2013 AP LANGUAGE AND COMPOSITION ARGUMENTATIVE ESSAY

Ownership is a many faceted and generally misunderstood concept that has been elucidated by dozens of thinkers throughout western history. These thinkers tend to define ownership in relation to a sense of self that is even less understood than the ownership that supposedly proceeds it. In the following, the reader will see a western interpretation of ownership and its inherently meaningless inclusion with a sense of self.

            The average individual in the western world has been reared in a society that induces massive consumerism in all ages from toddlers to the aged. In the years that divide these two age groups the western citizen is coerced through societal pressure to have as much as possible. From this having of object foreign to the body does the idea of self emanates. Westerners tend, in general, to derive their sense of self from the objects around them. What they fail to realize is that the objects that are being bought are the ideas of someone else. The products, ranging from cars to toys, are the designs of some other person. While a person might own something in the legal sense of own a product, to derive self-worth or a sense of self from this item would be detrimental to the individual. It is detrimental in the idea that said person is merely owning a single copy of the item, rather than owning the concept of the item itself. The original designer would “own” the item in its most total sense and would, would more capably, derive a sense of self from that item. Even in this derivation of self-worth there remain problems.

            As Sartre points out in his ideas regarding his waiter in the café, the sense of self that one derives from items or occupations is dependent on how the individual interprets said items to reflect on their idea of self. Here it is the individual’s interpretation that creates a sense of self rather than the item itself. While this is certainly a more nuanced view of the problem, it does not solve the problem of things outside the self reflecting an actuality of the self. In Sartre’s view the human will to create a sense of self in dependent on the individual, as it should be. Where he digresses is in the acquiescence to outside forces forming a persons will. A western citizen, cultured and grown in a world dedicated to materialism and consumerism, has little choice in their concept of self. The outside forces are, at least according to Sartre’s line of thought, so burdensome that the individual in some sense relinquishes their own created individual for the image that a society drapes upon them. People, in general, feel content to fulfill the roles that are cast upon them. This therefore is not the way to define self and is implausible due to several factors.

            Chief among these factors is the willingness to let things outside the body define the body itself. If one holds a non-metaphysical understanding of the world and the things in it, (ie, that one rejects the dualistic nature of platonic forms and other such ‘informers’ of the world) then one must ask why something that is foreign to a body has the capability to define that body itself. The body, and hence the self as a product of said body, can only be defined by what is within. People would rather define themselves by what they are not, ie anything outside the body. This however is just as detrimental to the understanding of self. Definition of self through negation, ie what is outside the body, does not define what self is but rather what self it not. For example, the idea of self is contingent upon the body. If it is contingent upon the body for its primary existence then it should derive its existential meaning from the thing it is derivative of, in this case the body itself. This is much the case with many things. Take for instance the idea of a tree. When lumber is harvested from a tree the original idea, existential meaning, of the lumber was to sustain the tree. It has simply been repurposed. The repurposing of the tree into lumber does not nullify its primary existential meaning of supporting its original body. Therefore we can still define lumber as something that was in existence to support the tree it originally come from. The same can be said of the self. Its original purpose is to support the body in which it resides, almost as a soul. However, unlike a soul its existence is completely contingent on the body. As it is contingent on the body for both its creation and continued existence, the body must, by necessity provide the self its primary meaning.

Therefore, the sense of self that one cultivates can not be derived from anything external to the body. These externalities include but a certainly not limited to, the products and creations of a modern world, the ideas that one creates with external input rather that a priori. Sense of self is predicated on the body and therefore must be derivative of the body and the body alone.   

Foucault and Greek Sexuality (Paper)

Greek Sexuality

Greek sexuality in the ancient period can be seen in two distinct ways: that of Foucault as being devoid of sexual discrimination and that of John Boswell as being sexually defined. Between these two historians lay many examples pointing to a clear emphasis is the classical period on understood and socially constructed homosexual relationships that differed dramatically in clearly defined ways. These examples will be used to support John Boswell's illustration of sexuality in the classical Greek period as superior to Foucault's. There are two distinct areas within this sexuality that illustrate the existence of homosexuality in the classical period, in light of Foucault's insistence that this distinction is not possible. The first area is in overturning the assumption that passivity and activity in homosexual relations were necessarily different than in heterosexual ones. The second is in determining that age does define the appropriate context of a homosexual relationship.

Defining passivity and activity in the Greek classical world as a tool to be used in determining the socio-sexual determination of the participants involved is shaky at best. In need of even graver consideration is the defining of homosexual men as members of a lower class than heterosexual men based on the socio-sexual determination of activity and passivity. In his work The History of Sexuality Foucault paints a picture of homosexual men as being regarded as inferior to heterosexual men due to the perceived effeminacy that homosexuals are supposedly labeled with for their 'passive' acts. Farther from the truth Foucault could not get. Plato states in the Symposium,

“Those who love men and rejoice to lie with and be embraced by men are also the finest boys and young me, being naturally the most manly. The people who accuse them of shamelessness lie;...A clear proof of this is the fact that as adults they alone acquit themselves as men in public careers.”¹

Plato, one of the most accomplished and respected citizens of Athens, goes on to reason that homosexual soldiers would make the best army in the world.² To limit the understanding of sexuality in the classical world to socially relative terms such as activity and passivity is academically inaccurate when there is first hand accounts that clearly show the existence and celebration of the homosexual lifestyle. Even in Greek mythology there are myriad examples of homosexual action.³ The heterosexual love of ancient Greece was even displayed as something that was transcended by homosexual love. According to Boswell, ”The Attic law-giver Solon considered homosexual eroticism too lofty for slaves and prohibited it to them.”⁴

The other area in which Boswell draws a distinction between modern historical study and the actuality of the period is in the age discrimination that was purportedly applied to same sex relationships. Foucault portrays these relationships as occurring almost solely between young boys and old men. He seems to encourage the idea that same sex relationships (homosexuality) between two older men would result in those parties becoming social outcasts. However the opposite is actually true. Apart from the quotes above, Boswell also portrays this discrimination between age as against what Foucault is implying. The ageism here means that now Foucault is further distinguishing male on male sexuality not just as homosexual (a term which is supposed to subsume all other archetypes of male on male sexual relations but) act but now as a homosexual, age dependent act. For example, Euripides at age seventy was loved by and in love with Agathon.⁵ This is just one among many example that Boswell is able to provide. Furthermore, with respect to activity/passivity, there is no unambiguous document that defines age as a criterion for determining who was the one to be loved and who would love the beloved. Because of the lack of factual evidence, Foucault appears to be using later texts of the Middle Ages when attempting to explain the clearly homosexual-friendly reality of the classical Greek world.

In all Foucault is wrong in assuming that homosexual relationships in classical Greece were generally considered socially unacceptable with the only exception being based on a different age dynamic. Instead, classical Greece was a place of homosexual acceptance and even celebration with homosexual relationships being held, in many instances, in a higher regard than heterosexual relationships. Furthermore the idea that homosexual relationships were looked down upon is clearly dispelled by Boswell.

1Plato, Symposium. 192A cf. Phaedrus's Speech

2 Boswell, John. "Introduction." In Christianity, social tolerance, and homosexuality: gay people in Western Europe from the beginning of the Christian era to the fourteenth century. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. p 25.

3ibid (see Hercules)

4Boswell, Christianity et al. p 27

5Boswell, Christianity et al. p28 n.52   

Platonic Forms, Time, and Narrativity (Paper)

Platonic Forms, Time, and Narrativity

The following paper will argue that the act of unchanging being through time is incompatible with Plato's epistemological view of humans. The argument will be preceded with a brief introduction of three core ideas: Time, Platonic Ethics, Narrativity. As Plato argues in the Euthyphro, the idea of piety must be unchanging and constant in order for the idea of piety to carry any weight. If the idea of piety must remain the same regardless of time in order for it to be 'Piety' and therefore carry metaphysical weight, humans must be able to understand piety in its fullness, which is to say that humans must be in a state of Being in order to fully understand Piety^ª.

Time is a series of interlocking moments as realized through the human(s) perception. In Heraclitus' work, with which it seems that Plato would tend to agree^*, he presents an understanding of time in which you have four basic premises: 1) That ‘X equals X’ at T¹, meaning that X exists at a moment in time, hence being. 2) That time is infinitely divisible. 3) That, because time is infinitely divisible, you can have no ‘moments in time’ because for everything that you label a moment you will be able to further divide that moment. 4) That because you cannot have any moments in time at no time can ‘X equal X’ which results in a world not of being but in a world of becoming. While this is logically correct in the sense that all the premises accurately reflect a logical conclusion we are concerned with presenting the accuracy of these premises in the first. Heraclitus uses the metaphor of a river to explain his ideas about the constant flux of the world and the constant change that takes place. Plato notes that according to Heraclitus, it is impossible to step into the same river twice. By this he means that the river is constantly changing and that the person entering the river would never be able to step into the same water twice, for this water would have been removed down river and replaced by new water. In order for this to be possible he stands in support of an ever changing world with no definable moments in time. This ever-changing phenomenon is not without faults, among them assumptions that time takes place regardless of humans and disregarding the fact that time and its divisibility is contingent upon the constructs usefulness to humans.

In order for this ever-changing world to be rational it must be exhibited by physical matter held in a vacuum otherwise this pretense does not hold up well in the physical world. We shall start with the first premise. ‘X equals X’. This premise may come across as straightforward but must be explained here for it has implications on the rest of the argument. The statement of ‘X equals X’ is a statement of Being while ‘X does not equal X’ stands to mean that the item is nonexistent. Unlike statements of Becoming, Being implies that at a specified time, T¹, a physical item actually existed whether in a physical or metaphysical form. This is juxtaposed to a statement such as Heraclitus' that we live in an ever-changing world. His world view is a clear statement in favor of Becoming in which we take a relative existence dependent upon what is exerting power upon us and the setting that we find ourselves in. According to Heraclitus, at all times then we are simply Becoming with no moment of Being.

In collusion with relativity goes dependence. Time, in order to exist, is dependent on people. Because of this time is something that is created, by humans, in order to give shape and meaning to the world around us. In the absence of humans, time does not exist. As previously stated, time is imposed by humans on a situation either while it is happening or after it has happened, and occasionally both. We require time’s dependence upon ourselves in order to construct a world in which to live with relative ease and it is for this reason that moments in time exist. This usefulness of time, in planning events, remembering actions, and keeping schedules is the reason for its existence, not some ethereal notion. Time is because we say it is. Because we create time it is of the utmost usefulness to ourselves that we also enable us to note moments in time. These moments are also relative to those viewing them. A scientist may measure things in nanoseconds for his work but an hourly worker will measure theirs in minutes. Moments, as part of a time that we create, are created for their usefulness to us. The impact of time on Platonic Ethics, particular the acquirement of knowledge of the Forms, is massive as will be shown below. The view of time that is held by Plato, via Heraclitus, is incompatible with the epistemological system which Plato describes. Before an examination of these problems the reader will find a detailed description of The Theory of the Forms and Narrativity.

Platonic Ethics is having and holding ethical virtue and knowledge over a continuous time frame with the intent on becoming more knowledgeable over time as displayed in The Republic Book V-VI. The basic principle upon which The Theory of the Forms is based is participation, particularly participation in the the Forms themselves. The Forms are metaphysical traits that exist separately from humans but are present in the world through different objects' participation in them. For instance, a person is tall because they participate in the form of Tallness. In a more basic understanding, anything that can be denoted as a adjective, whether it is a color, size, or description of any kind, is a reflection of that things participation in said forms. In addition to these forms is an overarching Form of The Good, under which all forms fall. A trait of all forms are that they are forms of good. The way in which humans understand the various objects around them and, in some sense, their own being itself, is through their understanding of forms. These forms are discoverable through dialectic discussions with other intelligent beings. This dialectical discussion introduces problems for the Theory of the Forms.

If Forms, and therefore knowledge, are discoverable through discussion then these discussions must take place between two people during a specified period of time. This time that is spent in discussion must, by necessity, take place in a world of Becoming. The reason behind this necessity is simple. If neither individual has any prior knowledge of the form they are attempting to find, such as Piety, then the individuals must be changing as they attempt to reason a definition for Piety. This dialectics will be labeled R. The time that they spend reasoning will be labeled S^†. The moment when they discover the true definition of the form of Piety will be labeled D. Now during the period of R both participants are using knowledge that they already have. This knowledge constitutes part of their Being. During S the participants are therefore to be considered in a state of Being. The problem arises that once they discover the true definition of Piety and therefore have the Form of Piety they can no longer be the same selves. Upon realizing D the participants have either: A- passed into a state of becoming during which they learn the Form of Piety and then revert into a state of Being after having learned this or B- passed from one state of Being into a new state of Being without having a state of Becoming. Through the first way of thinking the participants have retained narrativity and see themselves as the same Beings that did not have D previously but now have D. In the second way of interpretation the participants must reject narrativity in favor of Being different people, one person when they did not know D and a different person now that they know D.

One of the most important ideas contained in The Theory of the Forms is the idea that once a person has begun to understand forms as forms themselves they are ethically required to help other beings, through dialectics, to understand these forms. Now if dialectics is the only way to discover forms and forms are what allow us to understand the intelligible things around us, it stands to reason that through dialectics all knowledge has the ability to follow.

Narrativity is the act of being the same 'self' through a continuous time frame. This is to say that a being with Narrative identity sees their body and mind as existing as the same entities at different moments in time. At T¹ X is X. At T² X is X. At T³ X is X and so on. One who constructs their identity of self through a narrative time line is the same being as they were last year, 10 years ago, etc. The opposite of a narrative construction of self is a non-narrative construct. In non-narrative constructions of the self the individual sees themselves as fundamentally different people at different times. For example at T¹ the person is X, at T² the person identifies as Y and at T³ the person identifies as Z. In each of these cases the person does not necessarily identify with their previous selves because their new self is not a narrative begun in the last self. So while a person with a narrative construction of self lives in a state of Becoming the non-narrative person lives in a state of Being. The narrative person is in a state of becoming because they are constructing different ideas of themselves at different points in time while still maintaining that they are the same person. The impact of this view is tied closely to time and change over time as will be seen below.

If we are not the same person over time then it is impossible for us to understand any unchanging idea while in a state of Becoming. Being held in a state of constant Becoming means that our bodies and ideas are subject to change at random. However, this change would subject Piety, or any other Form for that matter, to the corruption of change. Because of this the person would have to reject a narrative life in exchange for a life of pure moments. In these moments that individual would be in a state of Being rather than in a state of Becoming. This state of being would mean that they are a whole, unchanging individual at that point in time. However, this view would mean that any individual would only have so much time in which to utilize a particular form because once they were able to move to the next point along their narrative they would in effect become a different self. While becoming this different self does not necessarily mean that they would no longer understand the form of X, they would, of necessity understand it in a different way and therefore incompletely. This different way of understanding would corrupt the original understanding of any particular form. For example, X understands the form of Piety at T¹. The duration of X understanding Piety is dependent on the duration of T¹ due to his state of being being connected to T¹ in the same fashion. X is only in a state of Being for the duration of T¹ and then becomes Y at T². Once T² is reached Y now understands Piety at a different moment in time as a different Being enclosed in a state of Being that will also only last until the end of T². When T² becomes T³ then Y, who was once X, is now Z. This is the crux of the problem. While the Forms themselves do not change the human understanding of them, by necessity, must change. There are only a few ways in which humans have the ability to understand a form in its entirety. We must either remain in a constant state of Being or our understanding of the forms is not impacted by the way we change. As one will see in the following there are problems with both of these hypotheses.

The first hypothesis to overcome is that we exist in a constant state of Being. There are some very fundamental problems with remaining in a state of constant Being. The first problem one could typically expect to face is that of change. If one is in a state of constant Being then how do they change, either physically or mentally? Any person would be stuck in this state without motion, thought [because it requires motion to think], or change of any kind. Living in this state would be equivalent to non-existence. One would not be able to feel, think, grow, age, die. One would not have a will either, because of the need to think in order to will. So while one would be a physical being they would stand as a statue in a vacuum, neither feeling nor knowing.

The other possibility is that our understanding of the forms does not change in relation to our state of Being. This however is wrong. It is through our change in Being that we learn, either from a state of Being to a new State of Being or remaining in a constant state of Becoming. Remaining in a constant state of becoming will make our understanding of any Form relative to our state of being and the time at which we are in these states of being. However, if one was to adopt a truly non-narrative view of their self identity then they would still be faced with the problem of the statue as mentioned above.

In essence the reason why Plato's epistemological view of humans and the Forms that they strive for is incompatible with the actualities that he presents about the Forms is that humans, by necessity must construct themselves as narrative beings. This places the human in question in a state of constant Becoming. While in this state of Becoming the individual would not be able to comprehend the full truth of the Forms. This is due to the fact that their perception of the Forms changes depending on their current state of Becoming in much the same way that a person cannot step into the same river twice with the Form being the river one originally steps into. Therefore the only way to understand forms would be to exist solely in a state of Being like the Forms themselves do. However, as stated above, this is not possible for the Human to do and still retain their 'humanity'. The solution here would be to view time as a human construct that can be changed via thought. By this it is meant that people are able to conceptualize time into units that are most useful to them.^˜ By being able to conceptualize the self as a narrative Becoming construct that also has episodic bouts of pure Being would make it possible to understand Plato's Forms in their fullness without the problem of becoming statue-like. It would allow the individual to engage in moments of Being while still reverting to a narrativity of becoming when necessary.

Bibliography

Published Work

Hutchins, Robert Maynard. "Plato." In Great books of the Western World. [Private library] ed. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1987. Books 1-7.

Strawson, Galen. "Against Narrativity."Ratio XVII, no. 4 (2004): 428-452.

Unpublished Work

Eames, Jeremy. .”Biomedical Platonic Ethics”. Unpublished manuscript, University of South Florida (2012)

Eames, Jeremy. . “Heraclitian Time”. Unpublished manuscript, University of South Florida (2011)

ªHere piety is used as a stand in for every form. Whether Justice, Love, Tallness, etc.

*Fragment 41; Quoted by Plato in Cratylus . The further breakdown on time and becoming is attributed to Heraclitus and is understood that Plato agrees with Heraclitus and his world of becoming.

†It is labeled S so as to not confuse it with other designations for time in different scenarios presented in this paper.

˜The truthfulness of this is a matter best left for further debate.

The Eternal Recurrence and the Problem of the Overman (Paper)

The Eternal Recurrence and the Problem of the Overman

Of the multiple ideas presented in Friedrich Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the two most intellectually stimulating and encompassing pieces contained therein are the philosophical idea of the Übermensch, hereafter referred to as the Overman, and the Eternal Recurrence. In the following essay the reader will find a thorough analysis of these two themes as well as a comparison of their faults, philosophically, in relation to each other.

The first central idea in Nietzsche's work is presented in the First Part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra. According to Zarathustra the Overman is the next evolution in mankind [Nietzsche, p. 13]. Nietzsche presents Zarathustra to the readers as the archetype of the Overman. In the First Part Nietzsche presents Zarathustra with all the accoutrements that would accompany an Overman: intellectual prowess, oratory skills, love of mankind, reclusiveness. The Overman, being characterized by such skills and behaviors, is a level of humanity that has superseded the ability of regular humans, but also desires to raise the rest of humanity up to the level of Overman. In order for the regular man to become an Overman there is the task of BECOMING. Zarathustra describes man as,”...a rope stretched between the animal and the Overman – a rope over an abyss [Nietzsche, p. 14].” Zarathustra says that what has made man untenable is,”...not your sin – it is your self-satisfaction... [Nietzsche, p. 14].” In the later part of this essay the reader will see the difficulty of reconciling the becoming required to achieve the status of Overman with the Eternal Recurrence.

The second major idea presented through the mouth of Zarathustra is the idea of the Eternal Recurrence. In the Third Part, Zarathustra presents an idea that all things that now live have lived already and are doomed to live again [Nietzsche, pp. 105-108]. In the theme of eternal recurrence, Zarathustra contemplates a gateway to which he has walked along a path. He stops at the gateway and asks questions of a dwarf there,” This long lane backwards: it continueth for an eternity. And that long lane forward – that is another eternity” [Nietzsche, p. 106]. To this the dwarf replies, “All truth is crooked; time itself is a circle” [Nietzsche, p. 107]. The idea here being that what has happened is destined to happen again and again an innumerable amount of times. For Zarathustra to stand at this gateway he must have already stood at the gateway and will always stand at the gateway in the future. Nietzsche's conception of the Eternal Recurrence is a romantic idea that is fraught with problems, not just in regard to the Overman but in regard to reason.

The problems that are presented with the Overman include: the ability to transform oneself into something that one does not know about, how to gain something that one does not have the capacity to understand, and to what extent the Overman represents a better humanity than humanity now.

In order for a human to transform, evolve, or otherwise change into something else, that person must understand either what it is they are changing into, how they are changing, or that they are changing. Changing, or becoming, does not necessarily imply an understanding of the end result of this change but would require some limited understanding of the change. If a person is expected to change then there must be a will to change for that change to take effect. Zarathustra acts as the catalyst for this change but does not offer a full explanation of the benefits that this change would provide for humanity with.

The Eternal Recurrence is even more problematic than the Overman. The primary problem that arises from the Eternal Recurrence is the idea of free will. Free will is necessary for humanity to decide what decisions to make and these decisions enable the individual to construct a sense of self, a sense of individuality, a sense of purpose. This is taken away by Eternal Recurrence. If a person has already done something before and is always destined to repeat it then it absolves humans of the responsibility of their actions because, in essence, these are already predetermined actions. Some may counter that if one does not know of Eternal Recurrence then their actions and decisions would retain their value to that individual. While that individual might still see their actions as having purpose that would be a misconception on the part of the individual. The decisions that the person would make would have already been made the same way with the same deliberations an infinite number of times and would continue to be made in the same fashion for eternity.

Once free will has been excerpted from the equation and humans are no longer the motivator of themselves, what remains to be answered is: Who or what is that motivator? In his debasing of christian morality, it is the belief of the essayist that Nietzsche would object vehemently to the view of an omnipotent unmoving mover. If it is not some demagogic entity that controls the actions of the world then it would be some wispy metaphysical term that would, at the same time, allow control of the universe and yet be 'non-living'. This is untenable.

To compound the problem one must also inspect the individuality of humans. In a cyclical time scheme the same people would recur doing the same actions, at the same places, with the same thoughts. If this were the case then one must pose the question; In each new cycle is the individual a new individual doing the same things or is it the same self doing the same things? In both cases there are inconsistencies. If one becomes another, different, identical self then you would have created the same person at a different time, in a different cycle, thereby creating a person that looks, thinks, and acts the same but is separated by time from his former selfs. This would make him a 'different' self which would nullify the Eternal Recurrence by putting a different person at different points in time instead of the same person. If one were to retain their individuality and were to remain the same self throughout the different cycles of time then one must account for the loss of memory between different cycles. If in each new cycle the individual is the exact same individual then that same individual should retain the memories from each previous cycle. If those memories are not retained then it is a new person in each new cycle. They would be connected to each other only because each new biological entity is doomed to repeat the same actions as the last. There would not be any metaphysical link that would tie these individuals together into one self.

The final problem with the Eternal Recurrence lies in its beginning. For something to recur it must first occur. Much in the same way that in order to draw a circle with a pencil one must first set the pencil to paper. Once completed, this written circle will recur indefinitely in a cyclical fashion. The same logic can apply to the Eternal Recurrence. There must be a linear starting point to a cyclical view of time. Once that linear starting point is established the recurrence will continue indefinitely. But for everything to occur in an eternity backwards and an eternity forwards there can be no starting point. Everything must be as it has been and will be.

These fallacies with the Overman and the Eternal Recurrence come together in the form of free will. If free will is negated by the Eternal Recurrence, how should the regular man will himself to become the Overman? The choice to become an Overman is based on a time-line that is purely linear. Attempting to reconcile this to the cyclical time-line of the Eternal Recurrence is almost impossible. If becoming an Overman requires free will and the Eternal Recurrence suppresses free will to the point of non-existence, then one, the other, or both, must be false

The two theories of the Overman and the Eternal recurrence are not compatible. The Overman, the next logical evolutionary step for humans, and the Eternal Recurrence are logical entities in their own right but when added together they turn what were two logical arguments into two mutually exclusive arguments.

Bibliography

Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, and Thomas Common. Thus spoke Zarathustra. 3 ed. New York: Modern Library, 1917. Electronic Copy.

Platonic Biomedical Ethics (Paper)

The following paper was written for a Bio-medical ethics class at the University of South Florida under the guidance of Mr. Nathan Draluck. May it be informative to you. Enjoy.

Platonic philosophy provides a way for doctors and patients to operate on the same intellectual plane by providing a stable and apparent ethical system based on the 'form' of good and the derivatives of good actions. The doctor and patient will be shown to rationally be of the same biological entity. The differences between doctor and patient are merely physical and the ability is real for all patients to be doctors. Because of an overpoweringly strong current in the biomedical community, dualism^# has become smothered and doctors have become intensely concerned with biological treatment, even when it is harmful to intellectual activity. Due to this lack of understanding on the part of doctors they have effectively relegated the patient to a subjugated role in lieu of affording them any large autonomy.

This paper will focus predominately on the relationship between doctors and their patients through the prism of Platonic Ethics. Furthermore, the paper will show that when considered in a rational way, Platonic Ethics provides an approach that is both safe for the doctor and engaging for the patient.

The reader will find three imitative case studies in which will be found a clear argument for the use of platonic ideals in treating a patient. Case one will expound on The Theory of the Forms and attempt to explain the actual differences between the patient and the doctor. While this may seem clear on the surface, the true difference, I believe, is actually nonexistent. In the second case we will examine the dualistic nature of Platonism and how this is translated, or not, into biomedical ethics. In the final case we will examine the autonomy of both parties involved in medical decision making, the patient and the doctor, and attempt to discover how autonomous each party actually is by defining autonomy in a platonic sense.^*

The Platonic theory of the forms is a rationally sound argument for the understanding of things around us. In order to give the reader a basic understanding of the arguments that follow it is necessary to provision the reader with the basics of Platonism. The chief metaphysical quality for Plato is The Theory of the Forms.^¤ The following will explain in detail the fundamentals of Platonic philosophy which will then be expounded upon later.

The basic principle upon which The Theory of the Forms is based is participation, particularly participation in the the Forms themselves. The Forms are metaphysical traits that exist separately from humans but are present in the world through different objects participation in them. For instance, a person is tall because they participate in the form of Tallness. In a more basic understanding, anything that can be denoted as a adjective, whether it is a color, size, or description of any kind, is a reflection of that things participation in said forms. In addition to these forms is an overarching Form of The Good, under which all forms fall. A trait of all forms are that they are forms of good. The way in which humans understand the various objects around them and, in some sense, their own being itself, is through their understanding of forms. These forms are discoverable through dialectic discussions with other intelligent beings.

One of the most important ideas contained in The Theory of the Forms is the idea that once a person has begun to understand forms as forms themselves they are ethically required to help other beings, through dialectics, to understand these forms. Now if dialectics is the only way to discover forms and forms are what allow us to understand the intelligible things around us, it stands to reason that through dialectics all knowledge has the ability to follow. While these may seem like rather arcane ideas when presented in short, it is strongly suggested that the reader view the complete Platonic works for themselves.

This brief overview has the ability to directly improve the doctor-patient relationship through several means. If we understand that doctors have a larger degree of understanding than their patients then we must also concede that because of this the doctors have a larger responsibility to impart this knowledge to their patients. The doctor must be willing to impart information, through dialectics, to the patient to increase the patients understanding of any medical conditions, preconditions, possible and probable outcomes from procedures, etc. A failure to do this on the doctors part would result in actions that would not be in accordance with Platonic Metaphysics and therefore would not fall under the form of The Good but would rather be a privation of good.^* While the doctor would have the ethical obligation to inform the patient of knowledge in which the patient was lacking, it is also the responsibility of the patient, in pursuit of knowledge, to attempt to discover, through dialectics, as much knowledge as possible. In doing so, medical knowledge would naturally be incorporated into this knowledge. From these interactions one may gather that through the form of the Good anything that transpires between a patient and doctor will be for the benefit of both parties as long as both parties willingly engage in Good, Selfless acts in accordance with Platonic Metaphysics.

Following this, one must make the argument that in these situations the parties involved have an overt obligation to do certain things. In order to arrive at this point the reader must first realize the following: that both the doctor and the patient are human beings who are capable of knowledge. If this supposition holds true then we can infer that there are obligation that each party must meet. The doctor has an obligation to search for knowledge in the same manner as the patient has an obligation to search for knowledge. With this primary obligation the reader can draw, among others, two distinct conclusions: That the patient should take into account the doctors suggestions for treatment only if they are unwilling to complete their own studies on the subject matter and, if this is the case, paternalism is to be considered opted into at this point in time. In cases in which the patient is unwilling, while possessing the ability to, attain the same knowledge as the doctor they have themselves mandated that their relation with their doctors will be a paternalistic one. While paternalism carries a heavily weighted connotation of loss of power, or immediate and unwarranted deference, it carries the heavier connotation of the inability to use dialectics. Therefore, paternalism should not be viewed as inherently negative but rather negative due to its association with non-dialectics.

Drawing upon The Theory of the Forms as outlined above, the reader shall find a discussion of Platonic Dualism, and how this is translated, or not, into biomedical ethics, in the anteceding argument. The first necessity in order to do this is a more thorough understanding of Platonic Dualism itself. Like most dualistic philosophies Platonic Dualism is a dualism of the mind an the body in which the mind is always superior to the body. In Platonic Dualism the terms for mind are many and varied but this paper will use only two interchangeably: mind and soul. Upon the death of the body the soul/mind are loosed to live among the forms and the forms are the highest ecstasy the mind can have both while contained in a body and upon the souls release from said body. Of paramount importance in this dualism is the idea that one should not deliberately kill ones body in order to release ones souls. To do so is an act of both desperation and an act demonstrating the pinnacle of a privation of good. While suicide is not acceptable in Platonic Dualism the body should always be treated in an inferior manner while the mind should be treated in a superior fashion. The reasoning behind this is that it is through our minds that we control our bodies therefore making our bodies a tool for our minds.

The dualism presented above has a very real connection with contemporary medicine. While this type of dualism is still extremely relative in contemporary society, many doctors focus their attention solely on the bodily ailments of their patients even when it can be detrimental to the patients mental health. The focal point of modern medicine is to prevent the death of the body through natural causes and this death is viewed as the ultimate item to beat. However when viewed realistically through a Platonic prism the death of the body can actually be a good act because it frees the mind from the constraints of the body. This is not to say that it is not worthwhile to treat the body, for it is worthwhile but only to the extent that it helps the mind. Put another way, the mind should be the focal point of medical procedures, while the body should only be treated in a fashion that neither hinders the mind nor makes the mind powerless. The example we can use to illustrate this is hypothetical in nature but revealing none the less.

A patient who has experienced some worldly calamity is in a coma and there is evidence that the brain has retained its capacity to function. The body of the patient is kept alive through a life support system. The doctors have the ability to bring the patient out of the coma but doing so will have repercussions on the mental state of the patient. Modern medicine will tell us that the patient is alive but comatose and therefore removing the comatose state is of the utmost importance even if this will result in a diminishing of the patients intellectual capabilities. From a Platonic viewpoint this is unacceptable. While the removal of the comatose state would certainly benefit the patient, it would only be of benefit if said removal was non-damaging to the intellectual abilities of the person in question. Therefore the 'Good' act in this case would be to let the patient either: remain in a coma or die of natural causes and thus have their soul separated from their body thereby preserving the intellectual capacity of that being.

The final sense in which Platonic Metaphysics has a role in Biomedical Ethics is in the sense of autonomy. The Platonic Sense of autonomy can be summed up in 4 points:

1. Autonomy is based upon the mind and its power over the body. ^*
2. Autonomy is for the mind to be free from coercive outside influence.
3. To be autonomous one must understand that actions that are willed through the body from the mind affect other individuals, who also have autonomy.
4. To be autonomous one must be cognizant of the fact that their mind has the capacity to learn any number of forms and their derivatives that are present in material objects.^*

Through these four points the reader can draw several conclusions about the roles of patients and doctors in autonomous relationships.

In order for a patient to be autonomous the mind must have power over the body and therefore the patient must have an active mind.^* A patient must understand their medical conditions and should only assent to things that they understand. If they do not understand things then they are willing themselves into a paternal relationship. This is acceptable but must be actively recognized by the patient. This lack of understanding is a lack of participation in dialectics on the part of the patient as the patient has the same mental ability as anyone else to learn. This understanding is predicated on the patient having an active mind.

Several of the obligations that are required of patients are also required of doctors, namely that they possess an active mind, among others. In addition every doctor should understand their patient's medical conditions and only recommend things that they understand. If they do not understand things then they are responsible for informing their patients of such. This is acceptable but must be actively recognized by both the doctor and the patient. One of the most damaging things that a doctor can do to impede upon the patients sense of autonomy is coercing a patient into a therapy that is not agreed to by the patient unless that patient has willingly approved of a paternalistic method of treatment with said doctor. If the patient has knowingly entered into a paternalistic relationship with the doctor then any treatment that the doctor orders that is beneficial to the patient is acceptable.

To display the way autonomy would work in a Platonic sense we turn again to our coma patient. In this thought experiment the coma patient is alive in the body but dead in the mind. In this situation the patient would not be able to control their body as they have no mind of which to speak. Without the use of their mind the patient would lack any type of autonomy and if autonomy is central to person-hood then this coma patient could not be considered to be a person. While they are still a human being genetically and they have a living body, the lack of a fit mind robs them of all right to person-hood. The doctor would not be able to treat the patient due to the fact that without a mind they are not human and therefore cannot understand their condition nor their treatment and could not consent to any given medical approach.

In conclusion the doctor-patient relationship can be effectively governed by a thorough understanding of Platonic metaphysics as they apply to Biomedical Ethics. The doctor and patient are both capable of the same knowledge and patients who willfully lack the knowledge of a doctor are knowingly committing themselves to a paternalist relationship with their physician. In addition, the modern medical approach places an inordinately large emphasis on the bodily health of their patients and not nearly enough of doctors resources are dedicated to ensuring the intellectual activity of a patient is preserved. Finally, the autonomy of a patient must be preserved at all times in order to serve the best interests of the patient.

#Body-mind dualism.

*In this sense autonomy would involve the definition of 'self/soul' as opposed to the definition of biological entity, further expanding upon the dualistic nature of Platonic philosophy.

¤A much broader understanding of The Theory of the Forms can be found in other works by Plato: The Republic, Phaedrus, Parmenides, and Sophist among others.

*Borrowed from Aquinas, Summa Theologica .

*Refer to Platonic Dualism

*Refer to Platonic Theory of the Forms

*Here active is used to mean fully functional

'Run, Lola Run' An Analysis (paper)

A classic look at German existentialism, Run Lola Run clearly portrays the type of philosophy Germany is famous for. The live in the moment style and the way that the three different scenes are portrayed clearly illustrates the philosophical concept known as "all possible worlds" in which individual actions can drastically change the way that a world turns out to be. What some people have termed to be moral tendencies in the film are little more than various outcomes of different events. In no way does the story take a moral stance. That really is the genius of the movie. It simply states what life could be and makes no assumptions about what life actually is. Within this framework we will observe the ways in which the film uses realism and anti-realism, verisimilitude, characterization, and flashbacks to present its subject matter in a curiously fun way.

The film itself, as mentioned above, exudes philosophical musings. The director has broken the film into three different but equally important pieces. That of acceptance, that of anger, and that of acceptance. In the first run Lola takes the path of accepting that her father is leaving her and her mother and proceeds to find many already robing the convenience store. She plays a mostly passive character throughout the first run not making thing happen but rather allowing things to happen to her. In the second run she becomes angry with her father and proceeds to rob the bank that he works for in order to save her boyfriend. In this role she is working in an active capacity to save her boyfriend instead of allowing things to happen to her. The third and final run plays into the theme of 'amor fati'^*. In this run Lola surrenders her ability to either be worked upon or to work upon the world. In accordance with the philosophy of 'amor fati' she allows fate to decide her future, as is evident in the way that she trusts the roll of the roulette wheel in the casino. The common theme throughout each of these encounters is not whether or not her actions or lack of actions are moral or not but whether she achieves her desired outcome or not. Next we will inspect how realism and anti-realism factor into this film.

The idea of having a film that is split into three different scenes about the same story may seem strange, and it is. The way the movie makes up for this is through its use of, for the most part, a realistic setting and actions that the ordinary viewer might find plausible for the situation that Lola is in. For instance, the entire film is actually filmed in Berlin, the actual setting for the movie. For the main core of German viewers they would be presented with a location that they would have had at least passing familiarity with. This might reinforce the way in which they view the film as recounting a possible day in the life of Lola and Manni. On the flip side of this however are the strange nuances that are added to the film, such as the ability for Lola to break glass with her voice when she is in a rage. While this is not a characteristic most people would have the director chose to include it in the film. The pressing question is: why? Even thought he director had gone through the effort to present most other facets of the movie as being realistic he added in this particular attribute to Lola. This was possibly the directors way of saying that the film, as much as it reflects reality does not, in fact, hold to be the absolute reality. In other words the film is meant to not show a realistic setting. The genius of the film however is to reconcile both of these realities into something comprehensible to the viewer. Here verisimilitude proves particularly adept.

Reconciling the outlandish qualities of the film to everyday viewers expectations of real life is a somewhat tall order. The way in which I will argue for verisimilitude in this particular film might seem to be out of the ordinary to some, and they would be correct. The easiest way to convince an audience that something is like their actual life to to provide them with a way to relate to the film. Normally this might be construed as making a film as realistic as possible and to siphon out any unrealistic elements. While this is perfectly acceptable the director of this film seems to arrive at the same believability through a completely opposite route. By this it is meant that the inclusion of certain unrealistic elements actually improves its verisimilitude. The particular example that fits here is that of the animated sequences. When a person views these sequences they are fully aware that the images they are viewing are not of live actors but of animated figures. Despite this fact I believe it is entirely plausible for a viewer to understand more about the character, and therefore characterization, of these more two dimensional characters simply because the viewer interprets that there is less information to know about an animated character than about a full-fledged person. Because of this idea they feel as though they can connect more with a character that they can more easily understand. Therefore the idea of verisimilitude is effective through a non-real medium.

The final idea that is presented in the movie is that of flashbacks. The reader, however, should take caution here as the flashbacks in this film are not your typical flashbacks. Instead of the traditional flashback the viewer is presented with a 'rerun'. Essentially the viewer watches the same film three times. In the case of 'Run, Lola Run' the flashback turns out to be a completely different reality for the characters. The greatest part about this is the fact that in parts of the film inklings of these other realities are still manifest in the minds of the participants. A prime example is when Lola has the gun while she is robbing the bank. She seems to remember, as if from some other life that the safety on a gun must be turned off in order to uses. In her current reality though she seems to actively remember this and turns the safety of the gun off. In this way the different runs in the film are flashbacks in that they are remembering another scene in the film.

In all the film 'Run, Lola Run' uses several great film tools to set it apart from other movies of its kind. The philosophical undertones of the film encourage the viewer to actively think about the film and the meaning behind it, if there is one, while actively watching the film. The way the director uses realism and anti-realism at the same time engraves a strange image in the viewers mind when used in conjunction with the flashbacks. However all of these are made to seem more familiar to the viewer when combined with verisimilitude and the interesting 2D characterization. The importance of the movie in world-wide cinema is even more important however than the actual film itself. The way in which this film allows a person to view film opens up a large Pandora-like box for other directors to explore and therefore the legacy of the film, while great in and of itself, it eventually outshone by the brilliance of the directors use of his professions paradigms.

*“Love of Fate” (from the Latin)

Existentialism (Quick Word)

A short excerpt from my paper on the movie Run, Lola Run! about the existential aspects of the film. Enjoy.

A classic look at German existentialism, Run Lola Run clearly portrays the type of philosophy Germany is famous for. The live in the moment style and the way that the three different scenes are portrayed clearly illustrates the philosophical concept known as "all possible worlds" in which individual actions can drastically change the way that a world turns out to be. What some people have termed to be moral tendencies in the film are little more than various outcomes of different events. In no way does the story take a moral stance. That really is the genius of the movie. It simply states what life could be and makes no assumptions about what life actually is.

The Ontological Argument (Paper)

This is a short essay written for the class of Dr. Thomas Williams, University of South Florida, Medieval Philosophy and involves the response of Anselm to his critic Gaunilo in his work The Proslogion. From this argument stems the current ontological view. Enjoy.

    Anselm's reply to Gaunilo, as illustrated in the Prosologion is, in effect, a restating of his earlier remarks in a slightly clearer manner. By this it is meant that the interpretation of Gaunilo's objections that Anselm uses portrays Gaunilo as saying, “... That something than which a greater cannot be thought is in the understanding no differently than from that which cannot be be thought according to the true nature of anything at all...{and} that it does not follow (as I say it does)that that than which nothing greater can be thought exists in reality as well simply because it exists in the understanding...”¹In response to this thesis on the part of Gaunilo, Anselm replies that, “Furthermore, if it can be thought at all, it necessarily exists.”² Therefore the reader can assume that according to Anselm, any thing can be thought of of which nothing greater can be thought, that it must exist.

   

   The philosophical principle behind this lays in many different sources but Anselm argues that, in accordance with divine simplicity, if you can think of God (i.e. that than which nothing greater can be thought) he must exist have always existed because otherwise you would have brought the idea of God into existence thereby giving God a beginning. However God is the essence of Beginninglessness because he is a perfect being. Therefore if God does not have a beginning then God would have existed before you thought of Him, thereby making Him a Necessarily Existent being.

   Anselm goes further in saying that it is absurd to think that than which nothing greater can be thought could exist only in the understanding. In order for that than which nothing greater can be thought to exist in the understanding it exists there because it is understood, comprehensible. He supports this by saying that if the idea exists in the understanding then it must have been thought. For a person to have something that they do not understand in their understanding is a negation. From there he lays out the idea that if it were to exist solely in the understanding then it is not that than which nothing greater can be thought but rather that than which something greater can be thought.

    

   At this juncture he refers to the lost island idea. He says that it is impossible for someone to think of a lost island, the most perfect island in existence, as not existing because when it is described to a person they understand what it is. If they were thinking of something that than which nothing greater can be thought, they would be thinking something that cannot be thought. Therefore he says they would in essence not be thinking at all.³ Because of this that than which nothing greater can be thought cannot be thought not to exist.⁴

   Anselm's final argument in support of his idea for the existence of that than which nothing greater can be thought to exist in reality, he says that the argument that that than which nothing greater can be thought is impossible to think due to our lack of understanding is not correct. He points out that when we think of good we compare goodness based on things that are familiar to us and that we understand. We use these understandings to formulate the highest good. He says that the same thing applies when we think of anything in relation to God.

1Hyman, Arthur, James J. Walsh, and Thomas Williams. "Proslogion." Philosophy in the Middle Ages: the Christian, Islamic, and Jewish traditions. 3rd ed. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 2010. 161-181. Print. p. 176a

2ibid

3Ibid pp 177b

4ibid

Dabbling in Plato (Paper)

My latest philosophy paper, based on Book VII of Plato's Republic. Enjoy.

Statement: Socrates argues that we should force the guardians who have seen the realm of the forms (outside the cave) to go back and rule even if they do not want to do so.

Thesis: It is morally corrupting to both a person and the state to force a participant to engage in an activity against their freewill when the cost to benefit ratio of that activity has not been clearly established.

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      In Plato's Republic Socrates examines what it means for a philosopher, long trapped in the world of the physical, to attain passage into the realm of the forms. Socrates paints a picture of civilization taking place in a cave where all one can see are the shadows on the wall until they are elevated above the mundane and are allowed to glimpse this spiritual realm of the forms. Yet upon this attainment of true knowledge they are to be forced back into the cave, back into the darkness to enlighten and to rule those they had previously left behind. According to Socrates they would force both themselves and each other back into the darkness because they would be spending the majority of their time in the world of the forms anyway. Their journey back into the darkness would be for the mutual good of everyone but most of all for the state. They would facilitate the state and through the state the increase in general 'good'.

      There are problems that arise however when Plato speaks of forcing people into the cave after being able to behold the world of the forms. This could lead to emotional and physical violence amongst those privy to the actual forms. There is also a problem with facilitating 'good'. If you are bring good to the people who have not seen the world of the forms then what were they experiencing prior to a philosophers return to govern them? It seems that the de facto answer would be a form of 'bad'. However, if all the forms are under the 'umbrella form', so to speak, of good, then bad would not exist negating the need for the philosophers who new of the realm of the forms to return to the physical world to rule others. In addition to this there is a problem with any person witnessing a physical ascent into a metaphysical realm. Where would this person 'be'? If he were speaking of the realm of the forms as a purely mental state then the philosopher who is aware of the forms would live in a dichotomy. On the one hand they would see themselves as the souls they truly were but on the other hand they would still need to partake of the physical realm to attend to the physical necessities of living. Otherwise they would waste away until they died. In addition to these rather large problems there is also the problem of who would decide that someone had actually visited the realm of the forms. In the event of someone claiming to have attained the knowledge of the forms but not, and them being made the ruler of the city would have drastic consequences both for the state as a whole but also for the individual citizens of the city be they economic, physically injurious, of mentally harmful consequences.

      While these are serious problems the issue that is really at stake is that of personal liberty and to what extent the greater good should take precedent over personal freedom. If philosophers were to force each other to return to the darkness are they not acting in a manner that is inconsistent with the 'good' by forcing their collective will upon someone who resists them.

      In terms of ruling the city, Plato also assumes that the rulers would all come to the correct and best way to rule the city. If one philosopher was to rule the city after being forced back into the physical world, it is not a stretch to think that they might themselves fall back into an emotional way of thinking by way of being forced into something they do not wish to do. While in this emotional state the ruler could make laws that punish those that are responsible, at least in some way, for him being forced back into the physical world, namely the non-philosophers. In a worst case scenario the ruler could essentially create a state that benefits him alone and morph the state into a dictatorial style of government that reduces the population to slavery at best and death at worst.

      Many of the points raised previously might have a suitable answer, at least from Socrates' perspective. In response to the enlightened philosophers becoming harmful to each other one might say that because of their learning they would not see any benefit to society or each other in partaking in it and therefore would abstain from it.

      The idea that by not having good in the physical world and therefore being left with bad is a more difficult point to answer. If all the forms are part of the form of good, then the form of bad must be so also. But if the form of bad is also good then it would not be bad, it would be good thereby making the idea of bad good. This in essence negates anything 'bad' in the world and would further negate the need for the philosophers to return to the physical world. It also presents the problem of having an idea that does not have an opposite and therefore becomes the normal. Without the bad, the good just wouldn't be good in the same sense that most people think of it. The best way to resolve this conundrum is to place the bad outside of the conventional idea of the theories of the forms. Socrates might possibly say that bad is created by the gods as a way for mortals to distinguish between things, or something to that effect. There really is not a good answer to this question.

      The question of a person actual ascending into a metaphysical world is not so much of a problem. The allegory that Socrates provides is exactly that, an allegory. The actual ascent would be induced in the mental state of the participant. Hence his being forced back into darkness would be more of a forcing him to partake in everyday affairs.

      The problem of deciding who had actually attained the knowledge of the forms and therefore is fit to be forced back to rule can be explained by the forms themselves. If a person is fit to rule then the form of governance, or something similar to it, would be evident in their character, and evident to those who recognized the forms, i.e. the philosophers. If the person were attempting to fake this knowledge that would also be apparent.

      This same reasoning can be used to explain the way that philosophers would react to being forced back into the physical realm. Because philosophers are taught to reject the emotions in favor of the rational they would see themselves returning to the physical world as beneficial and therefore for 'good' and would not reject the expectation of having to do so. Their personal liberty would not be at issue as they would want to do the most good they could for the state and would not be emotionally attached to liberty. They would most likely view their bodies as simply instruments for their minds to operate through and would see the sensibility of subjecting themselves to physically governing.

The way that each philosopher would rule would also be nearly identical. If the forms were dictating what the good thing to do is then the philosopher ruling the current city would view that as the best possible choice. Any other philosopher would see the same choice as the best because each rule and law would be taken directly from the form of the good.

      The real problem with forcing people back into the physical world is deciding exactly how they have to improve it/rule it. The form of the good would already be prevalent in the world because of the lack of a form of bad. Until a satisfactory answer is found to this question the idea of sending enlightened philosophers back into the physical world to rule is unacceptable. The good that they are capable of is not what is in question but rather whether or not the amount of good they could do in an already good world would be significant enough to force them into something that they might be unwilling to partake in. Unless a cost to benefit ratio is established, the violation of person liberties/freedoms, whether a grievance of the participant or not, sets a bad example for the remainder of the population. This idea could possibly lead to the enslavement of the free citizens to work exclusively for the state to better the lives of everyone in the state, but you are still compromising the welfare of the few for the many, which is morally negligent on the part of the state.