2013 AP LANGUAGE AND COMPOSITION ARGUMENTATIVE ESSAY

Ownership is a many faceted and generally misunderstood concept that has been elucidated by dozens of thinkers throughout western history. These thinkers tend to define ownership in relation to a sense of self that is even less understood than the ownership that supposedly proceeds it. In the following, the reader will see a western interpretation of ownership and its inherently meaningless inclusion with a sense of self.

            The average individual in the western world has been reared in a society that induces massive consumerism in all ages from toddlers to the aged. In the years that divide these two age groups the western citizen is coerced through societal pressure to have as much as possible. From this having of object foreign to the body does the idea of self emanates. Westerners tend, in general, to derive their sense of self from the objects around them. What they fail to realize is that the objects that are being bought are the ideas of someone else. The products, ranging from cars to toys, are the designs of some other person. While a person might own something in the legal sense of own a product, to derive self-worth or a sense of self from this item would be detrimental to the individual. It is detrimental in the idea that said person is merely owning a single copy of the item, rather than owning the concept of the item itself. The original designer would “own” the item in its most total sense and would, would more capably, derive a sense of self from that item. Even in this derivation of self-worth there remain problems.

            As Sartre points out in his ideas regarding his waiter in the café, the sense of self that one derives from items or occupations is dependent on how the individual interprets said items to reflect on their idea of self. Here it is the individual’s interpretation that creates a sense of self rather than the item itself. While this is certainly a more nuanced view of the problem, it does not solve the problem of things outside the self reflecting an actuality of the self. In Sartre’s view the human will to create a sense of self in dependent on the individual, as it should be. Where he digresses is in the acquiescence to outside forces forming a persons will. A western citizen, cultured and grown in a world dedicated to materialism and consumerism, has little choice in their concept of self. The outside forces are, at least according to Sartre’s line of thought, so burdensome that the individual in some sense relinquishes their own created individual for the image that a society drapes upon them. People, in general, feel content to fulfill the roles that are cast upon them. This therefore is not the way to define self and is implausible due to several factors.

            Chief among these factors is the willingness to let things outside the body define the body itself. If one holds a non-metaphysical understanding of the world and the things in it, (ie, that one rejects the dualistic nature of platonic forms and other such ‘informers’ of the world) then one must ask why something that is foreign to a body has the capability to define that body itself. The body, and hence the self as a product of said body, can only be defined by what is within. People would rather define themselves by what they are not, ie anything outside the body. This however is just as detrimental to the understanding of self. Definition of self through negation, ie what is outside the body, does not define what self is but rather what self it not. For example, the idea of self is contingent upon the body. If it is contingent upon the body for its primary existence then it should derive its existential meaning from the thing it is derivative of, in this case the body itself. This is much the case with many things. Take for instance the idea of a tree. When lumber is harvested from a tree the original idea, existential meaning, of the lumber was to sustain the tree. It has simply been repurposed. The repurposing of the tree into lumber does not nullify its primary existential meaning of supporting its original body. Therefore we can still define lumber as something that was in existence to support the tree it originally come from. The same can be said of the self. Its original purpose is to support the body in which it resides, almost as a soul. However, unlike a soul its existence is completely contingent on the body. As it is contingent on the body for both its creation and continued existence, the body must, by necessity provide the self its primary meaning.

Therefore, the sense of self that one cultivates can not be derived from anything external to the body. These externalities include but a certainly not limited to, the products and creations of a modern world, the ideas that one creates with external input rather that a priori. Sense of self is predicated on the body and therefore must be derivative of the body and the body alone.   

Paint with Black Ink (Poem)

Recently, I have undertaken a project to write a longer poem one day at a time. Each evening I will be adding one stanza to this poem. You can find the stanzas first on twitter @RedArmyFactionX.

Paint the world with black ink
Drawn with a needle through your soul
Rainbows in shades of gray
Sunsets of omniscient grief

And as you lay me down to sleep
Don't fix a smile upon my face
Set a look of despair and grief
And let me leave this cold dark place

Let me seek the glimmering light
Shed of these thoughts lighter than air
Let me paint a new and darker night
Forgetting my face lined with care

Response to Boccaccio's Decameron

            Boccaccio's Decameron tracks the travels of ten people fleeing the death that is brought to Florence in the form of the Bubonic Plague in 1348. The moral tone in his work displays the reaction to The Plague that ordinary people had. This reaction was not simply to The Plague but rather a reaction to what The Plague caused, death. In juxtaposition to this, my work, Welcome Aboard the Ship, is an embrace of Death and an acceptance of the inevitable end. Other than the different metaphorical approach that Boccaccio and I take towards death there are two other important areas which deserve special attention: the modern advantages that we have over death and the difference in the form of the work.

            In the Decameron, Boccaccio goes into the moral and social implications of The Plague on the travelers. He says, “Husbands left wives, brothers left sisters, mothers left children.”[1] This differs from my own interpretation of death as something that, instead of separating families can ultimately, potentially unite them. This ultimately stems from the period in which either of us are reflecting. From Boccaccio's point of view The Plague was surrounding and engulfing much of Southern Europe leaving death and devastation in its wake. Boccaccio's society lacked insight into the medical causes of the plague. In short Boccaccio writes about death but as death only as a guise of fear. Compared to Boccaccio's society, ours looks positively tame. Technologically, we are able to discover and effectively fight almost every major disease. While this is dramatic, it does not necessarily make our society less fearful of death in general.

            Where I believe we have a larger advantage is philosophically. Fortunately for us we are able to reflect on 150 years of existential philosophy. This philosophy puts our mental state at more of an advantage and is reflected in my poem. Awaiting Death as a friend to walk with is drawn from Ingar Bergman's The Seventh Seal, a profoundly existential and critically acclaimed Swedish film of the 1950's. The ship metaphor itself is drawn from Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra. It is used to illustrate the wonder with which many hold the sea. To wonder what is on the other side of the waves has been a question that has plagued mankind for millennium. In my poem I strive to make the ocean a soothing idea for the average person. Instead of something to fear it becomes something to recline and relax in. By attaching this to death as an idea and intertwining the two, I strive to eliminate the fear with which many people hold death. This is directly opposite of Boccaccio. In his work it feels like the menace of death is always around the next corner. Instead of focusing on when they might die they busy themselves in storytelling to while away the days. This is opposed to confronting the terrible reality of their time and coming to terms with death. In effect it is a form escapism. This escapism is supported in the introduction of the Decameron,

            “Having withdrawn to a comfortable abode where there were no sick persons, they locked               themselves in and settled down to a peaceable existence...They refrained from speaking to                               outsiders, refused to receive news of the dead or sick, and entertained themselves with music                  and whatever other amusements they were able to devise.” [2]

            The second large difference between Boccaccio's Decameron and my work is the form in which it is presented. Boccaccio uses a frame style within his work to encompass several dozen stories. The reason he does this is to clearly lay out moral and ethical ideas. In addition to being about the Black Death, the Decameron is also about the moralities of the day. The structure allows Boccaccio to efficiently launch several tirades against the church and other powerful institutions of his day. Aside from this it also gives him the ability to cover a wide range of topics in a single work. Contrary to this, my work has taken the form of a poem in which the meter and occasional rhyme lend more emotional weight to the words and creates, hopefully, an overarching effect from beginning to end. The effect is supported by the refrain in the poem,

“Don't be scared my lad, don't be scared my lad

of what might lie beyond

its for him to know, the black dressed man

and for us to ponder so”

The refrain helps to instill a sense of calm and to reduce the cloud of fear that generally surrounds death.

            In all my poem strives to create a calm feeling towards death. In order to accomplish this I have chosen the form of a poem with a refrain that puts the readers mind at ease. This is in direct opposition to the Decameron by Boccaccio. In his work he uses short stories to make a social and moral point and clearly shows people who have recoiled from the embrace of death. The differing attitudes towards death as presented in these two works can be attributed to the different time periods in which they were written and by the people who were possessed to write them.  

           

---

[1]Aberth, John. The Black Death: the great mortality of 1348-1350 : a brief history with documents. Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2005.Boccaccio pg 77

[2] Aberth, John. The Black Death: the great mortality of 1348-1350 : a brief history with documents. Boston, MA: Bedford/St. Martin's, 2005.Boccaccio pg 75

Walking To Our Graves

Walking To Our Graves

I wander around the whole world through

Seeking the answer, looking for you

You glide past and tickle the air

Leaving it smelling faint yet fair

We walk through the world loosing this smell

Locked in a prison, locked in our hell

Speaking you whisper, surrenders within

She left your side, creating your problem therein

Another day over another day strong

You enter my mind, Its for you that I long

Abandon the life, and the pain that you feel

Leave it behind, forward you heal

No more stumble in life, your doin alright

Head held high we trudge on ahead

Trudge on ahead

You see a reflection lost in uncertainty

You long to chase it but know its just me

Turning away, away in futility

I'm sorry my love its not meant to be

No, its not meant to be

Another day over another day strong

You fleet though  my mind, Its for you that I long

Your breeze has swept on out over the bay

saving itself for an October day

That last that I saw you were doin just fine

Happy and thoughtless to the sadness of mind

The sadness of mind

Aways down the road our fates could cross

What to do then but call it all lost

Wander alone down highways long gone

Loves irony, loves autobahn.

Another day over but not another day strong

You're leaving my mind, leaving just another sad song

Sitting there thinking through the whole year

No more regret and no more fear

Stepping to meet life on uncertain ground

Proving that love can remain unfound

Never again will my heart be played

No beacon re-lit no no fire remade

This lost souls alone, alone on the waves

And every day he walks closer yea closer to his grave

We all walk closer, yea closer to our graves

Not day over nor another day strong

You flee from my mind, for you I can't long

On Epistemology

On Epistemology

How do we know what it is that we know and how do we find what it is that we do not know but wish to know?

There are several ways to rationalize what we know, or rather what we think we know. We could attribute that knowledge that we have to Divine Providence, much like Augustine and Aquinas have done. We can admit that we know nothing, such as Plato/Socrates did. We can strive to understand through love and infinite resolution as Kierkegaard did. But it seems as though all these views of epistemology are devoid of a real answer. In the following I will survey three ways in which we think that we learn and provide a philosophical look at some of the most common way that we learn.

We learn by being taught, either by parental figures, or by professional teachers, or by peers. In this case we assume that our parents/teachers/peers have learned these things from someone or somewhere else. It may have been a book for instance. In this book are ideas that were written by its author. The author there for must have learned it from their teacher/parent/peer, and so on ad infinitum. This present the problem of an eternal regression. In order for there to be knowledge there must be a genesis. This starting point is either the starting point for all knowledge or the hope that there is a starting point for all knowledge, as knowledge cannot simply spring into existence. Or maybe it can.

Perhaps the genesis of knowledge is not in the idea that there is a definitive starting point, but in the fact that there is an infinite set of genesis points for knowledge. Here I mean the individual. Now many will say that the set of individuals is not infinite but is in fact finite. While at any one time there is a finite set of individuals in existence, there is the potential for an infinite number of individuals to exist in the future, hence an infinite amount of genesis points for knowledge albeit spread throughout time. So how does the individual become a genesis point for knowledge? We shall see.

The Darwinian idea of Natural Selection is a prime example of creating something new out of something that is, thereby creating something new. While the critical will ask where the first thing then came from, this essay will not attempt to answer that questions as it is best to let theologians and physicists to argue about it. We can imply that through our existence here there must have been a ‘first thing’ and this will be enough to work with without bothering with where it came from. Therefore, this first thing had the ability to create and to change itself over time. Much like a fish might grow larger fins to swim faster; this first thing would adapt and change over time to attempt to achieve a status of steady stability which is what all things desire, as opposed to chaos.

Given the penchant for thought that all the individuals have, the idea of self-genesis of knowledge is a completely justifiable thing in the sense that individuals, who have the power to adapt to their environments, would also have the ability to both adapt their ideas the encompass different ideas within them, and the genesis of new ideas, either new in totality or being derivative of older ideas. Throughout the course of western philosophy we see this happening. Commenting and critiquing another thinker, or another person in general, allows the individual to create new ideas. In fact it is the spark that drives all greater thought. You must look no farther than the Socratic Method that was applied in the Polis of Athens during the age of Pericles and the Thirty Tyrants.  In asking questions the dialecticians are refining a thought or idea. In refining this idea they are intrinsically changing the idea. If you change an idea then it is no longer the same idea. It has become a new and separate idea. This idea then has the ability, based on its interpretation and based on debates and discourses, to propagate more ideas. And so on in an exponential factor to the effect of . A single idea has the ability to spawn an infinite amount of subsequent ideas, much the same as an individual has the capacity to spawn a single idea or thought that will perpetuate into a long string of ideas. This only begs the question as to what spawns the original idea. 

Here is where Darwinism is applied. Much as the fish is able to grow larger fins to swim faster, so to the ability for humans to evolve the power to create ideas. To be the genesis of ideas. We are Creators in every sense of the word, giving ideas life, then the products of ideas a reality. With this ability the propagation of ideas is guaranteed. As long as there are people, there are ideas. We have the power to create knowledge and the power to change knowledge. Quite a scary spectacle. 

Foucault and Greek Sexuality (Paper)

Greek Sexuality

Greek sexuality in the ancient period can be seen in two distinct ways: that of Foucault as being devoid of sexual discrimination and that of John Boswell as being sexually defined. Between these two historians lay many examples pointing to a clear emphasis is the classical period on understood and socially constructed homosexual relationships that differed dramatically in clearly defined ways. These examples will be used to support John Boswell's illustration of sexuality in the classical Greek period as superior to Foucault's. There are two distinct areas within this sexuality that illustrate the existence of homosexuality in the classical period, in light of Foucault's insistence that this distinction is not possible. The first area is in overturning the assumption that passivity and activity in homosexual relations were necessarily different than in heterosexual ones. The second is in determining that age does define the appropriate context of a homosexual relationship.

Defining passivity and activity in the Greek classical world as a tool to be used in determining the socio-sexual determination of the participants involved is shaky at best. In need of even graver consideration is the defining of homosexual men as members of a lower class than heterosexual men based on the socio-sexual determination of activity and passivity. In his work The History of Sexuality Foucault paints a picture of homosexual men as being regarded as inferior to heterosexual men due to the perceived effeminacy that homosexuals are supposedly labeled with for their 'passive' acts. Farther from the truth Foucault could not get. Plato states in the Symposium,

“Those who love men and rejoice to lie with and be embraced by men are also the finest boys and young me, being naturally the most manly. The people who accuse them of shamelessness lie;...A clear proof of this is the fact that as adults they alone acquit themselves as men in public careers.”¹

Plato, one of the most accomplished and respected citizens of Athens, goes on to reason that homosexual soldiers would make the best army in the world.² To limit the understanding of sexuality in the classical world to socially relative terms such as activity and passivity is academically inaccurate when there is first hand accounts that clearly show the existence and celebration of the homosexual lifestyle. Even in Greek mythology there are myriad examples of homosexual action.³ The heterosexual love of ancient Greece was even displayed as something that was transcended by homosexual love. According to Boswell, ”The Attic law-giver Solon considered homosexual eroticism too lofty for slaves and prohibited it to them.”⁴

The other area in which Boswell draws a distinction between modern historical study and the actuality of the period is in the age discrimination that was purportedly applied to same sex relationships. Foucault portrays these relationships as occurring almost solely between young boys and old men. He seems to encourage the idea that same sex relationships (homosexuality) between two older men would result in those parties becoming social outcasts. However the opposite is actually true. Apart from the quotes above, Boswell also portrays this discrimination between age as against what Foucault is implying. The ageism here means that now Foucault is further distinguishing male on male sexuality not just as homosexual (a term which is supposed to subsume all other archetypes of male on male sexual relations but) act but now as a homosexual, age dependent act. For example, Euripides at age seventy was loved by and in love with Agathon.⁵ This is just one among many example that Boswell is able to provide. Furthermore, with respect to activity/passivity, there is no unambiguous document that defines age as a criterion for determining who was the one to be loved and who would love the beloved. Because of the lack of factual evidence, Foucault appears to be using later texts of the Middle Ages when attempting to explain the clearly homosexual-friendly reality of the classical Greek world.

In all Foucault is wrong in assuming that homosexual relationships in classical Greece were generally considered socially unacceptable with the only exception being based on a different age dynamic. Instead, classical Greece was a place of homosexual acceptance and even celebration with homosexual relationships being held, in many instances, in a higher regard than heterosexual relationships. Furthermore the idea that homosexual relationships were looked down upon is clearly dispelled by Boswell.

1Plato, Symposium. 192A cf. Phaedrus's Speech

2 Boswell, John. "Introduction." In Christianity, social tolerance, and homosexuality: gay people in Western Europe from the beginning of the Christian era to the fourteenth century. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980. p 25.

3ibid (see Hercules)

4Boswell, Christianity et al. p 27

5Boswell, Christianity et al. p28 n.52   

Platonic Forms, Time, and Narrativity (Paper)

Platonic Forms, Time, and Narrativity

The following paper will argue that the act of unchanging being through time is incompatible with Plato's epistemological view of humans. The argument will be preceded with a brief introduction of three core ideas: Time, Platonic Ethics, Narrativity. As Plato argues in the Euthyphro, the idea of piety must be unchanging and constant in order for the idea of piety to carry any weight. If the idea of piety must remain the same regardless of time in order for it to be 'Piety' and therefore carry metaphysical weight, humans must be able to understand piety in its fullness, which is to say that humans must be in a state of Being in order to fully understand Piety^ª.

Time is a series of interlocking moments as realized through the human(s) perception. In Heraclitus' work, with which it seems that Plato would tend to agree^*, he presents an understanding of time in which you have four basic premises: 1) That ‘X equals X’ at T¹, meaning that X exists at a moment in time, hence being. 2) That time is infinitely divisible. 3) That, because time is infinitely divisible, you can have no ‘moments in time’ because for everything that you label a moment you will be able to further divide that moment. 4) That because you cannot have any moments in time at no time can ‘X equal X’ which results in a world not of being but in a world of becoming. While this is logically correct in the sense that all the premises accurately reflect a logical conclusion we are concerned with presenting the accuracy of these premises in the first. Heraclitus uses the metaphor of a river to explain his ideas about the constant flux of the world and the constant change that takes place. Plato notes that according to Heraclitus, it is impossible to step into the same river twice. By this he means that the river is constantly changing and that the person entering the river would never be able to step into the same water twice, for this water would have been removed down river and replaced by new water. In order for this to be possible he stands in support of an ever changing world with no definable moments in time. This ever-changing phenomenon is not without faults, among them assumptions that time takes place regardless of humans and disregarding the fact that time and its divisibility is contingent upon the constructs usefulness to humans.

In order for this ever-changing world to be rational it must be exhibited by physical matter held in a vacuum otherwise this pretense does not hold up well in the physical world. We shall start with the first premise. ‘X equals X’. This premise may come across as straightforward but must be explained here for it has implications on the rest of the argument. The statement of ‘X equals X’ is a statement of Being while ‘X does not equal X’ stands to mean that the item is nonexistent. Unlike statements of Becoming, Being implies that at a specified time, T¹, a physical item actually existed whether in a physical or metaphysical form. This is juxtaposed to a statement such as Heraclitus' that we live in an ever-changing world. His world view is a clear statement in favor of Becoming in which we take a relative existence dependent upon what is exerting power upon us and the setting that we find ourselves in. According to Heraclitus, at all times then we are simply Becoming with no moment of Being.

In collusion with relativity goes dependence. Time, in order to exist, is dependent on people. Because of this time is something that is created, by humans, in order to give shape and meaning to the world around us. In the absence of humans, time does not exist. As previously stated, time is imposed by humans on a situation either while it is happening or after it has happened, and occasionally both. We require time’s dependence upon ourselves in order to construct a world in which to live with relative ease and it is for this reason that moments in time exist. This usefulness of time, in planning events, remembering actions, and keeping schedules is the reason for its existence, not some ethereal notion. Time is because we say it is. Because we create time it is of the utmost usefulness to ourselves that we also enable us to note moments in time. These moments are also relative to those viewing them. A scientist may measure things in nanoseconds for his work but an hourly worker will measure theirs in minutes. Moments, as part of a time that we create, are created for their usefulness to us. The impact of time on Platonic Ethics, particular the acquirement of knowledge of the Forms, is massive as will be shown below. The view of time that is held by Plato, via Heraclitus, is incompatible with the epistemological system which Plato describes. Before an examination of these problems the reader will find a detailed description of The Theory of the Forms and Narrativity.

Platonic Ethics is having and holding ethical virtue and knowledge over a continuous time frame with the intent on becoming more knowledgeable over time as displayed in The Republic Book V-VI. The basic principle upon which The Theory of the Forms is based is participation, particularly participation in the the Forms themselves. The Forms are metaphysical traits that exist separately from humans but are present in the world through different objects' participation in them. For instance, a person is tall because they participate in the form of Tallness. In a more basic understanding, anything that can be denoted as a adjective, whether it is a color, size, or description of any kind, is a reflection of that things participation in said forms. In addition to these forms is an overarching Form of The Good, under which all forms fall. A trait of all forms are that they are forms of good. The way in which humans understand the various objects around them and, in some sense, their own being itself, is through their understanding of forms. These forms are discoverable through dialectic discussions with other intelligent beings. This dialectical discussion introduces problems for the Theory of the Forms.

If Forms, and therefore knowledge, are discoverable through discussion then these discussions must take place between two people during a specified period of time. This time that is spent in discussion must, by necessity, take place in a world of Becoming. The reason behind this necessity is simple. If neither individual has any prior knowledge of the form they are attempting to find, such as Piety, then the individuals must be changing as they attempt to reason a definition for Piety. This dialectics will be labeled R. The time that they spend reasoning will be labeled S^†. The moment when they discover the true definition of the form of Piety will be labeled D. Now during the period of R both participants are using knowledge that they already have. This knowledge constitutes part of their Being. During S the participants are therefore to be considered in a state of Being. The problem arises that once they discover the true definition of Piety and therefore have the Form of Piety they can no longer be the same selves. Upon realizing D the participants have either: A- passed into a state of becoming during which they learn the Form of Piety and then revert into a state of Being after having learned this or B- passed from one state of Being into a new state of Being without having a state of Becoming. Through the first way of thinking the participants have retained narrativity and see themselves as the same Beings that did not have D previously but now have D. In the second way of interpretation the participants must reject narrativity in favor of Being different people, one person when they did not know D and a different person now that they know D.

One of the most important ideas contained in The Theory of the Forms is the idea that once a person has begun to understand forms as forms themselves they are ethically required to help other beings, through dialectics, to understand these forms. Now if dialectics is the only way to discover forms and forms are what allow us to understand the intelligible things around us, it stands to reason that through dialectics all knowledge has the ability to follow.

Narrativity is the act of being the same 'self' through a continuous time frame. This is to say that a being with Narrative identity sees their body and mind as existing as the same entities at different moments in time. At T¹ X is X. At T² X is X. At T³ X is X and so on. One who constructs their identity of self through a narrative time line is the same being as they were last year, 10 years ago, etc. The opposite of a narrative construction of self is a non-narrative construct. In non-narrative constructions of the self the individual sees themselves as fundamentally different people at different times. For example at T¹ the person is X, at T² the person identifies as Y and at T³ the person identifies as Z. In each of these cases the person does not necessarily identify with their previous selves because their new self is not a narrative begun in the last self. So while a person with a narrative construction of self lives in a state of Becoming the non-narrative person lives in a state of Being. The narrative person is in a state of becoming because they are constructing different ideas of themselves at different points in time while still maintaining that they are the same person. The impact of this view is tied closely to time and change over time as will be seen below.

If we are not the same person over time then it is impossible for us to understand any unchanging idea while in a state of Becoming. Being held in a state of constant Becoming means that our bodies and ideas are subject to change at random. However, this change would subject Piety, or any other Form for that matter, to the corruption of change. Because of this the person would have to reject a narrative life in exchange for a life of pure moments. In these moments that individual would be in a state of Being rather than in a state of Becoming. This state of being would mean that they are a whole, unchanging individual at that point in time. However, this view would mean that any individual would only have so much time in which to utilize a particular form because once they were able to move to the next point along their narrative they would in effect become a different self. While becoming this different self does not necessarily mean that they would no longer understand the form of X, they would, of necessity understand it in a different way and therefore incompletely. This different way of understanding would corrupt the original understanding of any particular form. For example, X understands the form of Piety at T¹. The duration of X understanding Piety is dependent on the duration of T¹ due to his state of being being connected to T¹ in the same fashion. X is only in a state of Being for the duration of T¹ and then becomes Y at T². Once T² is reached Y now understands Piety at a different moment in time as a different Being enclosed in a state of Being that will also only last until the end of T². When T² becomes T³ then Y, who was once X, is now Z. This is the crux of the problem. While the Forms themselves do not change the human understanding of them, by necessity, must change. There are only a few ways in which humans have the ability to understand a form in its entirety. We must either remain in a constant state of Being or our understanding of the forms is not impacted by the way we change. As one will see in the following there are problems with both of these hypotheses.

The first hypothesis to overcome is that we exist in a constant state of Being. There are some very fundamental problems with remaining in a state of constant Being. The first problem one could typically expect to face is that of change. If one is in a state of constant Being then how do they change, either physically or mentally? Any person would be stuck in this state without motion, thought [because it requires motion to think], or change of any kind. Living in this state would be equivalent to non-existence. One would not be able to feel, think, grow, age, die. One would not have a will either, because of the need to think in order to will. So while one would be a physical being they would stand as a statue in a vacuum, neither feeling nor knowing.

The other possibility is that our understanding of the forms does not change in relation to our state of Being. This however is wrong. It is through our change in Being that we learn, either from a state of Being to a new State of Being or remaining in a constant state of Becoming. Remaining in a constant state of becoming will make our understanding of any Form relative to our state of being and the time at which we are in these states of being. However, if one was to adopt a truly non-narrative view of their self identity then they would still be faced with the problem of the statue as mentioned above.

In essence the reason why Plato's epistemological view of humans and the Forms that they strive for is incompatible with the actualities that he presents about the Forms is that humans, by necessity must construct themselves as narrative beings. This places the human in question in a state of constant Becoming. While in this state of Becoming the individual would not be able to comprehend the full truth of the Forms. This is due to the fact that their perception of the Forms changes depending on their current state of Becoming in much the same way that a person cannot step into the same river twice with the Form being the river one originally steps into. Therefore the only way to understand forms would be to exist solely in a state of Being like the Forms themselves do. However, as stated above, this is not possible for the Human to do and still retain their 'humanity'. The solution here would be to view time as a human construct that can be changed via thought. By this it is meant that people are able to conceptualize time into units that are most useful to them.^˜ By being able to conceptualize the self as a narrative Becoming construct that also has episodic bouts of pure Being would make it possible to understand Plato's Forms in their fullness without the problem of becoming statue-like. It would allow the individual to engage in moments of Being while still reverting to a narrativity of becoming when necessary.

Bibliography

Published Work

Hutchins, Robert Maynard. "Plato." In Great books of the Western World. [Private library] ed. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica, 1987. Books 1-7.

Strawson, Galen. "Against Narrativity."Ratio XVII, no. 4 (2004): 428-452.

Unpublished Work

Eames, Jeremy. .”Biomedical Platonic Ethics”. Unpublished manuscript, University of South Florida (2012)

Eames, Jeremy. . “Heraclitian Time”. Unpublished manuscript, University of South Florida (2011)

ªHere piety is used as a stand in for every form. Whether Justice, Love, Tallness, etc.

*Fragment 41; Quoted by Plato in Cratylus . The further breakdown on time and becoming is attributed to Heraclitus and is understood that Plato agrees with Heraclitus and his world of becoming.

†It is labeled S so as to not confuse it with other designations for time in different scenarios presented in this paper.

˜The truthfulness of this is a matter best left for further debate.