2013 AP LANGUAGE AND COMPOSITION ARGUMENTATIVE ESSAY

Ownership is a many faceted and generally misunderstood concept that has been elucidated by dozens of thinkers throughout western history. These thinkers tend to define ownership in relation to a sense of self that is even less understood than the ownership that supposedly proceeds it. In the following, the reader will see a western interpretation of ownership and its inherently meaningless inclusion with a sense of self.

            The average individual in the western world has been reared in a society that induces massive consumerism in all ages from toddlers to the aged. In the years that divide these two age groups the western citizen is coerced through societal pressure to have as much as possible. From this having of object foreign to the body does the idea of self emanates. Westerners tend, in general, to derive their sense of self from the objects around them. What they fail to realize is that the objects that are being bought are the ideas of someone else. The products, ranging from cars to toys, are the designs of some other person. While a person might own something in the legal sense of own a product, to derive self-worth or a sense of self from this item would be detrimental to the individual. It is detrimental in the idea that said person is merely owning a single copy of the item, rather than owning the concept of the item itself. The original designer would “own” the item in its most total sense and would, would more capably, derive a sense of self from that item. Even in this derivation of self-worth there remain problems.

            As Sartre points out in his ideas regarding his waiter in the café, the sense of self that one derives from items or occupations is dependent on how the individual interprets said items to reflect on their idea of self. Here it is the individual’s interpretation that creates a sense of self rather than the item itself. While this is certainly a more nuanced view of the problem, it does not solve the problem of things outside the self reflecting an actuality of the self. In Sartre’s view the human will to create a sense of self in dependent on the individual, as it should be. Where he digresses is in the acquiescence to outside forces forming a persons will. A western citizen, cultured and grown in a world dedicated to materialism and consumerism, has little choice in their concept of self. The outside forces are, at least according to Sartre’s line of thought, so burdensome that the individual in some sense relinquishes their own created individual for the image that a society drapes upon them. People, in general, feel content to fulfill the roles that are cast upon them. This therefore is not the way to define self and is implausible due to several factors.

            Chief among these factors is the willingness to let things outside the body define the body itself. If one holds a non-metaphysical understanding of the world and the things in it, (ie, that one rejects the dualistic nature of platonic forms and other such ‘informers’ of the world) then one must ask why something that is foreign to a body has the capability to define that body itself. The body, and hence the self as a product of said body, can only be defined by what is within. People would rather define themselves by what they are not, ie anything outside the body. This however is just as detrimental to the understanding of self. Definition of self through negation, ie what is outside the body, does not define what self is but rather what self it not. For example, the idea of self is contingent upon the body. If it is contingent upon the body for its primary existence then it should derive its existential meaning from the thing it is derivative of, in this case the body itself. This is much the case with many things. Take for instance the idea of a tree. When lumber is harvested from a tree the original idea, existential meaning, of the lumber was to sustain the tree. It has simply been repurposed. The repurposing of the tree into lumber does not nullify its primary existential meaning of supporting its original body. Therefore we can still define lumber as something that was in existence to support the tree it originally come from. The same can be said of the self. Its original purpose is to support the body in which it resides, almost as a soul. However, unlike a soul its existence is completely contingent on the body. As it is contingent on the body for both its creation and continued existence, the body must, by necessity provide the self its primary meaning.

Therefore, the sense of self that one cultivates can not be derived from anything external to the body. These externalities include but a certainly not limited to, the products and creations of a modern world, the ideas that one creates with external input rather that a priori. Sense of self is predicated on the body and therefore must be derivative of the body and the body alone.   

Foucault and Greek Sexuality (Paper)

Greek Sexuality

Greek sexuality in the ancient period can be seen in two distinct ways: that of Foucault as being devoid of sexual discrimination and that of John Boswell as being sexually defined. Between these two historians lay many examples pointing to a clear emphasis is the classical period on understood and socially constructed homosexual relationships that differed dramatically in clearly defined ways. These examples will be used to support John Boswell's illustration of sexuality in the classical Greek period as superior to Foucault's. There are two distinct areas within this sexuality that illustrate the existence of homosexuality in the classical period, in light of Foucault's insistence that this distinction is not possible. The first area is in overturning the assumption that passivity and activity in homosexual relations were necessarily different than in heterosexual ones. The second is in determining that age does define the appropriate context of a homosexual relationship.

Defining passivity and activity in the Greek classical world as a tool to be used in determining the socio-sexual determination of the participants involved is shaky at best. In need of even graver consideration is the defining of homosexual men as members of a lower class than heterosexual men based on the socio-sexual determination of activity and passivity. In his work The History of Sexuality Foucault paints a picture of homosexual men as being regarded as inferior to heterosexual men due to the perceived effeminacy that homosexuals are supposedly labeled with for their 'passive' acts. Farther from the truth Foucault could not get. Plato states in the Symposium,

“Those who love men and rejoice to lie with and be embraced by men are also the finest boys and young me, being naturally the most manly. The people who accuse them of shamelessness lie;...A clear proof of this is the fact that as adults they alone acquit themselves as men in public careers.”¹

Plato, one of the most accomplished and respected citizens of Athens, goes on to reason that homosexual soldiers would make the best army in the world.² To limit the understanding of sexuality in the classical world to socially relative terms such as activity and passivity is academically inaccurate when there is first hand accounts that clearly show the existence and celebration of the homosexual lifestyle. Even in Greek mythology there are myriad examples of homosexual action.³ The heterosexual love of ancient Greece was even displayed as something that was transcended by homosexual love. According to Boswell, ”The Attic law-giver Solon considered homosexual eroticism too lofty for slaves and prohibited it to them.”⁴

The other area in which Boswell draws a distinction between modern historical study and the actuality of the period is in the age discrimination that was purportedly applied to same sex relationships. Foucault portrays these relationships as occurring almost solely between young boys and old men. He seems to encourage the idea that same sex relationships (homosexuality) between two older men would result in those parties becoming social outcasts. However the opposite is actually true. Apart from the quotes above, Boswell also portrays this discrimination between age as against what Foucault is implying. The ageism here means that now Foucault is further distinguishing male on male sexuality not just as homosexual (a term which is supposed to subsume all other archetypes of male on male sexual relations but) act but now as a homosexual, age dependent act. For example, Euripides at age seventy was loved by and in love with Agathon.⁵ This is just one among many example that Boswell is able to provide. Furthermore, with respect to activity/passivity, there is no unambiguous document that defines age as a criterion for determining who was the one to be loved and who would love the beloved. Because of the lack of factual evidence, Foucault appears to be using later texts of the Middle Ages when attempting to explain the clearly homosexual-friendly reality of the classical Greek world.

In all Foucault is wrong in assuming that homosexual relationships in classical Greece were generally considered socially unacceptable with the only exception being based on a different age dynamic. Instead, classical Greece was a place of homosexual acceptance and even celebration with homosexual relationships being held, in many instances, in a higher regard than heterosexual relationships. Furthermore the idea that homosexual relationships were looked down upon is clearly dispelled by Boswell.

1Plato, Symposium. 192A cf. Phaedrus's Speech

2 Boswell, John. "Introduction." In Christianity, social tolerance, and homosexuality: gay people in Western Europe from the beginning of the Christian era to the fourteenth century. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. p 25.

3ibid (see Hercules)

4Boswell, Christianity et al. p 27

5Boswell, Christianity et al. p28 n.52   

Platonic Forms, Time, and Narrativity (Paper)

Platonic Forms, Time, and Narrativity

The following paper will argue that the act of unchanging being through time is incompatible with Plato's epistemological view of humans. The argument will be preceded with a brief introduction of three core ideas: Time, Platonic Ethics, Narrativity. As Plato argues in the Euthyphro, the idea of piety must be unchanging and constant in order for the idea of piety to carry any weight. If the idea of piety must remain the same regardless of time in order for it to be 'Piety' and therefore carry metaphysical weight, humans must be able to understand piety in its fullness, which is to say that humans must be in a state of Being in order to fully understand Piety^ª.

Time is a series of interlocking moments as realized through the human(s) perception. In Heraclitus' work, with which it seems that Plato would tend to agree^*, he presents an understanding of time in which you have four basic premises: 1) That ‘X equals X’ at T¹, meaning that X exists at a moment in time, hence being. 2) That time is infinitely divisible. 3) That, because time is infinitely divisible, you can have no ‘moments in time’ because for everything that you label a moment you will be able to further divide that moment. 4) That because you cannot have any moments in time at no time can ‘X equal X’ which results in a world not of being but in a world of becoming. While this is logically correct in the sense that all the premises accurately reflect a logical conclusion we are concerned with presenting the accuracy of these premises in the first. Heraclitus uses the metaphor of a river to explain his ideas about the constant flux of the world and the constant change that takes place. Plato notes that according to Heraclitus, it is impossible to step into the same river twice. By this he means that the river is constantly changing and that the person entering the river would never be able to step into the same water twice, for this water would have been removed down river and replaced by new water. In order for this to be possible he stands in support of an ever changing world with no definable moments in time. This ever-changing phenomenon is not without faults, among them assumptions that time takes place regardless of humans and disregarding the fact that time and its divisibility is contingent upon the constructs usefulness to humans.

In order for this ever-changing world to be rational it must be exhibited by physical matter held in a vacuum otherwise this pretense does not hold up well in the physical world. We shall start with the first premise. ‘X equals X’. This premise may come across as straightforward but must be explained here for it has implications on the rest of the argument. The statement of ‘X equals X’ is a statement of Being while ‘X does not equal X’ stands to mean that the item is nonexistent. Unlike statements of Becoming, Being implies that at a specified time, T¹, a physical item actually existed whether in a physical or metaphysical form. This is juxtaposed to a statement such as Heraclitus' that we live in an ever-changing world. His world view is a clear statement in favor of Becoming in which we take a relative existence dependent upon what is exerting power upon us and the setting that we find ourselves in. According to Heraclitus, at all times then we are simply Becoming with no moment of Being.

In collusion with relativity goes dependence. Time, in order to exist, is dependent on people. Because of this time is something that is created, by humans, in order to give shape and meaning to the world around us. In the absence of humans, time does not exist. As previously stated, time is imposed by humans on a situation either while it is happening or after it has happened, and occasionally both. We require time’s dependence upon ourselves in order to construct a world in which to live with relative ease and it is for this reason that moments in time exist. This usefulness of time, in planning events, remembering actions, and keeping schedules is the reason for its existence, not some ethereal notion. Time is because we say it is. Because we create time it is of the utmost usefulness to ourselves that we also enable us to note moments in time. These moments are also relative to those viewing them. A scientist may measure things in nanoseconds for his work but an hourly worker will measure theirs in minutes. Moments, as part of a time that we create, are created for their usefulness to us. The impact of time on Platonic Ethics, particular the acquirement of knowledge of the Forms, is massive as will be shown below. The view of time that is held by Plato, via Heraclitus, is incompatible with the epistemological system which Plato describes. Before an examination of these problems the reader will find a detailed description of The Theory of the Forms and Narrativity.

Platonic Ethics is having and holding ethical virtue and knowledge over a continuous time frame with the intent on becoming more knowledgeable over time as displayed in The Republic Book V-VI. The basic principle upon which The Theory of the Forms is based is participation, particularly participation in the the Forms themselves. The Forms are metaphysical traits that exist separately from humans but are present in the world through different objects' participation in them. For instance, a person is tall because they participate in the form of Tallness. In a more basic understanding, anything that can be denoted as a adjective, whether it is a color, size, or description of any kind, is a reflection of that things participation in said forms. In addition to these forms is an overarching Form of The Good, under which all forms fall. A trait of all forms are that they are forms of good. The way in which humans understand the various objects around them and, in some sense, their own being itself, is through their understanding of forms. These forms are discoverable through dialectic discussions with other intelligent beings. This dialectical discussion introduces problems for the Theory of the Forms.

If Forms, and therefore knowledge, are discoverable through discussion then these discussions must take place between two people during a specified period of time. This time that is spent in discussion must, by necessity, take place in a world of Becoming. The reason behind this necessity is simple. If neither individual has any prior knowledge of the form they are attempting to find, such as Piety, then the individuals must be changing as they attempt to reason a definition for Piety. This dialectics will be labeled R. The time that they spend reasoning will be labeled S^†. The moment when they discover the true definition of the form of Piety will be labeled D. Now during the period of R both participants are using knowledge that they already have. This knowledge constitutes part of their Being. During S the participants are therefore to be considered in a state of Being. The problem arises that once they discover the true definition of Piety and therefore have the Form of Piety they can no longer be the same selves. Upon realizing D the participants have either: A- passed into a state of becoming during which they learn the Form of Piety and then revert into a state of Being after having learned this or B- passed from one state of Being into a new state of Being without having a state of Becoming. Through the first way of thinking the participants have retained narrativity and see themselves as the same Beings that did not have D previously but now have D. In the second way of interpretation the participants must reject narrativity in favor of Being different people, one person when they did not know D and a different person now that they know D.

One of the most important ideas contained in The Theory of the Forms is the idea that once a person has begun to understand forms as forms themselves they are ethically required to help other beings, through dialectics, to understand these forms. Now if dialectics is the only way to discover forms and forms are what allow us to understand the intelligible things around us, it stands to reason that through dialectics all knowledge has the ability to follow.

Narrativity is the act of being the same 'self' through a continuous time frame. This is to say that a being with Narrative identity sees their body and mind as existing as the same entities at different moments in time. At T¹ X is X. At T² X is X. At T³ X is X and so on. One who constructs their identity of self through a narrative time line is the same being as they were last year, 10 years ago, etc. The opposite of a narrative construction of self is a non-narrative construct. In non-narrative constructions of the self the individual sees themselves as fundamentally different people at different times. For example at T¹ the person is X, at T² the person identifies as Y and at T³ the person identifies as Z. In each of these cases the person does not necessarily identify with their previous selves because their new self is not a narrative begun in the last self. So while a person with a narrative construction of self lives in a state of Becoming the non-narrative person lives in a state of Being. The narrative person is in a state of becoming because they are constructing different ideas of themselves at different points in time while still maintaining that they are the same person. The impact of this view is tied closely to time and change over time as will be seen below.

If we are not the same person over time then it is impossible for us to understand any unchanging idea while in a state of Becoming. Being held in a state of constant Becoming means that our bodies and ideas are subject to change at random. However, this change would subject Piety, or any other Form for that matter, to the corruption of change. Because of this the person would have to reject a narrative life in exchange for a life of pure moments. In these moments that individual would be in a state of Being rather than in a state of Becoming. This state of being would mean that they are a whole, unchanging individual at that point in time. However, this view would mean that any individual would only have so much time in which to utilize a particular form because once they were able to move to the next point along their narrative they would in effect become a different self. While becoming this different self does not necessarily mean that they would no longer understand the form of X, they would, of necessity understand it in a different way and therefore incompletely. This different way of understanding would corrupt the original understanding of any particular form. For example, X understands the form of Piety at T¹. The duration of X understanding Piety is dependent on the duration of T¹ due to his state of being being connected to T¹ in the same fashion. X is only in a state of Being for the duration of T¹ and then becomes Y at T². Once T² is reached Y now understands Piety at a different moment in time as a different Being enclosed in a state of Being that will also only last until the end of T². When T² becomes T³ then Y, who was once X, is now Z. This is the crux of the problem. While the Forms themselves do not change the human understanding of them, by necessity, must change. There are only a few ways in which humans have the ability to understand a form in its entirety. We must either remain in a constant state of Being or our understanding of the forms is not impacted by the way we change. As one will see in the following there are problems with both of these hypotheses.

The first hypothesis to overcome is that we exist in a constant state of Being. There are some very fundamental problems with remaining in a state of constant Being. The first problem one could typically expect to face is that of change. If one is in a state of constant Being then how do they change, either physically or mentally? Any person would be stuck in this state without motion, thought [because it requires motion to think], or change of any kind. Living in this state would be equivalent to non-existence. One would not be able to feel, think, grow, age, die. One would not have a will either, because of the need to think in order to will. So while one would be a physical being they would stand as a statue in a vacuum, neither feeling nor knowing.

The other possibility is that our understanding of the forms does not change in relation to our state of Being. This however is wrong. It is through our change in Being that we learn, either from a state of Being to a new State of Being or remaining in a constant state of Becoming. Remaining in a constant state of becoming will make our understanding of any Form relative to our state of being and the time at which we are in these states of being. However, if one was to adopt a truly non-narrative view of their self identity then they would still be faced with the problem of the statue as mentioned above.

In essence the reason why Plato's epistemological view of humans and the Forms that they strive for is incompatible with the actualities that he presents about the Forms is that humans, by necessity must construct themselves as narrative beings. This places the human in question in a state of constant Becoming. While in this state of Becoming the individual would not be able to comprehend the full truth of the Forms. This is due to the fact that their perception of the Forms changes depending on their current state of Becoming in much the same way that a person cannot step into the same river twice with the Form being the river one originally steps into. Therefore the only way to understand forms would be to exist solely in a state of Being like the Forms themselves do. However, as stated above, this is not possible for the Human to do and still retain their 'humanity'. The solution here would be to view time as a human construct that can be changed via thought. By this it is meant that people are able to conceptualize time into units that are most useful to them.^˜ By being able to conceptualize the self as a narrative Becoming construct that also has episodic bouts of pure Being would make it possible to understand Plato's Forms in their fullness without the problem of becoming statue-like. It would allow the individual to engage in moments of Being while still reverting to a narrativity of becoming when necessary.

Bibliography

Published Work

Hutchins, Robert Maynard. "Plato." In Great books of the Western World. [Private library] ed. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1987. Books 1-7.

Strawson, Galen. "Against Narrativity."Ratio XVII, no. 4 (2004): 428-452.

Unpublished Work

Eames, Jeremy. .”Biomedical Platonic Ethics”. Unpublished manuscript, University of South Florida (2012)

Eames, Jeremy. . “Heraclitian Time”. Unpublished manuscript, University of South Florida (2011)

ªHere piety is used as a stand in for every form. Whether Justice, Love, Tallness, etc.

*Fragment 41; Quoted by Plato in Cratylus . The further breakdown on time and becoming is attributed to Heraclitus and is understood that Plato agrees with Heraclitus and his world of becoming.

†It is labeled S so as to not confuse it with other designations for time in different scenarios presented in this paper.

˜The truthfulness of this is a matter best left for further debate.

Time as Being (Paper)

The idea that you can have no such thing as moments in time is not possible in a human world. In Heraclitus' work he presents an understanding of time in which you have four basic premises: 1) That ‘X equals X’ at T1, meaning that X exists at a moment in time, hence being. 2) That time is infinitely divisible. 3) That because time is infinitely divisible you can have no ‘moments in time’ because for everything that you label a moment you will be able to further divide that moment. 4) That because you cannot have any moments in time at no time can ‘X equal X’ which results in a world not of being but in a world of becoming. While this is logically correct in the sense that all the premises accurately reflect a logical conclusion we are concerned with presenting the accuracy of these premises in the first. Heraclitus uses the metaphor of a river to explain his ideas about the constant flux of the world and the constant change that takes place. Plato notes that according to Heraclitus, it is impossible to step into the same river twice. By this he means that the river is constantly changing and that the person entering the river would never be able to step into the same water twice, for this water would have been removed down river and replaced by new water. In order for this to be possible he stands in support of an ever changing world with no definable moments in time. This ever-changing phenomenon is not without faults, among them assumptions that time takes place regardless of humans and disregarding the fact that time and its divisibility is contingent upon the constructs usefulness to humans.  

            In order for this ever-changing world to be rational it must be exhibited by physical matter held in a vacuum otherwise this pretense does not hold up well in the physical world. We shall start with the first premise. ‘X equals X’. This premise may come across as straightforward but must be explained here for it has implications on the rest of the argument. The statement of ‘X equals X’ is a statement of Being while ‘X does not equal X’ stands to mean that the item is nonexistent. Unlike statements of Becoming, Being implies that at a specified time, T1, a physical item actually existed whether in a physical or metaphysical form. This is juxtaposed to a statement such as Heraclitus' that we live in an ever-changing world. His world view is a clear statement in favor of  Becoming in which we take a relative existence dependent upon what is exerting power upon us and the setting that we find ourselves in. According to Heraclitus, at all times then we are simply Becoming with no moment of Being. Quite backward I think.

The second premise of the argument is that time is infinitely divisible. The idea of having time being infinitely divisible is not useful to humans. Because, as will be displayed below, time is relative and dependent upon humans for existence, time is simply a creation that we utilize because it is convenient and advantageous for us to do so. The idea that you can have no moments in time is not possible in a human world. If, as has been presented, time is infinitely divisible then it would be true that you can have no moments in time. However, in order for items and objects to interact with each other there must be a specified time, relative to the participants, at which two things come into contact. Therefore time must not be infinitely divisible, for time is relative to the object taking part in an action and is therefore a mere imposition of an abstract, unrealistic idea upon physical items. Therefore we must consider time as an abstract idea and decide if it is: Dependent or Independent, Relative or not. Let us first begin by examining the relativity of time.

            It is my understanding that time is relative to the participants in a given situation and that time is imposed upon items through their relation to those who witness the event. In the cases of black holes we, who are not entering a black hole but observing from outside its range are of the opinion that anything that enters a black hole becomes stationary when it crosses the line into the black holes area of power. This line is termed the event horizon. While to observers on the outside of a black hole the object that enters merely becomes stationary to our eyes, the person that enters a black hole sees themselves clearly continuing to move toward the center of the black hole. In this example time is made relative in an event by those who participate in it. Another example of usefulness is that of a car crash. In this event a person in a car that participates in the crash can see a dramatic difference in their perception of time as it is slowed down. To an observer that stands on the roadway and witnesses this event, time continues to move along at their own regular pace. The time that both participants witness is relative to them. 

            In addition those who are viewing it, humans impose the idea of time and change on the event. By this I mean that in the absence of humans, time does not exist but is merely a system of thought that we impose upon the world around us, in a practical manner, in order to interpret events that we are a part of or events that we perceive to happen. In this example we may take a tree that is in a forest. There are no witnesses to the event when the tree falls. Later a person comes walking by and witnesses a tree lying on the ground. By witnessing the tree lying on the ground we have inadvertently imposed our idea of time on a scene in order to reconstruct what has happened. Through this imposition we have come to the conclusion that the tree has fallen in a time that is relative to us (i.e. last week, an hour ago, etc.). Because we have imposed time, as a system of thought, upon our surroundings we have imposed an abstract, relative idea on an event.

            In collusion with relativity goes dependence. Time, in order to exist, is dependent on people. Because of this time is something that is created, by humans, in order to give shape and meaning to the world around us. In the absence of humans, time does not exist. As previously stated, time is imposed by humans on a situation either while it is happening or after it has happened, and occasionally both. We require time’s dependence upon ourselves in order to construct a world in which to live with relative ease and it is for this reason that moments in time exist. This usefulness of time, in planning events, remembering actions, and keeping schedules is the reason for its existence, not some ethereal notion. Time is because we say it is. Because we create time it is of the utmost usefulness to ourselves that we also enable us to note moments in time. These moments are also relative to those viewing them. A scientist may measure things in nanoseconds for his work but an hourly worker will measure theirs in minutes. Moments, as part of a time that we create, are created for their usefulness to us.  

            Heraclitus' argument against this could possibly come in the form of a rejection of events taking place outside of time. In order for events to take place in Heraclitus' world, time would not be relative nor a human creation. Time itself would take place outside of human interaction and would be what spurs the objects in the world to change. He would also argue that, because time is ever-changing at no ‘moment’ could the idea form in the minds of men that time were a creation of men. In addition to these objections he might also suppose that the senses we use to witness time are simply misleading being as they are of the body and not of the mind. He might also suggest that the idea of time taking place and being ever-changing is only possible to view from outside the body. He would argue that even though there are no humans to witness a river flowing it will continue to flow regardless.

            Logically, none of the rejections is plausible. First let us take the idea that time would take place outside of human notice. This is refuted by the idea previously stated, that time is imposed upon events, upon their being noticed by a human. The human would back-date, so to speak, the time essentially placing the events into their creation of time. Time must be recognized to exist and as the only creature with the agency to recognize this theoretical concept we implement it in a way that works best for us.

            On the second point raised we have already presented the idea of a time creation that is useful to us and therefore divisible to whatever such a point that the individual desires. Say at T2 a person decided to recognize time as a measurement that would be expedient for them and so decided to utilize it.

            On the third point the idea that the only way to view time accurately is to be in a separate dimension so to speak is not a rational statement. The only way for a human to recognize what is is through their own senses. Their own interpretation of time is what creates time in the first place. Also would time be taking place even while we struggled to understand the concept of time while in the body?

            In  summation, the idea that time is an ever flowing river that continuously changes is not a suitable idea for several reasons.  Because time is a human creation we are able to impose our own ideas of time in a fashion relative to our need for its usefulness.

Bibliography

Raven, J.E. , and G.S. Kirk. The Presocratic Philosophers. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1971. Print.

Also used: Assorted notes provided on draft #1 by Professor Ali Elamin, University of South Florida, Philosophy Dept. 10/25/2011                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 

A Discussion of Papal Authority in the High Middle Ages (Paper)

A Discussion of Papal Authority in the High Middle Ages

The following paper will discuss papal authority as viewed by Ivo of Chartres and will include a discussion on the Concordat of Worms as read in: Miller, Maureen C..Power and the holy in the age of the investiture conflict: a brief history with documents. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2005. 

Power in Europe in the 11^th and 12^th Centuries was split between the nobility and the church in a murky power arrangement that neither side clearly understood. In the latter half of the 11^th century the Bishops of Rome began to accumulate more direct power over the various sees in Western Europe placing them in direct conflict with the presiding Emperors and Kings. The most notable of these transgressions was with the Holy Roman Emperors of the German States which erupted into a wider battle with both sides claiming the right to appoint bishops and other church officials. What has been termed ‘The Investiture Conflict’ would culminate in the Concordat of Worms in 1122 with the Emperor Henry V coming to terms with Pope Calixtus II.¹ In the agreement the Emperor gives up all claims to investing Bishops in his lands with symbols of spiritual power and returns all lands and goods taken from the church by himself and his father. In return he was granted the right to invest bishops with secular power.² Some years previous to this Ivo of Chartres raised a few fundamental points on the relationship between King and Church in his letter of rejection sent to one Hugh of Lyon, an apostolic legate appointed by the Pope. In his letter he states that papal authorities have been asserting the power of the Bishop of Rome in ways that hinders the church or does not improve the church at all. He further states that it would be much easier for the local councils to vote for new bishops themselves rather than have them appointed to their posts by the Pope. Ivo also argues against the entire investing conflict because he does not see the harm in a king instating a bishop as it does not involve preforming any sacraments.³ While all these claims were made in Ivo’s Correspondence the only one actually addressed in the Concordat is the issue of the actual investing of bishops therefore, the issues presented by Ivo of Chartres were, for the largest part, left unaddressed in the Concordat of Worms.

In Ivo’s letter to the papal legate he asserts many points. The first and most important of these is the request not to be bound so tightly by papal laws that, according to Ivo, are not necessarily within the canonical laws that are exercised by the bishop of Rome. One may view this as a sign that while the Church was united they did not yet view the Bishop of Rome as the supreme power of the church. This is in spite of the fact that The Dictatus papae was written almost 30 years prior claiming more widespread authority for the Pope.⁴ This neglecting of the Pope’s authority can provide the historian with a glimpse into how the church in the High Middle Ages worked. Judging by the fact that many German bishops during the 1070s and 1080s rejected the authority of Gregory VII and called actively for his abdication until his death in 1085, one might say that the church was not centrally controlled by Popes at the time.⁵ This is fundamental to understanding why this conflict came about in the first place. In Ivo’s opinion the Pope was overstepping his authority by trying to broadly increase his authority not only over Emperors like Henry but also over bishops like Ivo. Central to the Pope’s aims was his claiming succession from St. Peter. In the eyes of Gregory VII this gave him the power to bar kings from heaven, appoint bishops from afar, and create new canon law. According to Ivo and his view on earlier church fathers, this should not be the case but rather the see of Rome should act in reference to the writing of predecessors instead of making up laws which benefit itself instead of the entire church.⁶

The second point made by Ivo inquires whether or not investiture by kings is truly a problem. This almost argues for the king to appoint the bishops otherwise, in effect, the church was saying that the kings and emperors were not holy. This was a direct contradiction to the populist ideas of the time as promulgated by Guibert of Nogent shortly after the letter by Ivo. In this account kings were able to miraculously heal their subjects with the slightest touch.⁷ This is powerful evidence for the social acceptability of Kings investing bishops. If kings were holy how could you deny them that power? At the same time Ivo states that it shouldn’t matter whether or not kings took part because in the end the bishop was invested by God himself. In this objection the historian may see why so many bishops supported the German Emperor in the first place. If the King or Emperor were seen as a holy figure in and of themselves as suggested by the tomb of Edward II and subsequent description in which bones of dead rulers where dispersed amongst his kingdom, the Bishops of his territory would naturally support him as: A-he was the one to invest them originally and B- They saw him as a way to contact god, as with saints.⁸

Ivo also argues that it is the power of the local clergy to appoint a bishop by election and that the pope should not interfere with this right unless that power had been granted by ancient rights of church fathers, which it had not. ⁹ Later, this power will be usurped by the pope as shown in the account of a disputed election in Auxerre. In other words the power of the popes is almost insured by the vague wording in the Concordat. Any power not expressly denied to the pope is still open for Papal rulers to somehow take as their own.

In the Concordat of Worms, the king gives up his ability to invest members of the clergy with symbols of Divine power such as the Staff and Ring. By doing this he has now limited his power to strictly temporal possessions and is therefore reliant on the church to provide him with divine absolution. In return for his cessation of investing with divine symbols Henry receives the ability to invest church officials in a more secular way with a scepter representing the power he is giving them over his lands. In this sense the clergy have now separated themselves further from the nobility by retaining more power for themselves in the form of divine investment which is done at the cost of the Kings and Emperors. The clergy will now solely hold the power to allow people into heaven. This is seen when Gregory VII excommunicates Henry IV, in essence barring him from heaven as the Pope is the direct successor to St. Peter, the Gatekeeper of Heaven.

In addition to the Emperors not investing clergy with divine symbols, the Concordat also states that any property that was seized by Henry or his father was to be given back to the church.¹⁰ This is actually a major setback for the nobility because large tracts of land that were previously granted to the nobility have since fallen into the hands of the Church through bequeathments and wills. This only served to strengthen the demands that the church made on the nobility.

Adjudicating the dispute between the church and the nobility is not an easy task for the brightest of men at the time of The Investiture Conflict and Ivo of Chartres is no exception. While many of his points about the differences in opinion between the two parties is spot-on the only actual point that is resolved in the Concordat of Worms is in regards to investment of actual bishops and leaves unresolved the issues of Papal authority, clergy autonomy, and the holiness of kings.

1 Miller, Maureen C. “The Agreements of Worms” Power and the holy in the age of the investiture conflict: a brief history with documents. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2005. 120-121

2  ibid Miller, "Power and the holy..." pp.120-121

3 Miller, Maureen C.”A Letter to the Apostolic Legate Hugh of Lyon”Power and the holy in the age of the investiture conflict: a brief history with documents. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2005. pp. 115-119

4    Miller, Maureen C.. "Pope Gregory VII, The Dictatus papae." In Power and the holy in the age of the investiture conflict: a brief history with documents. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2005. 81.

5 Miller, Maureen C. Power and the holy in the age of the investiture conflict: a brief history with documents. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2005. p. 105

6 Miller, Maureen C.”A Letter to the Apostolic Legate Hugh of Lyon”Power and the holy in the age of the investiture conflict: a brief history with documents. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2005. pp. 115-119

7 Miller, Maureen C. “On Royal Powers” Power and the holy in the age of the investiture conflict: a brief history with documents. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2005. pp. 162-163

8 Miller, Maureen C. “The Tomb of Edward II, Foreword” Power and the holy in the age of the investiture conflict: a brief history with documents. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2005. pp. 168-170

9 Miller, Maureen C.”A Letter to the Apostolic Legate Hugh of Lyon”Power and the holy in the age of the investiture conflict: a brief history with documents. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2005. pp. 115-119

10 Miller, Maureen C. “The Agreements of Worms” Power and the holy in the age of the investiture conflict: a brief history with documents. Boston: Bedford/St. Martins, 2005. pp. 120-121

Sartre on Bad Faith (Paper)

 In Being and Nothingness, Jean-Paul Sartre introduces a concept termed bad faith. In the following brief analysis of the term the reader will view the origins and definitions of the term bad faith, their relation to the existential, as well as the use of bad faith in Sartre's other works. In total, the reader will find a compelling reason why the term bad faith can be applied to humans.

To lie to one's self. To be a deceiver of the soul. To understand and recognize and then to ignore. These are the traits that are indicative of someone who is in bad faith. "We shall willingly grant that bad faith is a lie to oneself, on condition that we distinguish the lie to oneself from lying in general." (Sartre, Being and Nothingness p. 87) Sartre paints a literary picture in his work, Being and Nothingness, that portrays exactly what is at stake for a person who acts according to bad faith. According to Sartre the person who acts in bad faith is essentially performing an act of self-negation. While anyone is capable of telling a lie the person who tells a lie must also be in possession of the truth. (Sartre, Being and Nothingness p. 87). To be in bad faith that person knows the truth of their beliefs, actions, etc, but refuses to acknowledge these truths. The being that they have is therefore based on negating this very being. This self-lying is different from the lying that one might do to others. IN lying to others "The liar intends to deceive and he does not hide this intention from himself..." (Sartre, Being and Nothingness p. 88). In order for a man to truly be in bad faith he must be in possession of a truth and unwilling to recognize that truth. Once informed of the idea of bad faith the reader should see how bad faith is portrayed in other works by Sartre.

In the play No Exit, Sartre is able to display the way that bad faith would mold individuals into what they are. The one act play in which bad faith becomes evident, No Exit is about three people who have died and are now stuck in hell together. Hell in this instance is a drawing room decorated in Second Empire Style. The play was written in 1944 in France and could have been meant as a commentary on the German occupation of Paris. The three people that are kept in this drawing room are: a mother who cheated on her husband and then threw her illegitimate daughter, new-born, off a balcony, a man who joined the army but deserted before killing anyone, and a lady who seduced her cousin's wife while she was living with them. The room that they are stuck in has no mirrors, therefore the people trapped there could not see themselves as they want to see themselves but can only see themselves through the others in the room. The lack of a mirror can be representative of the lack of reflection on their actions that the people are capable of. The reflections are not corporeal with out a mirror. Instead they are forced to look inside themselves to understand who they are.

Estelle is the one looking for a mirror. With her dependency on mirrors the reader can clearly see the Narcissism inherent in her being. Because she refuses to see herself as she really is and relies instead upon her reflection in a mirror she is the character that is in bad faith the most. She is torturing herself by refusing to know herself as she is. With her torturing herself she inflicts torture on the other occupants, namely Garcin. (Sartre, No Exit )

Garcin is the cowardly soldier. He desperately wants reassurance that he is in fact not a coward. His desire is for peace and quiet more than the other characters. He had ambitions while alive to create a pacifist newspaper but never does. He runs from his actions and then seeks to rewrite them in his memory. (Sartre, No Exit )

Inez wants to be with Garcin, sexually. She works as the mirror for Estelle, to Estelle’s terror. When Inez describes what she sees in Estelle, she makes Estelle afraid/terrorized. She is the only one in the room who is able to see herself for what she is. She also attempts to make Garcin see himself as what he is. At one point she says, "So carry on, Mr. Garcin, and try to be honest with yourself-- for once." (Sartre, No Exit p. 38) This is at the point that she attempts to make Garcin realize that all the justifications that he has fabricated for running away from the army are just fabrications meant to enable him to live with his choices. Inez believes that Garcin understands that he is a coward but denies the truth to himself.

The play revolves around the idea of bad faith. Estelle is the one that is most clearly in bad faith. Garcin is much more ambiguous. He comes across as very indecisive. Inez is the only one who understands why she is placed int he drawing room. She is the only one who does not have bad faith. She understands that her person is defined by her actions. In her case she is defined by the terrible actions that she willingly did. She is the one who attempts to lead, unwittingly, the others to realize why there are in Hell. Hell is other people. There are problems with this way of thinking. In recognizing the negative forces that effect us one must also suppose that these negatives assure the existence of positives. While Garcin wants to focus solely on the negative he does so at the expense of the positive. The negation implies the possibility of the truth. (Sartre, No Exit )

The act of being requires an affirmation of the self by the individual. In addressing bad faith Sartre tries to identify why some people see themselves differently than they actually are. By being what you are and knowing what you are the individual is not living in bad faith. But if the individual acknowledges that they are being in one sense and deny that they are being in that one sense then they are, in essence, living by negation. They refuse to live positively and instead they live through denial. They deny who they are and, by doing so, they deny that they are, in fact, being. They are in a backwards fashion. (Sartre, No Exit )

It is my belief that Sartre portrays the human condition in a convincing fashion. In Being and Nothingness he portrays humanity as existing in a sort of equilibrium. Humans are capable of realizing who they are but shy away from doing so. Sartre uses the example of the waiter who is not a waiter. The waiter knows that he is not 'being' a waiter but is rather being a person who is playing at being a waiter. Sartre states that the waiter is merely a role in which the person playing at waiter is. (Sartre, Being and Nothingness p. 102). The man, acting as a waiter, knows that through such actions he is thereby given rights that pertain to such actions. (Sartre, Being and Nothingness p. 102). "I am a waiter in the mode of being what I am not" (Sartre, Being and Nothingness p.103). By saying this Sartre is affirming that in the first degree he is a man that has being and in the second degree is a man that chooses to act as a waiter, but he is never in the mode of being a waiter.

Through many different mediums Sartre assaults the way that most humans cope with their choices. In his work Being and Nothingness he describes in theoretical detail the way that many people suppress their true being in favor of something that they would rather think themselves being. In No Exit he supplies his reader with visceral evidence of people engaging in the act of self-denial. This evidence, coupled with his theory on being, drives the reader to be moved into accepting his bad faith as a legitimate explanation for understanding the self denial that humans visit upon themselves.

Bibliography

Sartre, Jean. No exit, and three other plays. Vintage International ed. New York: Vintage International, 1989. Print.

Sartre, Jean, and Hazel Estella Barnes. Being and nothingness. New York [etc.: Washington Square Press, 1992. Print.

The Eternal Recurrence and the Problem of the Overman (Paper)

The Eternal Recurrence and the Problem of the Overman

Of the multiple ideas presented in Friedrich Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the two most intellectually stimulating and encompassing pieces contained therein are the philosophical idea of the Übermensch, hereafter referred to as the Overman, and the Eternal Recurrence. In the following essay the reader will find a thorough analysis of these two themes as well as a comparison of their faults, philosophically, in relation to each other.

The first central idea in Nietzsche's work is presented in the First Part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. According to Zarathustra the Overman is the next evolution in mankind [Nietzsche, p. 13]. Nietzsche presents Zarathustra to the readers as the archetype of the Overman. In the First Part Nietzsche presents Zarathustra with all the accoutrements that would accompany an Overman: intellectual prowess, oratory skills, love of mankind, reclusiveness. The Overman, being characterized by such skills and behaviors, is a level of humanity that has superseded the ability of regular humans, but also desires to raise the rest of humanity up to the level of Overman. In order for the regular man to become an Overman there is the task of BECOMING. Zarathustra describes man as,”...a rope stretched between the animal and the Overman – a rope over an abyss [Nietzsche, p. 14].” Zarathustra says that what has made man untenable is,”...not your sin – it is your self-satisfaction... [Nietzsche, p. 14].” In the later part of this essay the reader will see the difficulty of reconciling the becoming required to achieve the status of Overman with the Eternal Recurrence.

The second major idea presented through the mouth of Zarathustra is the idea of the Eternal Recurrence. In the Third Part, Zarathustra presents an idea that all things that now live have lived already and are doomed to live again [Nietzsche, pp. 105-108]. In the theme of eternal recurrence, Zarathustra contemplates a gateway to which he has walked along a path. He stops at the gateway and asks questions of a dwarf there,” This long lane backwards: it continueth for an eternity. And that long lane forward – that is another eternity” [Nietzsche, p. 106]. To this the dwarf replies, “All truth is crooked; time itself is a circle” [Nietzsche, p. 107]. The idea here being that what has happened is destined to happen again and again an innumerable amount of times. For Zarathustra to stand at this gateway he must have already stood at the gateway and will always stand at the gateway in the future. Nietzsche's conception of the Eternal Recurrence is a romantic idea that is fraught with problems, not just in regard to the Overman but in regard to reason.

The problems that are presented with the Overman include: the ability to transform oneself into something that one does not know about, how to gain something that one does not have the capacity to understand, and to what extent the Overman represents a better humanity than humanity now.

In order for a human to transform, evolve, or otherwise change into something else, that person must understand either what it is they are changing into, how they are changing, or that they are changing. Changing, or becoming, does not necessarily imply an understanding of the end result of this change but would require some limited understanding of the change. If a person is expected to change then there must be a will to change for that change to take effect. Zarathustra acts as the catalyst for this change but does not offer a full explanation of the benefits that this change would provide for humanity with.

The Eternal Recurrence is even more problematic than the Overman. The primary problem that arises from the Eternal Recurrence is the idea of free will. Free will is necessary for humanity to decide what decisions to make and these decisions enable the individual to construct a sense of self, a sense of individuality, a sense of purpose. This is taken away by Eternal Recurrence. If a person has already done something before and is always destined to repeat it then it absolves humans of the responsibility of their actions because, in essence, these are already predetermined actions. Some may counter that if one does not know of Eternal Recurrence then their actions and decisions would retain their value to that individual. While that individual might still see their actions as having purpose that would be a misconception on the part of the individual. The decisions that the person would make would have already been made the same way with the same deliberations an infinite number of times and would continue to be made in the same fashion for eternity.

Once free will has been excerpted from the equation and humans are no longer the motivator of themselves, what remains to be answered is: Who or what is that motivator? In his debasing of christian morality, it is the belief of the essayist that Nietzsche would object vehemently to the view of an omnipotent unmoving mover. If it is not some demagogic entity that controls the actions of the world then it would be some wispy metaphysical term that would, at the same time, allow control of the universe and yet be 'non-living'. This is untenable.

To compound the problem one must also inspect the individuality of humans. In a cyclical time scheme the same people would recur doing the same actions, at the same places, with the same thoughts. If this were the case then one must pose the question; In each new cycle is the individual a new individual doing the same things or is it the same self doing the same things? In both cases there are inconsistencies. If one becomes another, different, identical self then you would have created the same person at a different time, in a different cycle, thereby creating a person that looks, thinks, and acts the same but is separated by time from his former selfs. This would make him a 'different' self which would nullify the Eternal Recurrence by putting a different person at different points in time instead of the same person. If one were to retain their individuality and were to remain the same self throughout the different cycles of time then one must account for the loss of memory between different cycles. If in each new cycle the individual is the exact same individual then that same individual should retain the memories from each previous cycle. If those memories are not retained then it is a new person in each new cycle. They would be connected to each other only because each new biological entity is doomed to repeat the same actions as the last. There would not be any metaphysical link that would tie these individuals together into one self.

The final problem with the Eternal Recurrence lies in its beginning. For something to recur it must first occur. Much in the same way that in order to draw a circle with a pencil one must first set the pencil to paper. Once completed, this written circle will recur indefinitely in a cyclical fashion. The same logic can apply to the Eternal Recurrence. There must be a linear starting point to a cyclical view of time. Once that linear starting point is established the recurrence will continue indefinitely. But for everything to occur in an eternity backwards and an eternity forwards there can be no starting point. Everything must be as it has been and will be.

These fallacies with the Overman and the Eternal Recurrence come together in the form of free will. If free will is negated by the Eternal Recurrence, how should the regular man will himself to become the Overman? The choice to become an Overman is based on a time-line that is purely linear. Attempting to reconcile this to the cyclical time-line of the Eternal Recurrence is almost impossible. If becoming an Overman requires free will and the Eternal Recurrence suppresses free will to the point of non-existence, then one, the other, or both, must be false

The two theories of the Overman and the Eternal recurrence are not compatible. The Overman, the next logical evolutionary step for humans, and the Eternal Recurrence are logical entities in their own right but when added together they turn what were two logical arguments into two mutually exclusive arguments.

Bibliography

Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, and Thomas Common. Thus spoke Zarathustra. 3 ed. New York: Modern Library, 1917. Electronic Copy.