speech

2 Boswell, John. "Introduction." In Christianity, social tolerance, and homosexuality: gay people in Western Europe from the beginning of the Christian era to the fourteenth century. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. p 25.

3ibid (see Hercules)

4Boswell, Christianity et al. p 27

5Boswell, Christianity et al. p28 n.52   

Platonic Forms, Time, and Narrativity (Paper)

Platonic Forms, Time, and Narrativity

The following paper will argue that the act of unchanging being through time is incompatible with Plato's epistemological view of humans. The argument will be preceded with a brief introduction of three core ideas: Time, Platonic Ethics, Narrativity. As Plato argues in the Euthyphro, the idea of piety must be unchanging and constant in order for the idea of piety to carry any weight. If the idea of piety must remain the same regardless of time in order for it to be 'Piety' and therefore carry metaphysical weight, humans must be able to understand piety in its fullness, which is to say that humans must be in a state of Being in order to fully understand Piety^ª.

Time is a series of interlocking moments as realized through the human(s) perception. In Heraclitus' work, with which it seems that Plato would tend to agree^*, he presents an understanding of time in which you have four basic premises: 1) That ‘X equals X’ at T¹, meaning that X exists at a moment in time, hence being. 2) That time is infinitely divisible. 3) That, because time is infinitely divisible, you can have no ‘moments in time’ because for everything that you label a moment you will be able to further divide that moment. 4) That because you cannot have any moments in time at no time can ‘X equal X’ which results in a world not of being but in a world of becoming. While this is logically correct in the sense that all the premises accurately reflect a logical conclusion we are concerned with presenting the accuracy of these premises in the first. Heraclitus uses the metaphor of a river to explain his ideas about the constant flux of the world and the constant change that takes place. Plato notes that according to Heraclitus, it is impossible to step into the same river twice. By this he means that the river is constantly changing and that the person entering the river would never be able to step into the same water twice, for this water would have been removed down river and replaced by new water. In order for this to be possible he stands in support of an ever changing world with no definable moments in time. This ever-changing phenomenon is not without faults, among them assumptions that time takes place regardless of humans and disregarding the fact that time and its divisibility is contingent upon the constructs usefulness to humans.

In order for this ever-changing world to be rational it must be exhibited by physical matter held in a vacuum otherwise this pretense does not hold up well in the physical world. We shall start with the first premise. ‘X equals X’. This premise may come across as straightforward but must be explained here for it has implications on the rest of the argument. The statement of ‘X equals X’ is a statement of Being while ‘X does not equal X’ stands to mean that the item is nonexistent. Unlike statements of Becoming, Being implies that at a specified time, T¹, a physical item actually existed whether in a physical or metaphysical form. This is juxtaposed to a statement such as Heraclitus' that we live in an ever-changing world. His world view is a clear statement in favor of Becoming in which we take a relative existence dependent upon what is exerting power upon us and the setting that we find ourselves in. According to Heraclitus, at all times then we are simply Becoming with no moment of Being.

In collusion with relativity goes dependence. Time, in order to exist, is dependent on people. Because of this time is something that is created, by humans, in order to give shape and meaning to the world around us. In the absence of humans, time does not exist. As previously stated, time is imposed by humans on a situation either while it is happening or after it has happened, and occasionally both. We require time’s dependence upon ourselves in order to construct a world in which to live with relative ease and it is for this reason that moments in time exist. This usefulness of time, in planning events, remembering actions, and keeping schedules is the reason for its existence, not some ethereal notion. Time is because we say it is. Because we create time it is of the utmost usefulness to ourselves that we also enable us to note moments in time. These moments are also relative to those viewing them. A scientist may measure things in nanoseconds for his work but an hourly worker will measure theirs in minutes. Moments, as part of a time that we create, are created for their usefulness to us. The impact of time on Platonic Ethics, particular the acquirement of knowledge of the Forms, is massive as will be shown below. The view of time that is held by Plato, via Heraclitus, is incompatible with the epistemological system which Plato describes. Before an examination of these problems the reader will find a detailed description of The Theory of the Forms and Narrativity.

Platonic Ethics is having and holding ethical virtue and knowledge over a continuous time frame with the intent on becoming more knowledgeable over time as displayed in The Republic Book V-VI. The basic principle upon which The Theory of the Forms is based is participation, particularly participation in the the Forms themselves. The Forms are metaphysical traits that exist separately from humans but are present in the world through different objects' participation in them. For instance, a person is tall because they participate in the form of Tallness. In a more basic understanding, anything that can be denoted as a adjective, whether it is a color, size, or description of any kind, is a reflection of that things participation in said forms. In addition to these forms is an overarching Form of The Good, under which all forms fall. A trait of all forms are that they are forms of good. The way in which humans understand the various objects around them and, in some sense, their own being itself, is through their understanding of forms. These forms are discoverable through dialectic discussions with other intelligent beings. This dialectical discussion introduces problems for the Theory of the Forms.

If Forms, and therefore knowledge, are discoverable through discussion then these discussions must take place between two people during a specified period of time. This time that is spent in discussion must, by necessity, take place in a world of Becoming. The reason behind this necessity is simple. If neither individual has any prior knowledge of the form they are attempting to find, such as Piety, then the individuals must be changing as they attempt to reason a definition for Piety. This dialectics will be labeled R. The time that they spend reasoning will be labeled S^†. The moment when they discover the true definition of the form of Piety will be labeled D. Now during the period of R both participants are using knowledge that they already have. This knowledge constitutes part of their Being. During S the participants are therefore to be considered in a state of Being. The problem arises that once they discover the true definition of Piety and therefore have the Form of Piety they can no longer be the same selves. Upon realizing D the participants have either: A- passed into a state of becoming during which they learn the Form of Piety and then revert into a state of Being after having learned this or B- passed from one state of Being into a new state of Being without having a state of Becoming. Through the first way of thinking the participants have retained narrativity and see themselves as the same Beings that did not have D previously but now have D. In the second way of interpretation the participants must reject narrativity in favor of Being different people, one person when they did not know D and a different person now that they know D.

One of the most important ideas contained in The Theory of the Forms is the idea that once a person has begun to understand forms as forms themselves they are ethically required to help other beings, through dialectics, to understand these forms. Now if dialectics is the only way to discover forms and forms are what allow us to understand the intelligible things around us, it stands to reason that through dialectics all knowledge has the ability to follow.

Narrativity is the act of being the same 'self' through a continuous time frame. This is to say that a being with Narrative identity sees their body and mind as existing as the same entities at different moments in time. At T¹ X is X. At T² X is X. At T³ X is X and so on. One who constructs their identity of self through a narrative time line is the same being as they were last year, 10 years ago, etc. The opposite of a narrative construction of self is a non-narrative construct. In non-narrative constructions of the self the individual sees themselves as fundamentally different people at different times. For example at T¹ the person is X, at T² the person identifies as Y and at T³ the person identifies as Z. In each of these cases the person does not necessarily identify with their previous selves because their new self is not a narrative begun in the last self. So while a person with a narrative construction of self lives in a state of Becoming the non-narrative person lives in a state of Being. The narrative person is in a state of becoming because they are constructing different ideas of themselves at different points in time while still maintaining that they are the same person. The impact of this view is tied closely to time and change over time as will be seen below.

If we are not the same person over time then it is impossible for us to understand any unchanging idea while in a state of Becoming. Being held in a state of constant Becoming means that our bodies and ideas are subject to change at random. However, this change would subject Piety, or any other Form for that matter, to the corruption of change. Because of this the person would have to reject a narrative life in exchange for a life of pure moments. In these moments that individual would be in a state of Being rather than in a state of Becoming. This state of being would mean that they are a whole, unchanging individual at that point in time. However, this view would mean that any individual would only have so much time in which to utilize a particular form because once they were able to move to the next point along their narrative they would in effect become a different self. While becoming this different self does not necessarily mean that they would no longer understand the form of X, they would, of necessity understand it in a different way and therefore incompletely. This different way of understanding would corrupt the original understanding of any particular form. For example, X understands the form of Piety at T¹. The duration of X understanding Piety is dependent on the duration of T¹ due to his state of being being connected to T¹ in the same fashion. X is only in a state of Being for the duration of T¹ and then becomes Y at T². Once T² is reached Y now understands Piety at a different moment in time as a different Being enclosed in a state of Being that will also only last until the end of T². When T² becomes T³ then Y, who was once X, is now Z. This is the crux of the problem. While the Forms themselves do not change the human understanding of them, by necessity, must change. There are only a few ways in which humans have the ability to understand a form in its entirety. We must either remain in a constant state of Being or our understanding of the forms is not impacted by the way we change. As one will see in the following there are problems with both of these hypotheses.

The first hypothesis to overcome is that we exist in a constant state of Being. There are some very fundamental problems with remaining in a state of constant Being. The first problem one could typically expect to face is that of change. If one is in a state of constant Being then how do they change, either physically or mentally? Any person would be stuck in this state without motion, thought [because it requires motion to think], or change of any kind. Living in this state would be equivalent to non-existence. One would not be able to feel, think, grow, age, die. One would not have a will either, because of the need to think in order to will. So while one would be a physical being they would stand as a statue in a vacuum, neither feeling nor knowing.

The other possibility is that our understanding of the forms does not change in relation to our state of Being. This however is wrong. It is through our change in Being that we learn, either from a state of Being to a new State of Being or remaining in a constant state of Becoming. Remaining in a constant state of becoming will make our understanding of any Form relative to our state of being and the time at which we are in these states of being. However, if one was to adopt a truly non-narrative view of their self identity then they would still be faced with the problem of the statue as mentioned above.

In essence the reason why Plato's epistemological view of humans and the Forms that they strive for is incompatible with the actualities that he presents about the Forms is that humans, by necessity must construct themselves as narrative beings. This places the human in question in a state of constant Becoming. While in this state of Becoming the individual would not be able to comprehend the full truth of the Forms. This is due to the fact that their perception of the Forms changes depending on their current state of Becoming in much the same way that a person cannot step into the same river twice with the Form being the river one originally steps into. Therefore the only way to understand forms would be to exist solely in a state of Being like the Forms themselves do. However, as stated above, this is not possible for the Human to do and still retain their 'humanity'. The solution here would be to view time as a human construct that can be changed via thought. By this it is meant that people are able to conceptualize time into units that are most useful to them.^˜ By being able to conceptualize the self as a narrative Becoming construct that also has episodic bouts of pure Being would make it possible to understand Plato's Forms in their fullness without the problem of becoming statue-like. It would allow the individual to engage in moments of Being while still reverting to a narrativity of becoming when necessary.

Bibliography

Published Work

Hutchins, Robert Maynard. "Plato." In Great books of the Western World. [Private library] ed. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1987. Books 1-7.

Strawson, Galen. "Against Narrativity."Ratio XVII, no. 4 (2004): 428-452.

Unpublished Work

Eames, Jeremy. .”Biomedical Platonic Ethics”. Unpublished manuscript, University of South Florida (2012)

Eames, Jeremy. . “Heraclitian Time”. Unpublished manuscript, University of South Florida (2011)

ªHere piety is used as a stand in for every form. Whether Justice, Love, Tallness, etc.

*Fragment 41; Quoted by Plato in Cratylus . The further breakdown on time and becoming is attributed to Heraclitus and is understood that Plato agrees with Heraclitus and his world of becoming.

†It is labeled S so as to not confuse it with other designations for time in different scenarios presented in this paper.

˜The truthfulness of this is a matter best left for further debate.

Time as Being (Paper)

The idea that you can have no such thing as moments in time is not possible in a human world. In Heraclitus' work he presents an understanding of time in which you have four basic premises: 1) That ‘X equals X’ at T1, meaning that X exists at a moment in time, hence being. 2) That time is infinitely divisible. 3) That because time is infinitely divisible you can have no ‘moments in time’ because for everything that you label a moment you will be able to further divide that moment. 4) That because you cannot have any moments in time at no time can ‘X equal X’ which results in a world not of being but in a world of becoming. While this is logically correct in the sense that all the premises accurately reflect a logical conclusion we are concerned with presenting the accuracy of these premises in the first. Heraclitus uses the metaphor of a river to explain his ideas about the constant flux of the world and the constant change that takes place. Plato notes that according to Heraclitus, it is impossible to step into the same river twice. By this he means that the river is constantly changing and that the person entering the river would never be able to step into the same water twice, for this water would have been removed down river and replaced by new water. In order for this to be possible he stands in support of an ever changing world with no definable moments in time. This ever-changing phenomenon is not without faults, among them assumptions that time takes place regardless of humans and disregarding the fact that time and its divisibility is contingent upon the constructs usefulness to humans.  

            In order for this ever-changing world to be rational it must be exhibited by physical matter held in a vacuum otherwise this pretense does not hold up well in the physical world. We shall start with the first premise. ‘X equals X’. This premise may come across as straightforward but must be explained here for it has implications on the rest of the argument. The statement of ‘X equals X’ is a statement of Being while ‘X does not equal X’ stands to mean that the item is nonexistent. Unlike statements of Becoming, Being implies that at a specified time, T1, a physical item actually existed whether in a physical or metaphysical form. This is juxtaposed to a statement such as Heraclitus' that we live in an ever-changing world. His world view is a clear statement in favor of  Becoming in which we take a relative existence dependent upon what is exerting power upon us and the setting that we find ourselves in. According to Heraclitus, at all times then we are simply Becoming with no moment of Being. Quite backward I think.

The second premise of the argument is that time is infinitely divisible. The idea of having time being infinitely divisible is not useful to humans. Because, as will be displayed below, time is relative and dependent upon humans for existence, time is simply a creation that we utilize because it is convenient and advantageous for us to do so. The idea that you can have no moments in time is not possible in a human world. If, as has been presented, time is infinitely divisible then it would be true that you can have no moments in time. However, in order for items and objects to interact with each other there must be a specified time, relative to the participants, at which two things come into contact. Therefore time must not be infinitely divisible, for time is relative to the object taking part in an action and is therefore a mere imposition of an abstract, unrealistic idea upon physical items. Therefore we must consider time as an abstract idea and decide if it is: Dependent or Independent, Relative or not. Let us first begin by examining the relativity of time.

            It is my understanding that time is relative to the participants in a given situation and that time is imposed upon items through their relation to those who witness the event. In the cases of black holes we, who are not entering a black hole but observing from outside its range are of the opinion that anything that enters a black hole becomes stationary when it crosses the line into the black holes area of power. This line is termed the event horizon. While to observers on the outside of a black hole the object that enters merely becomes stationary to our eyes, the person that enters a black hole sees themselves clearly continuing to move toward the center of the black hole. In this example time is made relative in an event by those who participate in it. Another example of usefulness is that of a car crash. In this event a person in a car that participates in the crash can see a dramatic difference in their perception of time as it is slowed down. To an observer that stands on the roadway and witnesses this event, time continues to move along at their own regular pace. The time that both participants witness is relative to them. 

            In addition those who are viewing it, humans impose the idea of time and change on the event. By this I mean that in the absence of humans, time does not exist but is merely a system of thought that we impose upon the world around us, in a practical manner, in order to interpret events that we are a part of or events that we perceive to happen. In this example we may take a tree that is in a forest. There are no witnesses to the event when the tree falls. Later a person comes walking by and witnesses a tree lying on the ground. By witnessing the tree lying on the ground we have inadvertently imposed our idea of time on a scene in order to reconstruct what has happened. Through this imposition we have come to the conclusion that the tree has fallen in a time that is relative to us (i.e. last week, an hour ago, etc.). Because we have imposed time, as a system of thought, upon our surroundings we have imposed an abstract, relative idea on an event.

            In collusion with relativity goes dependence. Time, in order to exist, is dependent on people. Because of this time is something that is created, by humans, in order to give shape and meaning to the world around us. In the absence of humans, time does not exist. As previously stated, time is imposed by humans on a situation either while it is happening or after it has happened, and occasionally both. We require time’s dependence upon ourselves in order to construct a world in which to live with relative ease and it is for this reason that moments in time exist. This usefulness of time, in planning events, remembering actions, and keeping schedules is the reason for its existence, not some ethereal notion. Time is because we say it is. Because we create time it is of the utmost usefulness to ourselves that we also enable us to note moments in time. These moments are also relative to those viewing them. A scientist may measure things in nanoseconds for his work but an hourly worker will measure theirs in minutes. Moments, as part of a time that we create, are created for their usefulness to us.  

            Heraclitus' argument against this could possibly come in the form of a rejection of events taking place outside of time. In order for events to take place in Heraclitus' world, time would not be relative nor a human creation. Time itself would take place outside of human interaction and would be what spurs the objects in the world to change. He would also argue that, because time is ever-changing at no ‘moment’ could the idea form in the minds of men that time were a creation of men. In addition to these objections he might also suppose that the senses we use to witness time are simply misleading being as they are of the body and not of the mind. He might also suggest that the idea of time taking place and being ever-changing is only possible to view from outside the body. He would argue that even though there are no humans to witness a river flowing it will continue to flow regardless.

            Logically, none of the rejections is plausible. First let us take the idea that time would take place outside of human notice. This is refuted by the idea previously stated, that time is imposed upon events, upon their being noticed by a human. The human would back-date, so to speak, the time essentially placing the events into their creation of time. Time must be recognized to exist and as the only creature with the agency to recognize this theoretical concept we implement it in a way that works best for us.

            On the second point raised we have already presented the idea of a time creation that is useful to us and therefore divisible to whatever such a point that the individual desires. Say at T2 a person decided to recognize time as a measurement that would be expedient for them and so decided to utilize it.

            On the third point the idea that the only way to view time accurately is to be in a separate dimension so to speak is not a rational statement. The only way for a human to recognize what is is through their own senses. Their own interpretation of time is what creates time in the first place. Also would time be taking place even while we struggled to understand the concept of time while in the body?

            In  summation, the idea that time is an ever flowing river that continuously changes is not a suitable idea for several reasons.  Because time is a human creation we are able to impose our own ideas of time in a fashion relative to our need for its usefulness.

Bibliography

Raven, J.E. , and G.S. Kirk. The Presocratic Philosophers. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971. Print.

Also used: Assorted notes provided on draft #1 by Professor Ali Elamin, University of South Florida, Philosophy Dept. 10/25/2011                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

Sartre on Bad Faith (Paper)

 In Being and Nothingness, Jean-Paul Sartre introduces a concept termed bad faith. In the following brief analysis of the term the reader will view the origins and definitions of the term bad faith, their relation to the existential, as well as the use of bad faith in Sartre's other works. In total, the reader will find a compelling reason why the term bad faith can be applied to humans.

To lie to one's self. To be a deceiver of the soul. To understand and recognize and then to ignore. These are the traits that are indicative of someone who is in bad faith. "We shall willingly grant that bad faith is a lie to oneself, on condition that we distinguish the lie to oneself from lying in general." (Sartre, Being and Nothingness p. 87) Sartre paints a literary picture in his work, Being and Nothingness, that portrays exactly what is at stake for a person who acts according to bad faith. According to Sartre the person who acts in bad faith is essentially performing an act of self-negation. While anyone is capable of telling a lie the person who tells a lie must also be in possession of the truth. (Sartre, Being and Nothingness p. 87). To be in bad faith that person knows the truth of their beliefs, actions, etc, but refuses to acknowledge these truths. The being that they have is therefore based on negating this very being. This self-lying is different from the lying that one might do to others. IN lying to others "The liar intends to deceive and he does not hide this intention from himself..." (Sartre, Being and Nothingness p. 88). In order for a man to truly be in bad faith he must be in possession of a truth and unwilling to recognize that truth. Once informed of the idea of bad faith the reader should see how bad faith is portrayed in other works by Sartre.

In the play No Exit, Sartre is able to display the way that bad faith would mold individuals into what they are. The one act play in which bad faith becomes evident, No Exit is about three people who have died and are now stuck in hell together. Hell in this instance is a drawing room decorated in Second Empire Style. The play was written in 1944 in France and could have been meant as a commentary on the German occupation of Paris. The three people that are kept in this drawing room are: a mother who cheated on her husband and then threw her illegitimate daughter, new-born, off a balcony, a man who joined the army but deserted before killing anyone, and a lady who seduced her cousin's wife while she was living with them. The room that they are stuck in has no mirrors, therefore the people trapped there could not see themselves as they want to see themselves but can only see themselves through the others in the room. The lack of a mirror can be representative of the lack of reflection on their actions that the people are capable of. The reflections are not corporeal with out a mirror. Instead they are forced to look inside themselves to understand who they are.

Estelle is the one looking for a mirror. With her dependency on mirrors the reader can clearly see the Narcissism inherent in her being. Because she refuses to see herself as she really is and relies instead upon her reflection in a mirror she is the character that is in bad faith the most. She is torturing herself by refusing to know herself as she is. With her torturing herself she inflicts torture on the other occupants, namely Garcin. (Sartre, No Exit )

Garcin is the cowardly soldier. He desperately wants reassurance that he is in fact not a coward. His desire is for peace and quiet more than the other characters. He had ambitions while alive to create a pacifist newspaper but never does. He runs from his actions and then seeks to rewrite them in his memory. (Sartre, No Exit )

Inez wants to be with Garcin, sexually. She works as the mirror for Estelle, to Estelle’s terror. When Inez describes what she sees in Estelle, she makes Estelle afraid/terrorized. She is the only one in the room who is able to see herself for what she is. She also attempts to make Garcin see himself as what he is. At one point she says, "So carry on, Mr. Garcin, and try to be honest with yourself-- for once." (Sartre, No Exit p. 38) This is at the point that she attempts to make Garcin realize that all the justifications that he has fabricated for running away from the army are just fabrications meant to enable him to live with his choices. Inez believes that Garcin understands that he is a coward but denies the truth to himself.

The play revolves around the idea of bad faith. Estelle is the one that is most clearly in bad faith. Garcin is much more ambiguous. He comes across as very indecisive. Inez is the only one who understands why she is placed int he drawing room. She is the only one who does not have bad faith. She understands that her person is defined by her actions. In her case she is defined by the terrible actions that she willingly did. She is the one who attempts to lead, unwittingly, the others to realize why there are in Hell. Hell is other people. There are problems with this way of thinking. In recognizing the negative forces that effect us one must also suppose that these negatives assure the existence of positives. While Garcin wants to focus solely on the negative he does so at the expense of the positive. The negation implies the possibility of the truth. (Sartre, No Exit )

The act of being requires an affirmation of the self by the individual. In addressing bad faith Sartre tries to identify why some people see themselves differently than they actually are. By being what you are and knowing what you are the individual is not living in bad faith. But if the individual acknowledges that they are being in one sense and deny that they are being in that one sense then they are, in essence, living by negation. They refuse to live positively and instead they live through denial. They deny who they are and, by doing so, they deny that they are, in fact, being. They are in a backwards fashion. (Sartre, No Exit )

It is my belief that Sartre portrays the human condition in a convincing fashion. In Being and Nothingness he portrays humanity as existing in a sort of equilibrium. Humans are capable of realizing who they are but shy away from doing so. Sartre uses the example of the waiter who is not a waiter. The waiter knows that he is not 'being' a waiter but is rather being a person who is playing at being a waiter. Sartre states that the waiter is merely a role in which the person playing at waiter is. (Sartre, Being and Nothingness p. 102). The man, acting as a waiter, knows that through such actions he is thereby given rights that pertain to such actions. (Sartre, Being and Nothingness p. 102). "I am a waiter in the mode of being what I am not" (Sartre, Being and Nothingness p.103). By saying this Sartre is affirming that in the first degree he is a man that has being and in the second degree is a man that chooses to act as a waiter, but he is never in the mode of being a waiter.

Through many different mediums Sartre assaults the way that most humans cope with their choices. In his work Being and Nothingness he describes in theoretical detail the way that many people suppress their true being in favor of something that they would rather think themselves being. In No Exit he supplies his reader with visceral evidence of people engaging in the act of self-denial. This evidence, coupled with his theory on being, drives the reader to be moved into accepting his bad faith as a legitimate explanation for understanding the self denial that humans visit upon themselves.

Bibliography

Sartre, Jean. No exit, and three other plays. Vintage International ed. New York: Vintage International, 1989. Print.

Sartre, Jean, and Hazel Estella Barnes. Being and nothingness. New York [etc.: Washington Square Press, 1992. Print.

Platonic Biomedical Ethics (Paper)

The following paper was written for a Bio-medical ethics class at the University of South Florida under the guidance of Mr. Nathan Draluck. May it be informative to you. Enjoy.

Platonic philosophy provides a way for doctors and patients to operate on the same intellectual plane by providing a stable and apparent ethical system based on the 'form' of good and the derivatives of good actions. The doctor and patient will be shown to rationally be of the same biological entity. The differences between doctor and patient are merely physical and the ability is real for all patients to be doctors. Because of an overpoweringly strong current in the biomedical community, dualism^# has become smothered and doctors have become intensely concerned with biological treatment, even when it is harmful to intellectual activity. Due to this lack of understanding on the part of doctors they have effectively relegated the patient to a subjugated role in lieu of affording them any large autonomy.

This paper will focus predominately on the relationship between doctors and their patients through the prism of Platonic Ethics. Furthermore, the paper will show that when considered in a rational way, Platonic Ethics provides an approach that is both safe for the doctor and engaging for the patient.

The reader will find three imitative case studies in which will be found a clear argument for the use of platonic ideals in treating a patient. Case one will expound on The Theory of the Forms and attempt to explain the actual differences between the patient and the doctor. While this may seem clear on the surface, the true difference, I believe, is actually nonexistent. In the second case we will examine the dualistic nature of Platonism and how this is translated, or not, into biomedical ethics. In the final case we will examine the autonomy of both parties involved in medical decision making, the patient and the doctor, and attempt to discover how autonomous each party actually is by defining autonomy in a platonic sense.^*

The Platonic theory of the forms is a rationally sound argument for the understanding of things around us. In order to give the reader a basic understanding of the arguments that follow it is necessary to provision the reader with the basics of Platonism. The chief metaphysical quality for Plato is The Theory of the Forms.^¤ The following will explain in detail the fundamentals of Platonic philosophy which will then be expounded upon later.

The basic principle upon which The Theory of the Forms is based is participation, particularly participation in the the Forms themselves. The Forms are metaphysical traits that exist separately from humans but are present in the world through different objects participation in them. For instance, a person is tall because they participate in the form of Tallness. In a more basic understanding, anything that can be denoted as a adjective, whether it is a color, size, or description of any kind, is a reflection of that things participation in said forms. In addition to these forms is an overarching Form of The Good, under which all forms fall. A trait of all forms are that they are forms of good. The way in which humans understand the various objects around them and, in some sense, their own being itself, is through their understanding of forms. These forms are discoverable through dialectic discussions with other intelligent beings.

One of the most important ideas contained in The Theory of the Forms is the idea that once a person has begun to understand forms as forms themselves they are ethically required to help other beings, through dialectics, to understand these forms. Now if dialectics is the only way to discover forms and forms are what allow us to understand the intelligible things around us, it stands to reason that through dialectics all knowledge has the ability to follow. While these may seem like rather arcane ideas when presented in short, it is strongly suggested that the reader view the complete Platonic works for themselves.

This brief overview has the ability to directly improve the doctor-patient relationship through several means. If we understand that doctors have a larger degree of understanding than their patients then we must also concede that because of this the doctors have a larger responsibility to impart this knowledge to their patients. The doctor must be willing to impart information, through dialectics, to the patient to increase the patients understanding of any medical conditions, preconditions, possible and probable outcomes from procedures, etc. A failure to do this on the doctors part would result in actions that would not be in accordance with Platonic Metaphysics and therefore would not fall under the form of The Good but would rather be a privation of good.^* While the doctor would have the ethical obligation to inform the patient of knowledge in which the patient was lacking, it is also the responsibility of the patient, in pursuit of knowledge, to attempt to discover, through dialectics, as much knowledge as possible. In doing so, medical knowledge would naturally be incorporated into this knowledge. From these interactions one may gather that through the form of the Good anything that transpires between a patient and doctor will be for the benefit of both parties as long as both parties willingly engage in Good, Selfless acts in accordance with Platonic Metaphysics.

Following this, one must make the argument that in these situations the parties involved have an overt obligation to do certain things. In order to arrive at this point the reader must first realize the following: that both the doctor and the patient are human beings who are capable of knowledge. If this supposition holds true then we can infer that there are obligation that each party must meet. The doctor has an obligation to search for knowledge in the same manner as the patient has an obligation to search for knowledge. With this primary obligation the reader can draw, among others, two distinct conclusions: That the patient should take into account the doctors suggestions for treatment only if they are unwilling to complete their own studies on the subject matter and, if this is the case, paternalism is to be considered opted into at this point in time. In cases in which the patient is unwilling, while possessing the ability to, attain the same knowledge as the doctor they have themselves mandated that their relation with their doctors will be a paternalistic one. While paternalism carries a heavily weighted connotation of loss of power, or immediate and unwarranted deference, it carries the heavier connotation of the inability to use dialectics. Therefore, paternalism should not be viewed as inherently negative but rather negative due to its association with non-dialectics.

Drawing upon The Theory of the Forms as outlined above, the reader shall find a discussion of Platonic Dualism, and how this is translated, or not, into biomedical ethics, in the anteceding argument. The first necessity in order to do this is a more thorough understanding of Platonic Dualism itself. Like most dualistic philosophies Platonic Dualism is a dualism of the mind an the body in which the mind is always superior to the body. In Platonic Dualism the terms for mind are many and varied but this paper will use only two interchangeably: mind and soul. Upon the death of the body the soul/mind are loosed to live among the forms and the forms are the highest ecstasy the mind can have both while contained in a body and upon the souls release from said body. Of paramount importance in this dualism is the idea that one should not deliberately kill ones body in order to release ones souls. To do so is an act of both desperation and an act demonstrating the pinnacle of a privation of good. While suicide is not acceptable in Platonic Dualism the body should always be treated in an inferior manner while the mind should be treated in a superior fashion. The reasoning behind this is that it is through our minds that we control our bodies therefore making our bodies a tool for our minds.

The dualism presented above has a very real connection with contemporary medicine. While this type of dualism is still extremely relative in contemporary society, many doctors focus their attention solely on the bodily ailments of their patients even when it can be detrimental to the patients mental health. The focal point of modern medicine is to prevent the death of the body through natural causes and this death is viewed as the ultimate item to beat. However when viewed realistically through a Platonic prism the death of the body can actually be a good act because it frees the mind from the constraints of the body. This is not to say that it is not worthwhile to treat the body, for it is worthwhile but only to the extent that it helps the mind. Put another way, the mind should be the focal point of medical procedures, while the body should only be treated in a fashion that neither hinders the mind nor makes the mind powerless. The example we can use to illustrate this is hypothetical in nature but revealing none the less.

A patient who has experienced some worldly calamity is in a coma and there is evidence that the brain has retained its capacity to function. The body of the patient is kept alive through a life support system. The doctors have the ability to bring the patient out of the coma but doing so will have repercussions on the mental state of the patient. Modern medicine will tell us that the patient is alive but comatose and therefore removing the comatose state is of the utmost importance even if this will result in a diminishing of the patients intellectual capabilities. From a Platonic viewpoint this is unacceptable. While the removal of the comatose state would certainly benefit the patient, it would only be of benefit if said removal was non-damaging to the intellectual abilities of the person in question. Therefore the 'Good' act in this case would be to let the patient either: remain in a coma or die of natural causes and thus have their soul separated from their body thereby preserving the intellectual capacity of that being.

The final sense in which Platonic Metaphysics has a role in Biomedical Ethics is in the sense of autonomy. The Platonic Sense of autonomy can be summed up in 4 points:

1. Autonomy is based upon the mind and its power over the body. ^*
2. Autonomy is for the mind to be free from coercive outside influence.
3. To be autonomous one must understand that actions that are willed through the body from the mind affect other individuals, who also have autonomy.
4. To be autonomous one must be cognizant of the fact that their mind has the capacity to learn any number of forms and their derivatives that are present in material objects.^*

Through these four points the reader can draw several conclusions about the roles of patients and doctors in autonomous relationships.

In order for a patient to be autonomous the mind must have power over the body and therefore the patient must have an active mind.^* A patient must understand their medical conditions and should only assent to things that they understand. If they do not understand things then they are willing themselves into a paternal relationship. This is acceptable but must be actively recognized by the patient. This lack of understanding is a lack of participation in dialectics on the part of the patient as the patient has the same mental ability as anyone else to learn. This understanding is predicated on the patient having an active mind.

Several of the obligations that are required of patients are also required of doctors, namely that they possess an active mind, among others. In addition every doctor should understand their patient's medical conditions and only recommend things that they understand. If they do not understand things then they are responsible for informing their patients of such. This is acceptable but must be actively recognized by both the doctor and the patient. One of the most damaging things that a doctor can do to impede upon the patients sense of autonomy is coercing a patient into a therapy that is not agreed to by the patient unless that patient has willingly approved of a paternalistic method of treatment with said doctor. If the patient has knowingly entered into a paternalistic relationship with the doctor then any treatment that the doctor orders that is beneficial to the patient is acceptable.

To display the way autonomy would work in a Platonic sense we turn again to our coma patient. In this thought experiment the coma patient is alive in the body but dead in the mind. In this situation the patient would not be able to control their body as they have no mind of which to speak. Without the use of their mind the patient would lack any type of autonomy and if autonomy is central to person-hood then this coma patient could not be considered to be a person. While they are still a human being genetically and they have a living body, the lack of a fit mind robs them of all right to person-hood. The doctor would not be able to treat the patient due to the fact that without a mind they are not human and therefore cannot understand their condition nor their treatment and could not consent to any given medical approach.

In conclusion the doctor-patient relationship can be effectively governed by a thorough understanding of Platonic metaphysics as they apply to Biomedical Ethics. The doctor and patient are both capable of the same knowledge and patients who willfully lack the knowledge of a doctor are knowingly committing themselves to a paternalist relationship with their physician. In addition, the modern medical approach places an inordinately large emphasis on the bodily health of their patients and not nearly enough of doctors resources are dedicated to ensuring the intellectual activity of a patient is preserved. Finally, the autonomy of a patient must be preserved at all times in order to serve the best interests of the patient.

#Body-mind dualism.

*In this sense autonomy would involve the definition of 'self/soul' as opposed to the definition of biological entity, further expanding upon the dualistic nature of Platonic philosophy.

¤A much broader understanding of The Theory of the Forms can be found in other works by Plato: The Republic, Phaedrus, Parmenides, and Sophist among others.

*Borrowed from Aquinas, Summa Theologica .

*Refer to Platonic Dualism

*Refer to Platonic Theory of the Forms

*Here active is used to mean fully functional