Platonic
Forms, Time, and Narrativity
The
following paper will argue that the act of unchanging being through
time is incompatible with Plato's epistemological view of humans.
The argument will be preceded with a brief introduction of three core
ideas: Time, Platonic Ethics,
Narrativity. As Plato argues in the Euthyphro,
the idea of piety must be unchanging and constant in order for the
idea of piety to carry any weight. If the idea of
piety must remain the same regardless of time in order for it to be
'Piety' and therefore carry metaphysical weight,
humans must be able to understand piety in its fullness,
which is to say that humans must be in a state of Being in order to
fully understand Pietyª.
Time
is a series of interlocking moments as realized through the human(s)
perception. In Heraclitus' work,
with which it seems that Plato would tend to agree*,
he presents an understanding of time in which you have four basic
premises: 1) That ‘X equals X’ at T¹,
meaning that X exists at a
moment in time,
hence being.
2) That time is infinitely divisible. 3) That,
because time is infinitely divisible, you can
have no ‘moments in time’ because for everything that you label a
moment you will be able to further divide that moment.
4) That because you cannot have any moments in time at no time can ‘X
equal X’ which results in a
world not of being but in a world of becoming.
While this is logically correct in the sense that all the premises
accurately reflect a logical conclusion we are concerned with
presenting the accuracy of these premises in the first.
Heraclitus uses the metaphor of a river to explain his ideas about
the constant flux of the world and the constant change that takes
place. Plato notes that according to Heraclitus,
it is impossible to step into the same river twice.
By this he means that the river is constantly changing and that the
person entering the river would never be able to step into the same
water twice, for this water would have been
removed down river and replaced by new water. In
order for this to be possible he stands in support of an ever
changing world with no definable moments in time.
This ever-changing phenomenon is not without faults,
among them assumptions that time takes place regardless of humans and
disregarding the fact that time and its divisibility is contingent
upon the constructs usefulness to humans.
In
order for this ever-changing world to be rational it must be
exhibited by physical matter held in a vacuum otherwise this pretense
does not hold up well in the physical world. We
shall start with the first premise. ‘X
equals X’. This premise may come across as
straightforward but must be explained here for it has implications on
the rest of the argument. The statement of ‘X
equals X’ is a statement of Being while ‘X does not equal
X’ stands to mean that the item is nonexistent.
Unlike statements of Becoming, Being
implies that at a specified time, T¹,
a physical item actually existed whether in a physical or
metaphysical form. This is juxtaposed to a
statement such as Heraclitus' that we live in an ever-changing world.
His world view is a clear statement in favor of Becoming in
which we take a relative existence dependent upon what is exerting
power upon us and the setting that we find ourselves in.
According to Heraclitus, at all times then we are
simply Becoming with no
moment of Being.
In
collusion with relativity goes dependence. Time,
in order to exist, is dependent on people.
Because of this time is something that is created,
by humans, in order to give shape and meaning to
the world around us. In the absence of humans,
time does not exist. As previously stated,
time is imposed by humans on a situation either while it is happening
or after it has happened, and occasionally both.
We require time’s dependence upon ourselves in order to construct a
world in which to live with relative ease and it is for this reason
that moments in time exist. This usefulness of
time, in planning events,
remembering actions, and keeping schedules is the
reason for its existence, not some ethereal
notion. Time is because we say it is.
Because we create time it is of the utmost usefulness to ourselves
that we also enable us to note moments in time.
These moments are also relative to those viewing them.
A scientist may measure things in nanoseconds for his work but an
hourly worker will measure theirs in minutes.
Moments, as part of a time that we create,
are created for their usefulness to us. The
impact of time on Platonic Ethics, particular the
acquirement of knowledge of the Forms, is massive
as will be shown below. The view of time that is
held by Plato, via Heraclitus,
is incompatible with the epistemological system which Plato
describes. Before an examination of these
problems the reader will find a detailed description of The Theory of
the Forms and Narrativity.
Platonic
Ethics is having and holding ethical virtue and knowledge over a
continuous time frame with the intent on becoming more knowledgeable
over time as displayed in The Republic Book V-VI.
The
basic principle upon which The Theory of the Forms is based is
participation,
particularly participation in the the Forms themselves.
The Forms are metaphysical traits that exist separately from humans
but are present in the world through different objects' participation
in them.
For instance,
a person is tall because they participate in the form of Tallness.
In a more basic understanding,
anything that can be denoted as a adjective,
whether it is a color,
size,
or description of any kind,
is a reflection of that things participation in said forms.
In addition to these forms is an overarching Form of The Good,
under which all forms fall.
A trait of all forms are that they are forms of good.
The way in which humans understand the various objects around them
and,
in some sense,
their own being itself,
is through their understanding of forms.
These forms are discoverable through dialectic discussions with other
intelligent beings.
This
dialectical discussion introduces problems for the Theory of the
Forms.
If
Forms,
and therefore knowledge,
are discoverable through discussion then these discussions must take
place between two people during a specified period of time.
This time that is spent in discussion must,
by necessity,
take place in a world of Becoming.
The reason behind this necessity is simple.
If neither individual has any prior knowledge of the form they are
attempting to find,
such as Piety,
then the individuals must be changing as they attempt to reason a
definition for Piety.
This dialectics will be labeled R.
The time that they spend reasoning will be labeled S†.
The moment when they discover the true definition of the form of
Piety will be labeled D.
Now during the period of R both participants are using knowledge that
they already have.
This knowledge constitutes part of their Being.
During S the participants are therefore to be considered in a state
of Being.
The problem arises that once they discover the true definition of
Piety and therefore have the Form of Piety they can no longer be the
same selves.
Upon realizing D the participants have either: A- passed into a state
of becoming during which they learn the Form of Piety and then revert
into a state of Being after having learned this or B- passed from one
state of Being into a new state of Being without having a state of
Becoming.
Through the first way of thinking the participants have retained
narrativity and see themselves as the same Beings that did not have D
previously but now have D.
In the second way of interpretation the participants must reject
narrativity in favor of Being different people,
one person when they did not know D and a different person now that
they know D.
One
of the most important ideas contained in The Theory of the Forms is
the idea that once a person has begun to understand forms as forms
themselves they are ethically required to help other beings,
through dialectics,
to understand these forms.
Now if dialectics is the only way to discover forms and forms are
what allow us to understand the intelligible things around us,
it stands to reason that through dialectics all knowledge has the
ability to follow.
Narrativity is the act of
being the same 'self' through a continuous time frame.
This is to say that a being with Narrative identity sees their body
and mind as existing as the same entities at different moments in
time. At T¹ X is X. At T² X
is X. At T³ X is X and so on.
One who constructs their identity of self through a narrative time
line is the same being as they were last year, 10
years ago, etc. The opposite
of a narrative construction of self is a non-narrative construct.
In non-narrative constructions of the self the individual sees
themselves as fundamentally different people at different times.
For example at T¹ the person is X, at T² the
person identifies as Y and at T³ the person identifies as Z.
In each of these cases the person does not necessarily identify with
their previous selves because their new self is not a narrative begun
in the last self. So while a person with a
narrative construction of self lives in a state of Becoming the
non-narrative person lives in a state of Being.
The narrative person is in a state of becoming because they are
constructing different ideas of themselves at different points in
time while still maintaining that they are the same person.
The impact of this view is tied closely to time and change over time
as will be seen below.
If we are not the same person over time then it is impossible for
us to understand any unchanging
idea while in a state of Becoming.
Being held in a state of constant Becoming means that our bodies and
ideas are subject to change at random.
However,
this change would subject Piety,
or any other Form for that matter,
to the corruption of change.
Because of this the person would have to reject a narrative life in
exchange for a life of pure moments.
In these moments that individual would be in a state of Being rather
than in a state of Becoming.
This state of being would mean that they are a whole,
unchanging individual at that point in time.
However,
this view would mean that any individual would only have so much time
in which to utilize a particular form because once they were able to
move to the next point along their narrative they would in effect
become a different self.
While becoming this different self does not necessarily mean that
they would no longer understand the form of X,
they would,
of necessity understand it in a different way and therefore
incompletely.
This different way of understanding would corrupt the original
understanding of any particular form.
For example,
X understands the form of Piety at T¹.
The duration of X understanding Piety is dependent on the duration
of T¹ due to his state of being being connected to T¹ in the same
fashion.
X is only in a state of Being for the duration of T¹ and then
becomes Y at T².
Once T² is reached Y now understands Piety at a different moment in
time as a different Being enclosed in a state of Being that will also
only last until the end of T².
When T² becomes T³
then Y,
who was once X,
is now Z.
This is the crux of the problem.
While the Forms themselves do not change the human understanding of
them,
by necessity,
must change.
There are only a few ways in which humans have the ability to
understand a form in its entirety.
We must either remain in a constant state of Being or our
understanding of the forms is not impacted by the way we change.
As one will see in the following there are problems with both of
these hypotheses.
The
first hypothesis to overcome is that we exist in a constant state of
Being.
There are some very fundamental problems with remaining in a state of
constant Being.
The first problem one could typically expect to face is that of
change.
If one is in a state of constant Being then how do they change,
either physically or mentally? Any person would be stuck in this
state without motion,
thought [because it requires motion to think],
or change of any kind.
Living in this state would be equivalent to non-existence.
One would not be able to feel,
think,
grow,
age,
die.
One would not have a will either,
because of the need to think in order to will.
So while one would be a physical being they would stand as a statue
in a vacuum,
neither feeling nor knowing.
The
other possibility is that our understanding of the forms does not
change in relation to our state of Being.
This however is wrong.
It is through our change in Being that we learn,
either from a state of Being to a new State of Being or remaining in
a constant state of Becoming.
Remaining in a constant state of becoming will make our understanding
of any Form relative to our state of being and the time at which we
are in these states of being.
However,
if one was to adopt a truly non-narrative view of their self identity
then they would still be faced with the problem of the statue as
mentioned above.
In
essence the reason why Plato's epistemological view of humans and the
Forms that they strive for is incompatible with the actualities that
he presents about the Forms is that humans,
by necessity must construct themselves as narrative beings.
This places the human in question in a state of constant Becoming.
While in this state of Becoming the individual would not be able to
comprehend the full truth of the Forms.
This is due to the fact that their perception of the Forms changes
depending on their current state of Becoming in much the same way
that a person cannot step into the same river twice with the Form
being the river one originally steps into.
Therefore the only way to understand forms would be to exist solely
in a state of Being like the Forms themselves do.
However,
as stated above,
this is not possible for the Human to do and still retain their
'humanity'. The
solution here would be to view time as a human construct that can be
changed via thought.
By this it is meant that people are able to conceptualize time into
units that are most useful to them.˜
By being able to conceptualize the self as a narrative Becoming
construct that also has episodic bouts of pure Being would make it
possible to understand Plato's Forms in their fullness without the
problem of becoming statue-like.
It would allow the individual to engage in moments of Being while
still reverting to a narrativity of becoming when necessary.
Bibliography
Published
Work
Hutchins,
Robert Maynard. "Plato." In Great
books of the Western World.
[Private library] ed. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1987. Books
1-7.
Strawson,
Galen. "Against Narrativity."Ratio XVII,
no. 4 (2004): 428-452.
Unpublished
Work
Eames, Jeremy. .”Biomedical Platonic Ethics”. Unpublished manuscript, University of South Florida (2012)
Eames, Jeremy. . “Heraclitian Time”. Unpublished manuscript, University of South Florida (2011)
*Fragment
41; Quoted by Plato in Cratylus
. The further breakdown on time and becoming is
attributed to Heraclitus and is understood that Plato agrees with
Heraclitus and his world of becoming.
†It
is labeled S so as to not confuse it with other designations for
time in different scenarios presented in this paper.
˜The
truthfulness of this is a matter best left for further debate.
